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PARTI
PERSONAL STUDY PROGRAMME PROPOSAL
PERSONAL STUDY PROGRAMME PROPOSAT.
Psvch. D. in Clinical Psychology;
Conversion Programme
Name: Margaret Norma Morrison 
Date of Registration: 10/ 1/ 95 
Registration number: 3414302
1. Overall aims and objectives
Overall aim: To attain greater professional competence in order to enhance the 
contribution of clinical psychology to health care.
Overall objective: To produce a portfolio of study, practice and research that 
will demonstrate increased competence in each of these areas.
2. Academic
2.1 Aims: - To increase academic competence in two specialist areas of clinical
psychology to develop the services offered by the department.
- To use the wider knowledge to improve clinical competence.
- To share increased knowledge with members of the department and 
other related professions.
2.2 Objectives: To complete two academic reviews as follows:
1) An overview of the cognitive-behavioural model of obsessive- 
compulsive disorder and treatment outcome studies based on that 
model.
2) Comparison of the efficacy of cognitive therapy delivered individually 
or in a group: a review of the literature.
2.3 Rationale:- It will be useful to add to both my personal knowledge and that
of the department in these areas. There has been a noticeable increase 
in the number of clients being referred for treatment for obsessional 
compulsive disorder in the last year, no doubt due to increased publicity 
about the problem. Improving knowledge in this area may provide the 
opportunity to offer a specialist clinic for this disorder.
- The second topic will provide an overview of whether help should be 
offered in groups or individually, not only for this disorder but for others 
such as depression, social anxiety, generalised anxiety, panic disorder, 
etc. In the present financial climate within hospital trusts, there is 
obviously a preference for treatments which can be delivered to more 
than one patient at a time which helps to shorten waiting lists.
2.4 Plan: To read as widely as possible on these subjects and also to attend any
relevant lectures or workshops on them. The timescale to which I hope 
to keep would be three months for each academic component.
3. Clinical
3.1 Aims:- To demonstrate professional competence.
- To enhance professional competence by critical reflection on practice.
3.2 Objectives:-To document original training course (1962-1964) and
research component as this is no longer available.
- To document continuing professional development for the period of the 
Psych. D. Conversion course.
- To describe current clinical duties, focussing particularly on the work 
undertaken with the obsessional- compulsive treatment research team at 
the University of Oxford Department of Psychiatry. This will include a 
description of current treatment methods, illustrated by clinical examples,
and consideration of their effectiveness and difficulties they present.
3.3 Rationale: This will provide an opportunity to reflect on clinical practice
and assess the relationship of treatment methods to theory.
3.4 Plan:- To describe cognitive-behavioural treatment for obsessional
ruminators and ritualisers.
- To identify which are the more successful interventions.
- To illustrate with relevant clinical examples or case histories.
- To link practice to theory through reference to relevant literature.
4. Research
4.1 Aims: To increase research competence.
4.2 Objectives: To develop a research dossier based on a study of different 
measures of both general and obsessional symptomatology, of importance 
and control of intrusive thoughts, and of responsibility appraisals and 
responsibility assumptions. Results would be compared for groups of 
obsessional patients, anxiety controls and normal controls.
- To complete a statistical analysis of the results to demonstrate which 
questionnaires differentiate most effectively between groups. It might then 
be possible to put together a more compact battery which could be used as 
an instrument which allows a more accurate focus of interventions, an 
indicator of progress in therapy and a predictor of outcome.
4.3 Rationale: Recent research into cognitive factors in OCD has suggested that 
obsessions are cognitive intrusions, the content of which patients interpret 
or appraise negatively as potentially harmful to themselves or to others whom 
they are responsible to protect. To prevent harm they neutralise their thoughts 
by engaging in thought rituals or compulsive behaviours (Salkovskis 1989; 
Salkovskis & Warwick, 1985). Cognitive theory suggests that underlying 
these negative appraisals and intrusions is a cluster of faulty beliefs relating 
to responsibility, doubt and control. It is to be expected that modification of
these beliefs would enhance therapeutic efficiency. Accurate identification of 
these beliefs could provide the basis for more accurate interventions, a measure 
of therapeutic progress and a predictor of outcome. A comparison of 
obsessionals and normals on measures of beliefs would also test some of 
the propositions of the cognitive model.
4.4 Plan: A selection of measures would be assembled, such as the SCID for 
OCD to make the initial clinical diagnosis, the MOCI, Spielberger State and 
Trait Anxiety, BAI, BDI, and three inventories of obsessional beliefs. These 
would be given to groups of obsessionals, anxiety disorders and normals. 
The data obtained from this would then be analyzed by analysis of variance 
to look at the difference between groups, and by factor analysis to find which 
items load higher on certain factors. Data for this would be gathered in the 
first year of the course and analyzed and written up in the next.
5. Portfolio outline Contents of the portfolio will be as follows :
1. Personal study programme proposal.
2. Academic reviews.
2.1 An overview of the current state of cognitive-behavioural treatment of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder.
2.2 Comparison of the efficacy of cognitive therapy delivered individually 
or in a group - a review of the literature.
3. Clinical dossier.
4. Research dossier. A study if obsessive-compulsive measures in obsessive- 
compulsive disorder.
6. Suggestions for training events.
6.1 Pain.
6.2 Cognitive marital therapy.
6.3 Brief solutions therapy.
Signed.................................................................. Participant
Signed.............................................................. Course Director
PART II
ACADEMIC DOSSIER
ACADEMIC REVIEW (I)
An overview of the cognitive-behavioural model 
of obsessive-compulsive disorder and treatment 
studies based on that model.
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Abstract.
This paper presents an overview of the current state of cognitive-behaviour 
therapy for obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD). The cognitive model of OCD 
will be considered, including the role of increased sense of responsibility and 
investigations into intrusive thoughts in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations. The implications of these findings for clinical practice and the 
resulting developments in cognitive -behavioural treatment for OCD will be 
discussed. Studies carried out so far on the efficacy of cognitive therapy for 
OCD will be evaluated.
Introduction.
The prognosis for obsessional patients, though still often regarded as "difficult" 
patients to treat, has improved immensely in recent years. In the early 1960's, the 
outlook for them was pessimistic indeed. Treatment recommended by a 
psychiatric textbook of the time consisted of "superficial psychotherapy, 
environmental readjustment and perhaps some sedation" and went on to say that 
those who had depressive symptoms in addition to their obsessions ought to have 
convulsive therapy. When all else had failed preffontal leucotomy should be 
considered (Mayer-Gross, Slater & Roth, 1960). However, the first signs of a 
successful therapeutic approach appeared in Meyer’s (1966) suggestion of aiming 
for modification of the patients’ expectations of feared consequences. By the 
1970's, the work of researchers such as Foa (1979), and Rachman (1976,1978) 
had established that the treatment of choice for obsessive-compulsive disorder 
was behavioural, with emphasis on exposure and response prevention (ERP). This 
had been the most promising approach with evidence of a 60-85% improvement 
rate (Foa, Grayson, Steketee, Doppelt, Turner & Latimer, 1983). Psychodynamic 
psychotherapy had not made any impact on the problem. Medication, in the form 
of anti-depressants, (usually Clomipramine) has had some success but mainly 
with patients who were showing some level of depression as well as obsessional 
difficulties (Rachman, Cobb, Grey, MacDonald, Mawson, Sartory and Stem, 
1979). Also the beneficial effects of the dmg tend only to be maintained while the 
patient was on it. So there was a tendency not to look beyond ERP though it was 
not the answer to all obsessional problems. There were still some who showed no 
improvement - patients with over-valued ideas, those who were concurrently 
depressed, and those who had obsessions with no overt rituals (Foa,1979). Partly 
in an attempt to find some way to help these "treatment failures", and partly 
because by its very nature obsessional-compulsive disorder might be regarded as 
the cognitive disorder "par excellence", attention started to turn to what might be 
added to behavioural treatment by cognitive therapy or by using cognitive therapy 
alone. Cognitive therapy would logically seem to be the treatment of choice for 
a disorder characterised by intmsive thoughts. A cognitive explanation of 
obsessive - compulsive disorder was put forward by Beck in 1976, but this looked 
at the content of obsessional thought and its relation to danger in the form of
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doubt or warning. This, however, does not differentiate between anxiety and 
obsessional-compulsive disorder because other anxious patients experience this 
too. McFall and Wollersheim (1979) proposed four types of irrational thoughts, 
the first two related to perfectionism, the third to an exaggerated sense of 
responsibility and the fourth to thought/action fusion (i.e. the belief that thinking 
is as bad as doing and that thinking something increases the likelihood of it 
happening). The range of theories to explain OCD is discussed at greater length 
in the introduction to the research dossier.
Cognitive model of obsessive-compulsive disorder.
The usual pattern of obsessional problems is that the individual has an intrusive 
thought which he or she finds upsetting or distressing which is then followed by 
neutralising behaviour, i.e. reducing their distress by engaging in some 
compulsive thought or action. Any mental or overt activity that stops the 
obsessional thought is a form of neutralising (Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau & 
Gagnon, 1992; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1994). Persistent reassurance seeking 
shown by many obsessional patients is also a way of neutralising in that, by 
spreading the responsibility, they avert the possibility of being blamed by oneself 
or others. In addition, avoidance of the objects or situations which trigger these 
obsessions becomes common. To have intrusive thoughts is not in itself 
abnormal. Studies have shown that this is common in non-clinical as well as 
clinical populations (Rachman & de Silva 1978, Salkovskis & Harrison 1984, 
Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon & Thibodeau, 1991). Surprisingly, the content of 
these intrusions in the non-clinical population was apparently indistinguishable 
from the content of clinical obsessions. However, the main difference between 
the two groups appears to be that the non-clinical sample finds these thoughts 
easily dismissable, whereas in the obsessional group, these thoughts are followed 
by feelings of distress and attempts to neutralise. The reason for the differing 
reactions would appear to lie in the negative automatic thoughts experienced by 
the obsessional patient as a result of his* appraisal of these thoughts (Salkovskis,
1985). In Beck's terms, the intrusive thoughts may be activating pre-existing 
dysfunctional schemata which result in negative automatic thoughts. In 
obsessional patients, as opposed to anxious or depressed patients, these thoughts 
appear to relate specifically to beliefs about being responsible for harm to oneself 
or others, and to be seen to be to blame for this harm (Salkovskis & Warwick, 
1988). This triggers off attempts to ensure that this consequence is averted by 
means of neutralising. Neutralising may take the form of performing an action 
(ritual) or repeating a thought or phrase in one's mind. Examples are 
hand-washing to avoid "contamination", checking switches or taps repeatedly to 
avoid being responsible for harm coming to themselves or another, or having to 
"unthink" a thought which involved harm befalling a friend or relative.
* (For convenience, "he" and "his" will represent "he/she" and "his/her" 
throughout.)
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Often the negative thought revolves around responsibility for even just having the 
thought, e.g. "I'm wicked to have had this thought." or "Having the thought is as 
bad as the deed." Unfortunately, the attempt at "putting right" or neutralising not 
only results in an increase in the strength and firequency of the thoughts 
(Salkovskis & Campbell 1993), but it deprives the patient of the opportunity to 
disconfirm his expectations of catastrophe. This in turn leads to further 
avoidance, repeated neutralising and reassurance seeking, and the patient 
becomes more anxious and depressed. This model was expressed 
diagrammatically by Salkovskis & Warwick (1988) (Fig. 1).
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Previous experience 
Actual experience and perception of:
i) problems caused by "not taking sufficient care about what you do".
ii) specific teaching in codes of conduct and responsibility.
Formation of dysfunctional assumptions 
Critical incident
4/
Activation of assumptions
4.
“Normal" obsessions become the focus of responsibility
4/
Negative automatic thoughts/imagery
i/
"Neutralising'V'putting right" develops extensively
i
OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE DISORDER
BEHAVIOURAL 
avoidance and self-impose 
restrictions 
repeated checking 
repeated washing 
reassurance seeking
COGNITIVE 
cognitive rituals 
attention to negative 
information 
helplessness 
preoccupation 
rumination
PHYSIOLOGICAL
increased arousal 
changes in bodily function 
sleep disturbance
AFFECT
anxiety
depression
discomfort
Figa
Cognitive model of the development of O.C. disorder 
(From Salkovskis and Warwick, 1988.)
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Intrusive thoughts.
It may be helpfiil to examine some of the components of obsessional experience 
more closely. Clark and Purdon (1992) define intrusive thoughts as "Unpleasant 
and unwanted thoughts, images or impulses that are attributed to an internal 
origin, intrude into consciousness, and are perceived as unrealistic, ego-dystonic 
and difficult to control." Some examples of these thoughts would be:
"I cannot remember checking that the gas taps are off, and we might all be 
gassed."
"If I don't wash that work-top again, there might still be germs on that 
work-top, and my family will become seriously ill."
"I could strangle my baby while he is asleep."
These are all things that might occur in normal individuals without leading to a 
serious disturbance. Why is it then that obsessional patients are unable to dismiss 
these thoughts in a similar fashion? As previously mentioned in the description 
of the cognitive model of obsessive-compulsive disorder, Salkovskis (1985) sees 
this original intrusive thought as a stimulus which provokes negative automatic 
thoughts. He suggests that intrusions only cause distress when they have a 
particular meaning for the individual e.g. "I must be a bad person to have 
thoughts like that." "If I can think things like that, I am capable of doing it." 
Previous studies (Rachman & de Silva 1978, Salkovskis & Harrison 1984) 
showed that discomfort ratings for the intrusions were not affected by frequency 
or type of intrusion, but by ease of dismissal. This also supports the hypothesis 
that it is how the obsessional patients appraise the thoughts in comparison to 
normals which makes the difference. More recently, Salkovskis (1994,1995) has 
said that the difference between normal intrusive thoughts and obsessions lies not 
in the occurrence or controllability of the thoughts but in the way obsessional 
patients interpret intrusions as an indication that they may be responsible for 
harm or its prevention. This is similar to the cognitive hypothesis of panic (Clark,
1986), in which panic attacks are said to occur as a result of misinterpretation of
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normal bodily sensations. Most normal people experience those sensations, but 
only those who have an enduring tendency to misinterpret them in a catastrophic 
fashion will have repeated panic attacks. Similarly, intrusive thoughts are normal, 
but only people who have an enduring tendency to misinterpret their own mental 
activity as indicating "responsibility" will experience the pattern of discomfort 
and neutralising characteristic of OCD (Salkovskis, 1994; Rachman 1997). This 
misinterpretation would also include memory for actions and doubts. These 
individuals believe that the occurrence of such cognitions indicate personal 
responsibility for distressing harm unless corrective action is taken. The appraisal 
links the intrusive thought with both distress and the occurrence of neutralising 
behaviour. If the appraisal solely concerns harm or danger without an element of 
responsibility, then the effect is more likely to be anxiety or depression, 
(Teasdale, 1983). The appraisal of inflated responsibility is made more likely by 
the presence of the cognitive bias called thought/action fiision which can take two 
forms - the belief that having an unacceptable thought may influence the 
probability that the aversive event will occur, and that having a morally 
unacceptable thought is equivalent to carrying out that action (Rachman 1993, 
1997).
The suggestion that a distinction should be made between the thoughts and the 
way they are evaluated had been questioned by Jakes (1989) who felt this was not 
necessary. Salkovskis argued that this view was based on a misunderstanding of 
cognitive therapy, seeing it as an "enterprise in rational thinking". He points out 
that according to cognitive theory, emotions result from appraisal of events 
(including thoughts) rather than the events, and pre-existing beliefs and attitudes 
influence that appraisal. Jakes also objected that the cognitive view caimot 
explain why the obsessional experiences more frequent obsessions than do 
normals, but this ignores the work done on the paradoxical effects of thought 
suppression, which will now be considered.
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Paradoxical enhancement.
Another factor hindering the obsessional patient from dismissing the thoughts is 
that he is trying too hard. The distorted sense of responsibility which the sufferer 
attaches to his or her activities (thoughts and memories as well as behaviour) 
leads them to attempt a pattern of mental effort characterised both by overcontrol 
and pre-occupation (Salkovskis, 1994). It had long been assumed that thought 
suppression resulted in paradoxical enhancement. In recent years, a number of 
researchers have sought to establish that this was in fact so. Results of Wegner's 
studies (1989) showed that initial enhancement did not occur, but subsequently 
enhancement, described as a rebound, was observed. Later studies by Clark, Ball 
& Pape (1991) and Clark, Winton & Thin (1993) also failed to find immediate 
enhancement effect. They suggested that studies which had found the effect had 
not taken into account the frequency with which the subject to be suppressed was 
mentioned prior to the task. Two recent studies (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; 
Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994) used thoughts that were naturally occurring 
intrusions idiosyncratic to the individuals themselves, whereas previous research 
used emotionally neutral stimuli. Their results indicate that suppression can result 
in increased intrusion, and that general distraction instructions resulted in 
enhancement, but either telling people not to distract or providing distraction did 
not. They also put forward the hypothesis that motivated monitoring of 
consciousness (i.e. the constant scanning of one's mind for distressing thoughts) 
may be as important as suppression, given that obsessional patients tend to be 
constantly vigilant for the occurrence of obsessional thinking.
Distorted beliefs about responsibility.
Cognitive therapy for OCD focuses on modifying distorted beliefs about 
responsibility. Salkovskis (1985) lists a sample of the dysfunctional assumptions 
most likely to interact vrith intrusive thoughts:
1) having a thought about an action is like performing the action.
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2) failing to prevent (or failing to try to prevent) harm to self or 
others is the same as having caused the harm in the first place.
3) responsibility is not attenuated by other factors (e.g. low 
probability of occurrence).
4) not neutralising when an intrusion has occurred is similar or 
equivalent to seeking or wanting the harm involved in that 
intrusion to happen.
5) one should (and can) exercise control over one's thoughts.
This appears to be a common thread running through all the varieties of 
obsessional behaviour, especially in the area of obsessions without compulsions, 
e.g. thoughts of harming one's children or of thinking bad thoughts about one's 
family or friends. Checkers fall readily into this category, but there has been some 
disagreement about washers and cleaners who often deny that they are being 
motivated by those ideas. Also it is often difficult to fit some of the more 
apparently meaningless compulsions into this hypothesis. This may be because 
the rituals are completely effective in avoiding the original intrusive thought, 
often when they have been in place over a number of years.
Studies of the importance of responsibility in OCD.
Many authors have now referred to responsibility in relation to OCD, but in fact 
there have been few empirical studies, the majority of which have been carried 
out by the Canadian group, Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon and Thibodeau. In 
1992, this group carried out an empirical study where they examined the intrusive 
thoughts of non-clinical subjects and found that responsibility, guilt and 
disapproval (of the negative automatic thought) were the only significant 
predictors of compulsive activity. In a previous study by the same group 
(Freeston et al., 1991), using their Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (CIQ), 
obsessive-compulsive patients were shown to feel more responsible than the
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control group if the content of the thought were to come true. The same group 
have continued to investigate this aspect of OCD. In more recent papers, they 
have suggested that inflated responsibility is not the only factor responsible for 
the development of OCD. A study was carried out to empirically test the relative 
importance of perfectionism and responsibility in OCD symptoms (Rheaume, 
Freeston, Dugas, Letarte & Ladouceur, 1995). Perfectionism and two measures 
of responsibility showed moderate correlations with OCD symptoms. 
Hierarchical regression analysis showed that although responsibility accounted 
for more variance, perfectionism was still a significant predictor of OCD once 
responsibility had been partialled out. This suggests that both are related to OCD. 
They define perfectionism as the research of perfection i.e. the belief that a 
perfect state exists, and may be reflected in all areas such as performance, 
certainty, appearance, morality, etc. However, when they give examples of this, 
e.g. having an unacceptable sexual thought, it is difficult to see why the examples 
could not be equally well explained by inflated responsibility.
In their most recent study ( Ladouceur, Rheaume, Freeston, Aublet, Jean, 
Lachance, Langlois & de Pokomandy-Morin, 1995), they aimed to demonstrate 
the link between different levels of perceived responsibility and checking 
behaviours by manipulating responsibility in non-clinical S's. In the first study, 
a sound recognition task with both high (HR) and low (LR) perceived 
responsibility, only one variable was found to be significantly different, that the 
high responsibility group reported more anxiety than the other group. This did not 
support a link between responsibility and checking behaviour. In a second study, 
HR and LR S's were compared on a manual task The HR group hesitated and 
checked more. Since perceived severity of outcome was the variable most 
affected by the manipulation, they suggest that perception of danger is a 
necessary variable in producing compulsive behaviour. However, since 
manipulation of responsibility showed significantly greater hesitations and
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checking behaviour in the HR group, study two gives empirical support for the 
link between perceived responsibility and checking behaviours. This then raises 
the question - do people feel responsible after having perceived threat or do they 
perceive threat because they already feel responsible? In a study by Lopatka and 
Rachman (1995), while manipulating responsibility by providing reassurance to 
the S's, they were also inadvertently diminishing the perception of threat so it is 
unclear which of these is responsible for the variation in compulsive behaviour. 
Clinical implications of these results are that it may be more useful (and easier) 
to focus on correcting the evaluation of severity and probability of potential 
outcomes.
On the other hand, the hypothesis of over-developed responsibility is supported 
by the fact that, in general, obsessions are not troublesome where it is possible to 
pass on the responsibility to others (Roper & Rachman, 1975). This is why OCD 
sufferers seek reassurance fi*om others - they have effectively passed on the 
responsibility for ensuring that no harm will occur and that, if it does, the blame 
will not fall on them. Thus reassurance has become another form of neutralising. 
Therefore if a compulsive checker is able to have the partner, friend or relative 
do the checking for them, once will be enough. Sometimes it is sufficient to have 
another person present who does not check, as presumably the checker thinks that 
if anything were wrong, the other person would do something about it or at least 
would be there to shoulder part of the blame. This is one of the pitfalls of 
therapist-directed exposure as it can lead to indirectly giving inappropriate 
reassurance and hence to the failure of response prevention. For example, a 
checker may be able to close his front door and walk away without further 
checking if the therapist is watching. The same person may have to do it ten times 
if he is on his own. This was home out in the experiments cited above by Roper 
and Rachman where stimuli which normally provoked checking produced little 
or none when the therapist was present. It follows that it is necessary to be careful
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about the use of the spouse as co-therapist as that too may act as a form of 
reassurance. Sometimes the obsessional patient has only been able to function 
by using the spouse as reassurance.
Another recent study by Rheaume, Ladouceur, Freeston & Letarte (1995) looked 
at responsibility for negative outcome in a non-clinical sample on four 
dimensions - probability, severity, personal influence and pivotal influence. 
Pivotal influence (i.e. the belief that one possesses pivotal power to provoke or 
prevent negative outcomes) appeared to be the major component. If the same 
holds true of clinical subjects, it would suggest the importance of restructuring 
beliefs about power as a way of modifying ideas of responsibility.
Three further studies have given support to the hypothesis of inflated 
responsibility. Rachman observed that compulsive checkers displayed no 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms when first admitted to a hospital but, after a few 
days, checking rituals resumed (Rachman, 1993). Rachman interprets this as 
evidence of inflated responsibility; the patients start to check again after they 
begin to feel more responsible for their surroundings.
Lopatka and Rachman (1995) manipulated perceived responsibility for feared 
consequences. Results were that decreased responsibility was associated with a 
significant decline in discomfort and urge to check (but as noted already, that 
might have been due to decreased perception of threat). Ladouceur et.al. (1995) 
manipulated perceived responsibility in a laboratory setting. Checking behaviours 
were more frequent in the group receiving high responsibility instructions as 
compared with the control group.
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Implications for treatment, 
ta^  Elements of treatment.
Cognitive theory would predict that successful treatment requires modification 
both of beliefs leading to the misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts as indicating 
heightened responsibility and of the associated behaviours involved in the 
maintenance of these beliefs. Salkovskis (1995) lists the main elements of 
treatment as:
1) Working with the patient to develop a comprehensive cognitive-behavioural 
model of the maintenance of their obsessional problems.
2) Detailed identification and monitoring of obsessional thoughts and patients' 
appraisal of these thoughts.
3) Discussion techniques for challenging appraisals and basic assumptions upon 
which these are based (e.g. pie-charts).
4) Behavioural experiments to test directly appraisals and assumptions involved 
in the patients' problems.
Relapse prevention is also important to avoid the patient slipping back into old 
habits.
(bl Increasing compliance.
The cognitive model provides a way of increasing compliance in the obsessional 
patient by giving a framework for understanding the reasons for exposure and 
response prevention (Salkovskis & Warwick, 1988; Tallis, 1992). This can often 
be a stumbling-block for patients because they anticipate such a high level of 
anxiety that they feel that they will not be able to cope with it (Salkovskis & Kirk,
1997). This in the past has been one of the main reason for the high drop-out rate 
in treatment in those with obsessions and compulsions (Salkovskis & Kirk, 
1997). In addition to facilitating behavioural techniques, other cognitive 
techniques give the patient the opportunity to discover for himself that there are 
other ways of regarding his problem. If he remains unconvinced of the
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explanation of the problem, he can be encouraged to discuss and rate the 
probability of his worries being a result of anxiety or of being a result of real 
danger. The collaborative nature of the cognitive approach together Avith 
techniques such as normalising, reattribution, and behavioural experiments 
increase the possibility of engaging the patient more readily (Salkovskis, 1994). 
It also helps compliance by broadening the scope of treatments, e.g. if a patient 
is unable to consider exposure, it might be helpful to do a cost-benefit analysis 
of the belief which could result in sufficient modification of the belief to allow 
him to go ahead with exposure in the form of a behavioural experiment.
(cl Reappraisal during exposure.
Reappraisal will allow the patients to discover that neutralising is not fulfilling 
any useful purpose. This can be facilitated by giving them information about the 
nature of intrusive thoughts and by presenting exposure as a behavioural 
experiment. For example, thinking "bad" thoughts about the therapist and seeing 
whether they come true or not.
(dl Encouragement to take responsibility.
As aheady established, the therapist can be an inadvertent source of reassurance. 
Not only can his presence or his instructions be viewed as a type of permission, 
but even his knowledge of the patient's actions can be viewed this way. Even 
homework given by the therapist can be interpreted as "permission" to carry out 
the task, making it easy for him at the time but resulting in difficulties after he is 
no longer in therapy. For this reason, it is better to work towards having the 
patient devise his own homework without telling anyone about it and only 
reporting to the therapist on the difficulty or success of it (Salkovskis (1989). 
This gives him the opportunity to experience taking fiill responsibility himself. 
It is also useful to encourage him to get involved in previously avoided activity 
which contains an element of responsibility.
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Evaluating the effects of cognitive therapy for PCD.
So far, there have been relatively few studies investigating the effectiveness of 
cognitive therapy with OCD. The first was carried out by the Dutch group, 
Emmelkamp, van der Helm, van Zanten and Plochg (1980) and looked at whether 
self-instructional training could enhance the effectiveness of exposure in vivo 
plus response prevention. This was not borne out. A subsequent study by 
Emmelkamp, Visser and Hoekstra (1988) compared the effects of rational 
emotive therapy (RET) to those of self-controlled exposure in vivo plus response 
prevention. The RET group were trained to record their thoughts and to challenge 
their irrational beliefs. RET was as effective as exposure plus response 
prevention. A third study by Emmelkamp and Beens (1991) looked at whether 
RET was as effective as self-controlled exposure in vivo plus response 
prevention, and whether a combined package would be superior to exposure with 
response prevention. No difference was found between RET and exposure with 
response prevention, and the combined treatment was no more effective than 
exposure alone. Until 1995, only one study had demonstrated the use of cognitive 
therapy with OCD according to the model of Beck and Salkovskis (Salkovskis 
& Warwick, 1985). All the controlled trials were on RET and up to that point, no 
controlled study had targeted responsibility alone in the treatment of OCD.
Some of the problems found in the studies described above could be summarised 
as follows:
1) What can be considered to be cognitive therapy? Some studies cite RET 
(Emmelkamp et al., 1988, Emmelkamp & Beens, 1991), some SIT (Emmelkamp 
et al., 1980), and one Beckian cognitive therapy (Salkovskis & Warwick, 1985). 
Are these sufficiently similar to be considered to be all representative of CT, or 
are they in fact sufficiently dissimilar to be considered three different therapies?
2) Several of the earlier studies cite thought-stopping as their main CT technique 
(Wilhnuth,1988, Gandev, 1992 & 1993, Dupont, 1992). Most would now agree
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that it is primarily a behavioural technique, not cognitive, which has in any case 
been discredited by the recent work on paradoxical enhancement.
3) Some employed multimodal methods so it becomes impossible to determine 
which elements of treatment were responsible for the outcome (Gandev, 1993, 
Enwright, 1991).
4) Some give no indication how the patients in their sample have been diagnosed, 
whether DSM or ICD were used (Enwright, 1991, Emmelkamp et al., 1988, 
Emmelkamp & Beens, 1991).
5) There is no common consensus as to what outcome measures are most 
appropriate. Some use behavioural measures alone (Willmuth, 1988, Gandev, 
1992,1993), some use behavioural, affective and severity of illness measures.
6) There is usually no indication given as to the level of experience or skill 
required of the therapists. This would seem quite a fundamental problem in 
comparing such studies.
James and Blackburn (1995) have examined the various studies carried out up to 
that point, and while acknowledging that the Dutch studies are the most carefully 
carried out so far, they still find problems with the methodology of all of these 
studies. Their conclusion was that until more accurate trials were carried out, the 
jury was still out on the efficacy of cognitive therapy with OCD.
Theoretically, correction of inflated responsibility should produce clinically 
significant change if indeed it is pivotal in the development and maintenance of 
OCD. From 1995 onwards, studies have been carried out targeting responsibility 
and using a more Beckian type of therapy. The more recent studies have 
concentrated on the effectiveness of cognitive therapy along the lines of Beck 
(1976) and Salkovskis (1985). One such study by van Oppen, de Haan, van 
Balkom, Spinhoven, Hoogduin & van Dyck (1995) evaluated the effects of 
cognitive therapy on OCD and compared the effects with those of self-controlled
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exposure in vivo with response prevention. Cognitive therapy with almost no 
exposure was at least as effective as exposure and response prevention. Both led 
to a statistically significant improvement. Significant differences in multivariate 
analysis suggested a superior efficacy of cognitive therapy on obsessive 
compulsive measures and measures for associated psychopathology. Significantly 
more patients were rated "recovered" in the cognitive therapy. This suggests that 
this form of cognitive therapy may be even more effective than exposure in vivo. 
CT training was given to all the therapists prior to the start of the trial, thereby 
ensuring a reasonably homogeneous level of skill. Salkovskis and Kirk (1997) 
argue that a more meaningful comparison would be habituation-based exposure 
and response prevention compared to cognitively based therapy involving similar 
amounts of exposure and response prevention. If the cognitive theory is correct, 
a more rapid and complete improvement would be expected with the cognitive 
approach.
Van Oppen also suggests that responsibility must be targeted directly to evaluate 
its role in the maintenance of OCD. A recent study carried out by the Canadian 
group (Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume & Dube, 1996) addressed this issue and 
targeted responsibility directly with no exposure or response prevention. All 
subjects (N = 4) reported a clinically significant decrease in interference caused 
by rituals, a 52 - 100% reduction in Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale 
(YBOCS) scores and a decrease in perceived responsibility. Therapeutic gains 
were maintained at follow-up ( 6 - 1 2  months) for 3 of the 4 patients. They 
maintain that this suggests that targeting inflated responsibility is a promising 
alternative to exposure based treatment. However, the number of patients is too 
small to generalise from and this was not a controlled trial.
Ideally, to be able to make any statement about the effectiveness of cognitive-
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behavioural treatment for OCD, it is necessary to have trials which have random 
allocation to CBT, to an alternative equally credible treatment and to a wait-list 
condition. In addition, both short-term and long-term results of treatment would 
be followed up for both conditions, at least for one-year after end of treatment. 
Assessment of outcome should be carried out by an assessor blind to the 
treatment condition. At present, the Oxford OCD research team, led by Dr. Paul 
Salkovskis, is carrying out such a trial which is described in greater detail in the 
clinical dossier.
Conclusion.
The introduction in recent years of cognitive techniques into the treatment of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder has produced encouraging results, perhaps not 
surprisingly as this could be viewed as the most cognitively based disorder. These 
methods have facilitated change in what were previously regarded as intractable 
cases, such as patients with over-valued ideas, those with concurrent depression 
and those vdth obsessions alone. They have also helped make behavioural 
treatments more effective. Cognitive-behavioural treatment aims to help the 
patient conclude that obsessional thoughts are irrelevant to further action, and that 
intrusive thoughts are common to all and therefore of no special significance. 
Further investigations need to be made to find out what will reduce responsibility 
both in the short and long-term. Also, it has still to be determined to what extent 
excessive responsibility, perfectionism and overestimated perception of danger 
each contribute to the development of OCD. So far, results of therapy outcome 
trials are encouraging and there are more under way. However, there is a need for 
more rigorously designed studies to be carried out. Cognitive therapy for OCD 
can be regarded as still in its early stages. Freeston, Rheaume & Ladouceur
(1996), while recognising that more evidence is necessary to make predictive 
statements about cognitive therapy as an effective treatment for OCD, comment 
"We strongly believe that cognitive therapy techniques will have an impact on the
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treatment of obsessional thoughts, both by complementing and potentiating 
existing exposure and response prevention packages and even by eliminating the 
need for massed exposure in some cases, but also by extending the benefit of 
treatments aimed at rapid and lasting symptom reduction to subjects who refuse 
exposure and response prevention." If this is backed up by future trials evaluating 
both short- and long-term effectiveness of this approach, it will represent a 
significant advance in the treatment of a disorder which has long been regarded 
as resistant to treatment.
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ACADEMIC REVIEW (2)
A comparison of the efficacy of cognitive therapy 
delivered individually or in a group: a review of the literature.
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Introduction.
Although cognitive therapy was originally developed as an individual therapy, by 
the late 1970's this approach was also spreading to group-work. Groups were run 
on the same principles as the individual model i.e. identification and modification 
of dysfimctional thoughts, assumptions and beliefs; relying on techniques such 
as self-monitoring of activities, affect and cognitions; education; behavioural 
experiments to assist reattribution. Group therapy has obvious advantages in the 
present business-oriented climate of National Health Service Trusts since it is 
possible to treat more people in a given period in a group than can be treated 
individually. However, outcome studies have come to differing conclusions as to 
the benefits of individual v. group therapy (Rush & Watkins, 1981 ; Shaffer et al., 
1981; Brown & Lewinsohn, 1984; Covi & Lipman, 1987; Heimberg et al., 1990 
and 1993; Hope, Herbert & White, 1995.) This review will look at which 
different formats have been tried, what the advantages and disadvantages of those 
formats might be, which client groups have been targeted for cognitive- 
behavioural group therapy (CBGT), and lastly whether a group format in general 
offers any advantages over individual CBT. Outcome studies and their 
implications for the use of CBGT will be discussed.
Group structure.
II Homogeneous v. heterogeneous groups.
Most of the original group work concentrated on groups for depressed patients 
(Shaw, 1977; Hollon & Shaw, 1979; Shaffer, Shapiro, Sank & Coghlan, 1981;
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Rush & Watkins, 1981). Shaw and Hollon favoured a two-hour, once a week 
format and ran both open and closed groups (though instead of comparing these 
formats, they combined the outcome for the groups to compare with outcome of 
individual CBT). Shaffer, Shapiro, Sank & Coghlan gave 10 weekly sessions 
lasting one and a half hours each. Results of this were compared with 
interpersonal group therapy and with individual CBT. Numbers are small (CBT - 
10, IGT - 13 and individual CBT -12). It is not apparent from the paper whether 
these were split into smaller groups or seen in one larger group. Rush and 
Watkins ran twenty groups over a twelve week period of 75-90 minutes duration. 
These were closed groups of 4 to 6 patients and two therapists. Results were 
compared with individual CBT and individual CBT plus medication. Sessions 
proceed from socialising the patients into the cognitive model (i.e. educating 
them about the link between thoughts feelings and behaviour) to planning and 
monitoring behavioural interventions, and identifying, re-evaluating and testing 
automatic negative thoughts and assumptions. Structure within sessions followed 
the usual sequence of establishing personal agenda items, looking at measures of 
mood, reviewing responses to prior sessions, reviewing homework assignments, 
discussing agenda items and special topics, assigning homework and 
summarizing the session.
Patients with depression had been traditionally regarded as poor candidates for 
group therapy, partly because they were thought to have needs which might not 
be able to be met in a group context, or might even deteriorate because of 
negative self-comparison with other group members, and partly because it was 
felt that they would have a disruptive effect on other non-depressed patients in the 
group. However Yalom (1970) suggested that these constraints applied more to 
the inclusion of depressed patients in heterogeneous groups (with other types of 
patients) than in homogeneous groups where all patients shared a common 
problem. This could be held to be true of groups held for other types of client e.g.
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social anxiety, generalised anxiety, and personality disorder. There is an obvious 
advantage in the material that is presented and discussed in the group being 
relevant to every member in it, and in providing an opportunity for each member 
to observe from an objective point of view other members displaying the same 
type of dysfunctional thinking as they do. On the other hand, the lack of success 
of traditional methods with depressed patients in heterogeneous groups may owe 
more to the orientation of the group than to the mixture of problems (Hollon & 
Stevens, 1983). Depressed patients may find the process-oriented nature of 
traditional psychotherapy groups unhelpful, but when given a more structured, 
educational, problem-oriented and focused approach to group sessions will have 
less difficulty in making use of the help offered. However, heterogeneous groups 
have been run successfully. A notable example of this is the work done by Sank 
& Shaffer (1984), which they detailed in a therapist's manual. This work will be 
discussed further under outcome studies.
2V*Open” v.”Closed” groups.
Groups in which all clients start and finish at the same time are called "closed" 
groups. If members can join in the group at any time, it is said to be an "open" 
group. Closed groups are more common in outpatient work, open groups in 
inpatient treatment. There appears at present to have been no studies comparing 
open V. closed groups, though both appear to be effective. (As mentioned earlier, 
Shaw and Holloway ran a closed followed by an open group but then combined 
the scores instead of making any comparisons.) The open-ended group is the 
most frequently used form of GCBT in hospital settings because the composition 
of the group is constantly changing. Closed groups would appear to be easier for 
the therapist to run and to be more economical with time as the group moves 
along at more or less the same pace. With an open group, time has to be spent 
(usually outwith the session) orientating the new group member. Freeman, 
Schrodt, Gibson & Ludgate (1993) give a summary of the three different types
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of open group which can be implemented:
il Open-ended GCT. In this, advance preparation is important. The patient 
should be introduced to the cognitive model through individual therapy, reading 
and other assignments. In this type of group, obviously one of the variables 
determining success or failure is how well the therapy is "sold" before joining the 
group. An attempt is made to make each session "a therapy within a therapy". 
This can be facilitated by:
- emphasizing the psychoeducational aspects of CT.
- obtaining the patient's cooperation in setting an agenda by having them come 
to the group with one or two items already in mind.
- focusing on issues that have broad relevance.
- using homework to link GCT with the rest of the milieu.
- constant preparation for discharge.
ill Rotating-theme groups. This type of group was developed with hospital 
inpatients in mind (Bowers 1989). An attempt is made to have each session 
complete in itself so that patients who are only in hospital for a short time can 
still derive benefit from the sessions that they are able to attend. A cycle of 8 
sessions would take place, 3 per week, each of which would be focused on a 
particular topic. In this type of group, frequency would be increased in 
comparison to the more usual weekly schedule. Patients would be asked to 
prepare something in advance for these sessions and the nurses would help them 
review the material before the session. As obviously every topic will not be 
relevant to every group member, they may have to wait for an appropriate session 
to deal with their primary problem. Topics vary according to the population of the 
group. An example of a group for depression (Freeman et al., 1993) would
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include reactions to hospitalisation, building self-esteem, getting motivated again, 
setting goals, coping with family and friends and returning to work. The topic list 
should be matched to the population mix. A shift in the composition of the patient 
group would suggest that the session themes be altered. The therapist should 
remain responsive to the needs of the group rather than simply carrying out a pre­
arranged programme and should still involve the patients in setting the agenda. 
If the group had been for eating disorders, topics might have included body 
image, meal planning or thoughts about eating. Although this is more structured 
than an open-ended group, member interaction is still very much encouraged and 
the agenda is constructed from the themes on their cards.
iii) Programmed groups. These groups are a mixture of the previous two and 
more psychoeducational groups. This type is the most structured and didactic and 
the least interactive. This type of group has been tried successfully by Covi, Roth 
and Lipman (1982) with a group of depressed outpatients. In spite of the very 
structured and didactic nature of this type of group, their group members 
attributed much of their improvement to group factors. The authors did not cite 
what those factors might be, but one assumes these would include some of the 
therapeutic factors listed in Yalom (1970) such as instillation of hope, group 
cohesiveness, imitative behaviour, interpersonal learning, recognition of 
similarity in others, and the opportunity to ventilate emotions. The situation for 
inpatients is more complicated as they could be admitted at different times and 
join the group at different sessions. Therefore the basic cognitive model has to be 
described at every meeting so that new members will have an overview before 
being confronted with cognitive techniques of which they would have had no 
understanding. Then a didactic presentation would be given (e.g. identifying 
negative thoughts), followed by eliciting agenda items from the group to illustrate 
the procedures just described, and finishing by assigning homework. This format 
is probably the most efficient in imparting information on CT but as it does
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sacrifice time for group interaction, some of the traditional advantages of group 
therapy may be short-changed. Also since the pace of this sort of group may be 
too fast for some of the members, it follows that it helps if a fairly homogeneous 
group can be selected.
Practical considerations.
il Therapists. The consensus of opinion in published articles (Covi, Roth & 
Lipman, 1982; Hope & Heimberg, 1992; Freeman, Schrodt, Gilson & Ludgate, 
1993) appears to be that it is better to have a co-therapist rather than try to run a 
group single-handed, partly because there can be a considerable amount of 
written material (e.g. dysfimctional thought records) to go through at the 
beginning of a session which could be done by the co-therapist. This avoids a 
certain amount of boredom and waste of time for the group members. If there is 
no co-therapist available, six would appear to be the maximum number practical 
for a single therapist to handle (Hollon & Shaw, 1979).
ill Frequency. Length of time recommended varies e.g. 2 hour sessions once a 
week for 12 weeks (Shaw & Hollon 1978), or one and a half hours twice weekly 
(Rush & Watkins 1981). A complete closed group can be 12 to 20 sessions. The 
length and fi*equency of group meetings is dependent on a number of variables, 
including duration of hospital stay, therapeutic focus, hospital schedule and space 
restrictions. Researchers appear to be fairly evenly divided on the subject of 
length of time of the sessions. Some use a one and a half hour session (Rush & 
Watkins, 1981; Telch, Lucas, Schmidt, Hanna, Jaimez, & Lucas, 1993; 
Heimberg, Salzman, Holt & Blendell, 1993; Heimberg & Juster, 1994; Freeman 
et al., 1993) and the others a two hour session (Covi, Roth & Lipman, 1982; 
Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy & Zollo, 1990; Free, Gei & Sanders, 1991; 
Krone, Himle & Nesse, 1991). This allows time to set an agenda, to do
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meaningful therapeutic work and to close the session with homework and 
review. Shorter groups of 45 minutes to one hour have difficulty in developing 
and gaining closure on therapy topics (Freeman, Schrodt, Gilson & Ludgate, 
1993). Most outpatient groups would meet once weekly but groups which are a 
primary component of in-patient stay are often held twice or three times weekly.
iiil Group selection. In general, this would be partly determined by the function 
of the group. Numbers in the group would be from 6 to 10. Some patients usually 
regarded as unsuitable would be those with organic brain syndromes, acute 
psychosis or mania. One reason for this may have been the fact that it was felt 
that these patients would not necessarily benefit from CBT (though this could be 
challenged now by the work being done currently on CBT with psychotic 
patients), that they are not suitable cases for brief therapy, and lastly that they 
might well have a disruptive effect on the group. In spite of the fact that patients 
with severely disruptive personality disorder are usually excluded from CBT 
groups, Linehan (1987) has described a CBT group for borderline personality 
disorder which works well on an outpatient basis.
Difference in emphasis of CBGT in different client groups.
The structure of CBGT is similar across client groups but there are some 
differences in emphasis.
Ï) CBGT for depression. Usually one to two preparatory interviews are given 
before the member joins the group, focusing both on assessing the level of 
depression and educating the member in the cognitive model. The BDI would 
normally be administered at the beginning of each session. At the first session, 
it is useful to deal with general structure, and establish ground rules and 
individual goals. Ground rules should include confidentiality and structuring time 
so that each member gets a chance to have his say. Looking at individual goals
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will help to eliminate unrealistic expectations early on and will elicit any 
pessimistic expectations. Hollon & Shaw (1979) illustrate how useful it is to elicit 
these feelings in the first session and to demonstrate how negative self -appraisals 
operate. They asked each participant to rank all the members of the group, 
including themselves, in terms of who they thought would benefit most from the 
group. Naturally, each one put himself or herself at the bottom of his or her own 
list. In the discussion that followed, it was clear that there were obvious 
similarities in how members of the group viewed themselves in relation to others. 
Up to this point, they had assumed that they were thinking factually about 
themselves, but pointing out this similarity in the way they think about 
themselves facilitated the identification of their negative cognitive distortions. 
Concrete examples will be taken from the participants' experience to demonstrate 
thinking errors and self-fulfilling prophecies. Homework is assigned in each 
session and reviewed at the beginning of the next session. They would not move 
on to a different task until previous tasks have been mastered. As in individual 
cognitive therapy, sessions would follow the pattern of measuring mood, setting 
the agenda, reviewing the homework, dealing with that week's topic and setting 
homework assignments (Hollon & Shaw, 1979).
ill CBGT for social anxiety and social phobia. One of the main exponents of 
group work in this area is Heimberg who has developed a program for this client 
group known as the Albany Social Phobia Protocol. (Heimberg 1989, 1991; 
Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo & Becker 1990; Hope & Heimberg 
1992; Heimberg, Salzman, Holt & Blendell 1993.) The program consists of 
several components:
- Development of a cognitive behavioural explanation of social phobia.
- Training of patients in the skills of identifying, analyzing and challenging 
problem cognitions.
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- Exposure of patients to simulations of anxiety- provoking situations during 
treatment groups.
- Use of cognitive restructuring procedures to teach patients to control their 
maladaptive thinking before, during and after simulated exposures.
- Homework assignments for actual exposure to situations already confronted 
during exposure simulation.
- Teaching a self-administered cognitive restructuring routine for use before and 
after completion of behavioural assignments.
The programme consisted of 12 weekly sessions given by 2 co-therapists. Though 
one might think it was being optimistic to treat social phobics in a group because 
of their basic difficulties with people, the group format provides opportunities for 
them which are lacking in individual therapy e.g. vicarious learning, having 
others to role-play with, and seeing others with similar problems. Social phobics, 
almost by definition, find it difficult to discuss their fears with anyone and 
consequently believe that their problems are unique. The group provides a useful 
opportunity for members to discover that others have similar thoughts and 
problems.
In choosing appropriate clients for the group, Hope and Heimberg (1995) suggest 
that the following points should be borne in mind :
- If the individual has evolved an aggressive manner as his defence, he may be 
disruptive to the group processes.
- Some social phobics experience such severe anxiety in the group setting that 
they would not be able to tolerate it.
- Individuals lacking in interpersonal skills may not get maximum benefit from 
CBGT.
However, in some instances the group experience is instrumental in helping the 
patient overcome precisely these kinds of difficulties, especially through seeing
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the others modelling a more constructive way of relating to each other. Certainly, 
the running of the group will be easier for the therapist if these factors are taken 
into consideration, but then the excluded patient may well miss out on a useful 
experience. Some of the difficulties that these patients present could be at least 
moderated by one or two individual sessions before entering the group.
The main difference between these and groups for depression lies in the exposure 
element (which calls for considerable courage on the part of the participants). 
Otherwise, similar procedures to those in other CBT groups are followed.
iiil CBGT for Panic.
It appears that only one such study has been reported (Telch, et al., 1993). This 
study compared cognitive group treatment (N=34) with a delayed treatment 
control group(N=33). Treatment was delivered in small groups ranging from 4 
to 6 patients per group. Subjects received 12 treatment sessions of 90 minutes 
over an 8 week period. Sessions 1 to 8 were twice weekly, sessions 9 to 12 were 
one week apart, given by one primary therapist and one graduate student 
assistant. Treatment consisted of (a) education and corrective information, (b) 
cognitive therapy, (c) training in diaphragmatic breathing, (d) interoceptive 
exposure. Treatment followed the cognitive model of panic (Clark, 1986), 
although nowadays training in diaphragmatic breathing would not be considered 
as part of cognitive therapy. Results will be considered later.
ivl CBGT for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.
Only one study which might be considered a cognitive-behavioural group has 
been reported (Enright, 1991). Although a few behavioural studies have included 
some cognitive work (e.g. Krone, Himle and Nesse, 1991), this would not be 
sufficient to be called a cognitive-behavioural group. The content of the groups 
as described contains no attempt to identify and/or modify the patients' beliefs or
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negative appraisals about having the intrusive thoughts or having to carry out the 
rituals. In the Enright study, he does not at any point state what theoretical 
approach is taken by the programme, although he does say that "none of the 
clients had received any previous cognitive-behavioural input to their problems" 
which would suggest that is what they would be receiving in this programme. 
However, the content of the sessions seems more eclectic (e.g. presentation and 
discussion of theories of obsessive-compulsive disorder, including biomedical, 
psychoanalytical, behavioural and mood state) and very general (assertiveness, 
stress management and progressive relaxation). The programme consisted of 9 
treatment sessions conducted weekly for an hour and a half. As only one of these 
sessions could be considered to be cognitive therapy, and in the absence of any 
continuing 'thread' of CBT throughout these sessions, this cannot be taken to be 
a representative example of a CBT group for OCD.
vl Variations on the theme.
One variation is the Coping Skills Group devised by Sank & Shaffer (1984). As 
aheady mentioned, this differed from the majority of CBGT in that almost 50% 
of the input appeared to be skills training (relaxation, assertiveness, etc.). Another 
variation on the standard group for depression was the approach taken by O'Hara 
& Rehm (1983), self-control group therapy for depression. This was based on a 
more general model of self-regulation proposed by Kanfer & Karoly (1972) 
which suggests that certain behaviours are maintained by 3 interconnected 
cognitive behavioural processes (self-monitoring, self-evaluation, and 
self-reinforcement) operating in a closed loop feedback system. They include a 
10 session manual chapter which presents the following program: 
self-monitoring; mood and events; immediate v. delayed consequences; 
attribution of causality; goal setting; overt self-reinforcement; covert 
self-reinforcement; review and consolidation. Although this approach is rather 
more behavioural, it seems to have been very effective for the participants.
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vH Cognitive milieu. The logical extension of CBGT is the cognitive milieu 
described by Wright et al. (1993). They do not suggest a program of "cognitive 
therapy only", but suggest incorporating other useful therapeutic methods such 
as biological psychiatry. However, they do think that cognitive therapy principles 
can serve as the major operational constructs for an inpatient unit. Suggestions 
are made for promoting the growth of the milieu such as re- aligning standard 
activities (unit-community meetings and psychoeducational sessions) to support 
the cognitive therapy perspective. Treatment planning offers another opportunity 
for this. They conclude that a cognitive therapy orientation appears to offer a 
pragmatic solution to the problem of providing an effective psychotherapy in a 
short period of time.
Advantages of the group format.
1) The obvious one is that more clients can be treated within a given period of 
time than can be treated individually. (This is assuming that they would improve 
equally with either group or individual CBT, which is not necessarily the case.)
2) Negative automatic thoughts of the other group members provide opportunities 
for demonstrating both the relationship between thoughts and feelings, and the 
procedures for identifying and challenging these.
3) Group sessions increase the likelihood that negative social comparisons will 
be triggered. Cognitions in session often reveal the most compelling 
demonstrations of the role of idiosyncratic thinking in depression and the power 
of therapeutic techniques in modifying these negative thoughts.
4) Because the depressed patient distorts information relating to himself much 
more than information about others, then he more easily recognises the cognitive 
distortions of others, and his experience with them appears to facilitate the 
recognition and re- evaluation of his own cognitive sets.
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5) Group members can be used as co-therapists.
6) Public commitment seems to keep motivation higher and thus make change 
more likely.
7) Group members, who previously may have felt very isolated by their problem, 
find "being in the same boat as others" quite therapeutic.
8) At times, when clients feel they are making little progress, they can receive 
encouragement through the success of others.
9) Groups provide opportunity for vicarious learning.
10) Groups help foster independence, whereas a one-to-one relationship with a 
therapist may bring problems of dependency.
Disadvantages of CBGT.
The disadvantages are those found in any psychotherapeutic group.
1) There is always a danger of one individual monopolizing the group. Care must 
be taken to ensure that everyone has an opportunity to have a say.
2) Personal attacks by one group member on another must be looked out for and 
avoided if possible.
3) In larger size groups, care must be taken to avoid the development of 
sub-groups.
4) As the weeks go on, the different improvement rate of the members can pose 
a problem, as some may feel discouraged that they are not progressing as fast as 
others in the group.
5) There can be a tendency in some groups to lapse into "small-talk".
6) In a group situation, individuals may be reluctant to discuss disturbing core 
beliefs. However, if these are not dealt with, there is the possibility that the 
person may retain a vulnerability to the recurrence of their problem.
7) On a purely practical basis, it is often difficult to arrange a day or time when 
most of the people you wish to target can attend.
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Outcome studies.
The efficacy of CBGT for depression has been established in papers such as Free, 
Gei & Sanders (1991) where depression scores, as measured by the BDI and the 
Zung Self-rating Scale for depression, decreased markedly over the course of 
therapy. Their groups ran for 2 hours over a course of 12 weeks with 2-8 patients 
in each group. As there was no comparison group in this study, it is therefore not 
legitimate to conclude that the improvement would not have occurred without the 
therapy. Some papers have attempted to compare the efficacy of CBGT with 
individual CBT or to compare both vrith some other treatment such as 
pharmacotherapy, interpersonal group therapy or a credible placebo therapy. 
Rush & Watkins' pilot study (1981) suggested that individual CT leads to greater 
improvement than GCT. However, this was not borne out by two subsequent 
studies (Shaffer et al., 1981; Brown & Lewinsohn, 1984) and it is possible that 
their results were affected by the small size of their sample. Strict randomisation 
was not feasible and follow-up data was incomplete.
The Sank and Schaffer Coping Skills Group, already mentioned, accepted 
patients with symptoms of depression, of anxiety, problems with assertiveness 
and "problems in living" (to do with work, finance or relationships). There was 
perhaps a stronger behavioural component in these groups than most CBT groups 
in that they contained a relaxation module and an assertiveness module in which 
the emphasis is more on supplying deficient skills than on cognitive restructuring. 
These groups formed the basis of a study comparing group v. individual CBT, 
and comparing both of these to an interpersonal group therapy approach (Shaffer 
et al.,1981). This study supported the hypothesis that CBT in a group format was 
as effective as individual CBT for the symptom clusters mentioned (depression
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and anxiety). Outcome was measured by the Beck Depression Inventory, the 
Speilberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory, and the Adult Self-expression 
Scale (Gay, Hollandsworth and Galassi, 1975). One-way analyses of variance 
were calculated for the first and second assessments of each dependent measure 
by treatment (CBGT, IGT, and individual CBT) and no significant differences 
were found. Repeated measures analyses were carried out on all self-report 
measures. All treatments resulted in a significant reduction in depression, state 
and trait anxiety, and an increase in assertiveness by the end of treatment. Pre- 
and post-treatment results were most effective for depression but there was no 
significant difference found between CBGT, IPGT (interpersonal group 
psychotherapy) and ICBT (individual cognitive therapy). The writers felt that this 
may be due to common elements in the therapies confounding the results. It was 
suggested that perhaps there would have been more significant differences if a 
more homogeneous patient sample with more pronounced symptoms had been 
used, as it was felt that the sample used may not have provided sufficient 
potential range for improvement. Also numbers were small: in CBGT, N= 10; in 
IPGT, N= 13; in ICBT, N= 12. Brown & Lewinsohn (1984) found no difference 
between individual and group formats. Covi & Lipman (1987) found that both 
GCT and GCT plus Imipramine were more effective than traditional 
non-directive group therapy for depressed adults which supports the cognitive 
approach in groups but sheds no fiirther light on whether individual therapy might 
have been even more effective.
Outcome studies on individual therapy for depression have been well documented 
elsewhere (for a review, see Williams, 1992). Based on several studies, Williams
(1997) calculates that the mean percentage change across samples of out-patients 
who have received CBT alone is 66%, compared with a mean of 63% in patients 
receiving tricyclic antidepressants alone,and 72% for patients who have received 
a combination of the two. Overall, the data available appears to be inconclusive
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as to which mode of therapy would be the more effective for depressed patients 
and there is no data which suggests conclusively that group therapy would be a 
more effective alternative to individual therapy.
The report on the panic group (Telch et al., 1993) showed effective results. Post­
treatment at 9 weeks, 85.3% were panic-free compared to 30.3% of delayed 
treatment controls.Taking more stringent criteria of recovery (i.e. had to be 
showing normal functioning on all three measures of panic attacks, anxiety and 
avoidance), 63.6% of these patients who had group treatment were judged as 
recovered against 9.1% of the control group. At 6 month follow-up, the figures 
for the group patients were only marginally less (83.3%). These figures appear 
to be comparable to those obtained in studies of individual therapy. For example, 
in a study comparing individual CBT for panic disorder with applied relaxation, 
Imipramine and a wait-list condition (Clark, Salkovskis, Hackman, Middleton, 
Anastasiades & Gelder, 1994), 86% in the CBT condition were judged panic-free 
at post-treatment compared to 48% who had applied relaxation, 52% on 
Imipramine and 7% on the waiting-list. At one-year follow-up, the percentage of 
patients panic-free were 76%, 43%, and 48% respectively. An earlier study by 
Beck, Sokol, Clark, Berchick & Wright (1992) comparing cognitive therapy (CT) 
with supportive therapy (ST) found 94% of the CT group to be panic-free post­
treatment and 25% of the ST patients. A recent study by Amtz & van den Hout 
(1996) comparing cognitive therapy with applied relaxation (AR) and wait-list 
found 78% of the CT group were panic-free post-treatment compared to 47% of 
the AR group and 28% of the wait-list group. It seems that for this group at least, 
results may be comparable to those of individual therapy, but there is a need for 
further studies of panic groups to determine whether this is consistently upheld.
Results from the group cognitive therapy on CCD patients were very non-specific 
(Enright, 1991). Patients reported an increase of hope, understanding and control.
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enhanced mood and a reduction of the disabling effects of the symptoms, but 
there was no direct reduction of the symptoms themselves. Individual cognitive 
therapy for OCD on the other hand (van Oppen, de Haan, van Balkom, 
Spinhoven, Hoogduin & van Dyck, 1995; Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume & Dube, 
1996) has shown a statistically significant decrease in symptomatology.
One of the populations in which a larger number of outcome studies have been 
carried out is that of social phobia. Heimberg et al.(1990 and 1993) looked at 
outcomes for CBGT for this problem. In the first study, 49 patients participated 
in a study where CBGT was compared with a credible placebo control 
(lecture-discussion and group support). At both post-test and follow-up, CBGT 
patients were rated as more improved than controls and reported less anxiety 
before and during the behavioural test. These same patients were re- contacted 
approximately 5 years later, and were again assessed. Patients who had received 
CBGT remained more improved than patients who had the alternative treatment. 
However, due to the long follow-up time, only a portion fi*om the original sample 
could be assessed so there have to be some reservations about these results.
A more recent paper (Hope, Herbert & White, 1995) found that both generalized 
social phobia (patients have fears in all major situational domains) and non­
generalized social phobia (having fears in multiple domains but having at least 
one unaffected domain) responded positively to group social intervention. 
Generalized social phobics were more impaired prior to treatment and they 
continued to be more impaired after treatment on some measures. It was 
concluded that it was "likely that the broader range of feared situations may 
require a longer or more intensive course of cognitive therapy". However an 
equally valid hypothesis might be that those people actually need individual as 
opposed to group therapy.
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In an effort to separate out which were the most effective components of their 
CBGT social phobia package and to find out if cognitive restructuring was 
necessary to good outcome, this group compared CBGT to an exposure-based 
treatment without formal cognitive restructuring and to a wait-list control (Hope 
et. al., 1995). Subjects in the active treatment conditions improved and those in 
the wait-list condition did not. Results suggested that subjects in the exposure 
alone condition (EAs) showed more broad-based change on the social phobia 
measures. At 6 month follow-up, all differences had disappeared and both 
treatment groups were improved. However, both cognitive theory and previous 
studies would have predicted superiority of cognitive restructuring over exposure 
alone. For example Heimberg, Dodge et.al. (1990) reported an 81% response to 
treatment for CBGT subjects, whereas in this trial the rate is only 36%. Possible 
explanations suggested to account for this result are that numbers were very small 
(e.g. in the cognitive group N=13) and the CBGT group had been affected more 
than the other by dropout due to factors unrelated to the therapy thereby 
disturbing group cohesion. They conclude that, in spite of the poor response to 
CBGT in this study, it would be premature to conclude that the cognitive 
component of treatment is unnecessary and that it is possible that some cognitive 
change may have occurred in the non-cognitive condition due to successful 
experience allowing more functional information processing. It is not possible, 
on the basis of the small numbers involved in this study, to draw any conclusions 
about the relative efficacy of cognitive vs. exposure based treatment.
Another recent investigation of the effectiveness of CBGT for social phobia 
(Scholing & Emmelkamp, 1993 & 1996) employed a more long-term follow-up 
(18 months) and compared both group and individual therapy while also 
comparing exposure in vivo, cognitive therapy followed by exposure in vivo and 
a CBT in which both strategies were integrated from the beginning. Results on 
patients who completed the long-term follow-up showed that all (N=50)
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demonstrated significant lasting improvement compared with the pre-test. The 
most effective was exposure in vivo in group with the least effective the 
integrated group treatment. The individual treatment conditions came somewhere 
in between. All conditions showed improvement by post-test and no significant 
changes were observed later on. However, the exposure group yielded the most 
effective results. The authors mention that those patients who were significantly 
more depressed formed the bulk of the non-participants (i.e. refused any further 
cooperation) and drop-outs, and therefore concluded that the results were more 
representative of social phobics without comorbid conditions. It is difficult to 
attach much importance to these results because of the small number involved. 
For example, although the exposure group yielded the best results, the size of 
this group was only 5 patients, 3 of whom had received further treatment between 
both follow-ups. The treatment that was received by those who felt a need for 
further treatment was cognitive in nature. Therefore it seems impossible to 
continue to view this group as representative of solely exposure based treatment. 
If a group of patients with pneumonia were assigned a blood-letting condition by 
leeches, and when it was discovered that they needed further treatment were 
given antibiotics, one could not attribute their improvement to the leeches. Taking 
the study as a whole, the mean follow-up ratings on a social phobia scale were 
still significantly higher than normal. This would agree with the Feske and 
Chambless (1995) comment that more powerful strategies are needed to achieve 
higher rates of clinically meaningful improvement for social phobia. On the other 
hand, the significance of this may be that more powerful idiosyncratic 
interventions are necessary, which would be more easily attained in individual 
therapy.
The ongoing Oxford study (Wells, Clark, Salkovskis, Ludgate, Hackman & 
Gelder, 1995) provides treatment on an individual basis. Idiosyncratic beliefs and 
safety behaviours are identified and targeted, helped by use of video and third-
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party feedback. Preliminary results are encouraging and may prove to be more 
effective in both level of improvement and in relapse prevention.
Conclusion.
It would appear that cognitive therapy for some conditions can be delivered 
effectively in a group setting. What this type of therapy must necessarily lack in 
depth would appear to be compensated by the advantages offered by the nature 
of a group format. These are summed up in a quote from O'Hara & Rehm (1983, 
p.70) : "A depressed client often does not believe he or she can meet the goals the 
therapist has set for him or her. The group allows the individual to interact with 
others who are similar in terms of how they feel. As group members see each 
other making changes, their own sense of hopelessness usually diminishes 
enough so that they try out new ways of thinking and new behaviours."
The benefits are also obvious in the case of social anxiety where the group format 
provides a continuous opportunity for experiments to disconfirm their beliefs. 
Results in the panic trial (Telch et al., 1993) were also favourable though one 
reported trial does not give sufficient basis for generalisation. The benefits for an 
OCD group are less obvious. Again it is impossible to generalise on the basis of 
one reported group (and one which cannot be considered particularly cognitive), 
but patient ratings were highest for non-specific effects so there was no obvious 
effect on the obsessional symptoms. Enright suggests that there may be an 
important pre-treatment role for this sort of group. However it would seem that 
unless it can be shown that it actually reduces the time spent on individual 
therapy for OCD afterwards, it is not time well spent. There is a need for more 
studies for this client population and more strictly focused cognitive 
interventions. It is also possible that due to the diversity of symptoms in OCD 
and their extremely idiosyncratic nature, it is preferable to offer individual
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therapy to this group. In general, it would appear that treatment results from 
group therapy are less consistent than from the studies on individual cognitive 
therapy. On balance, it seems that the advantages of an idiographic approach to 
therapy in any of the disorders discussed outweigh the advantages of the group 
condition. On the other hand, in the present economic climate where there is 
pressure to "process" as many patients as possible in as short a space of time as 
possible, one can be assured of certain benefits in the group approach as already 
discussed. Ultimately, the decision whether to treat patients in a group or 
individually may rest with time and financial considerations.
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PART III 
CLINICAL DOSSIER.
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1. OUTLINE OF CLINICAL TRAINING.
COURSE : Postgraduate Diploma in Clinical Psychology,
University of Glasgow, 1962 - 1964.
1.1 Course structure : The first year of the course was spent at the Southern 
General Hospital, Glasgow.
Course director - Dr. R.M. Mowbray.
Clinical tutor - Ralph McGuire.
Time was divided between clinical work and teaching, both formal and informal. 
Weekly seminars were held for the course students, but as clinical psychology 
training courses were in their infancy then, much of our teaching was in 
conjunction with psychiatric SHOs or Registrars taking the Diploma in 
Psychological Medicine. Lectures in Adult Mental Health, Elderly, Children and 
Learning Difficulties were provided within that framework (although of course 
the last was not described by that terminology at that time). Neuroanatomy and 
neuropathology lectures were attended with dental students, and we attended the 
anatomy lab. once a week to dissect a brain.
Extra practice in assessment was given by taking out-patient clinics with the 
psychiatrists.
There was also a two-week placement arranged at Yorkhill Childrens Hospital in 
Glasgow.
Opportunity was given both for supervision in behaviour therapy at the Southern 
General, and to have a supervised case in psychoanalytic psychotherapy at the 
Lansdowne Clinic which at that time was one of the few places where this type 
of therapy could be obtained on the National Health Service.
The second year was spent at the Crichton Royal Hospital, Dumfries. Two
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mornings a week, the trainees worked in Ladyfield, the children's unit there where 
experience was gained with a variety of problems, autism, learning difficulties 
and behavioural disturbances. The remaining clinical time was divided between 
an adult acute ward and a geriatric ward.
Seminars were held weekly, and supervision provided in all three areas. A 
research project was required to be carried out and written up in this year. Exams 
were also taken at the end of the two years.
1.2 Research Project. An investigation into the neuro-psychological post­
operative effects of general anaesthesia in the elderly with special reference to 
spatial orientation. (Approximate title).
This was carried out at the Dumfries and Galloway General Hospital with the 
permission of the surgical wards. Equipment was made up that would be easy to 
use with people in bed, e.g. a feltboard with pieces adapted for use on it. Each 
patient was given a group of tests one day before, one day after where fitness 
allowed and three days after their operation and the results compared. The tests 
were Raven's Matrices, The Benton Visual Retention Test, the Wechsler Memory 
Scale and the Spatial Orientation test from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
adapted for use with patients confined to bed. An equal number of male and 
female patients were used, aged between 65 and mid-80s. Some patients showed 
some impairment in spatial orientation and short-term memory at first post­
operative test but, as far as I remember, most of the effect had gone by the second 
post-operative test. The number was small and not significant. (This is not 
available for the portfolio as Glasgow University did not keep the research work 
until the course became an MSc. in 1983.)
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2. POST-QUALIFICATION EXPERIENCE.
1964-1966 - Basic grade clinical psychologist at Royal Edinburgh Hospital, 
Edinburgh.
1966-1969 - Research psychologist with the Language and Proficiency Project, 
Department of Applied Linguistics, University of Edinburgh. This was an 
investigation of whether it was possible to predict a child's proficiency in 
languages and whether the age at which the child commenced to learn influenced 
this. The post involved work on test construction, experimental design and 
statistics, and also administration of the tests in schools.
1969-89 Time-out for practical in developmental psychology. This period 
included part-time involvement with the National Childbirth Trust and Relaxation 
for Living, an educational charity.
October 1989 - July 1995. Principal Clinical Psychologist in Adult Mental 
Health in East Berkshire, attached to Windsor and Maidenhead Community 
Mental Health Team (5 sessions).
Clinical work: predominantly cognitive-behaviour therapy with out- patients with 
a variety of diagnoses (e.g. depression, panic disorder, all types of anxiety 
disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder).
Teaching: cognitive-behaviour therapy to psychiatric registrars and SHOs. Also 
fortnightly session for team.
Supervision: Fortnightly session (which alternated with teaching) where member 
of team would bring a complex case.
Shared supervision of Oxford Regional Clinical Training Course trainee.
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Primary care experience: 1 session weekly for Cookham Medical Centre, 
individual clinical work. Also ran approximately 4 anxiety management groups 
per year.
Continuing Professional Development: The most significant fiirther training 
entered upon in this time period was the one-year Certificate in Cognitive 
Therapy at Oxford in 1993. The course comprised one full day per week over 
three 12-week terms. Within that day, clinical supervision was given for one and 
a half hours. Reading and written assignments were in addition to the teaching 
day. Students also took it in turn to provide a practical or theoretical seminar. 
Term I covered the basic concepts and skills of cognitive therapy, term II focused 
on developing these in relation to specific client groups and term III on managing 
difficulties in the practice of cognitive therapy and on the use of schema-focused 
therapy with personality disorders and difficult cases. Essays and case reports 
were required each term and therapy tapes regularly rated by supervisors. The 
final therapy tape was required to reach a certain standard to be passed.
3. Current clinical responsibilities.
Julv 1995 - present. Principal Clinical Psychologist with Oxfordshire Mental 
Health NHS Trust at the Wameford Hospital, Oxford (.5 WTE)
Clinical work: Predominantly cognitive-behaviour therapy within the Central 
department, which is a tertiary unit specialising in complex cases. A further two 
sessions are spent seconded to the Obsessive-compulsive Treatment Research 
Trial in the University Department of Psychiatry. This involves treatment with 
ruminators and ritualisers, contributing to planning and theoretical meetings and 
designing handouts.
Teaching: CBT to the psychiatric registrars and SHOs.
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Supervision: Supervisor on the Cognitive Therapy at Oxford course, which 
involves supervision in groups of three for one and a half hours per week, reports 
on the trainees at the end of each term and rating 6 therapy tapes per term. 
Supervising psychiatric registrars and SHOs in groups of three for one hour 
weekly. Also a further 45 minutes supervising those registrars who wish to 
continue with cognitive therapy training after completing their original 6 month 
placement. I also am a clinical supervisor and personal tutor for the Oxford 
Clinical Psychology Regional Training Course.
Primarv Care: as above.
The area I would like to focus on as the main content of my clinical dossier is the 
work I am doing with the Obsessional-compulsive Treatment Research Trial, 
partly because treatment methods in this area are still relatively experimental, 
partly because much of my work for the psychology department also involves 
OCD patients (currently forming 50-75% of my case-load) and it is my main area 
of interest.
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4. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT LOG FOR PERIOD OF 
PSYCH.D.(JANUARY 1995 - DECEMBER 19961
10/01/95 Introductory workshop, Psych. D. Conversion course. University of 
Surrey.
25/01/95 Avoidant Personality Disorder - Dr. Gillian Butler (frill day workshop). 
Part of Oxford Cognitive Therapy course follow-up program.
01/02/95 Deconstructing Schizophrenia - Dr. Mary Boyle (half-day workshop). 
University of Surrey.
16/02/95 Working with Families in the Community - Dr.Grainne Fadden (half­
day workshop). Wexham Park Hospital, Slough.
23/02/95 Psychological Effects of Torture - Dr. Metin Basoglu (lecture for 
BABCP). University Department of Psychiatry, Wamford Hospital, 
Oxford.
03/03/95 Psychopathy - Dr. R. Blackburn (full day workshop). University of 
Surrey.
20/03/95 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder - Dr. Padmal de Silva (half-day 
workshop). University of Surrey.
03/05/95 Groups for CSA Survivors - Dr. Helen Kennerley (full day workshop). 
Oxford Cognitive Therapy follow-up program.
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17/07/95 Cognitive Therapy with Couples - Dr.Christine Padesky and Dr.
Kathleen Moody (full day workshop). Oxford Cognitive Therapy 
follow- up program.
07/09/95 British Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies 
Annual Conference, Southampton University. (Attended one day 
which included mini-workshop on PTSD.)
08/09/95 Portfolio Presentations - Paul Devonshire. Half day demonstrating the 
requirements for the Psych.D.portfolio. University of Surrey.
15/09/95 Tutorial on use of Psych. Lit., Wamford Hospital Library, Oxford.
21/09/95 Cognitive Therapy with Complex Cases - Basics Revisited - Dr.
& Melanie Fennell, Ann Hackman & Linette Whitehead (2 x 1/2 day
25/09/95 workshops). University Department of Psychiatry, Wamford Hospital, 
Oxford.
07/12/95 Introduction to Word - Computer Department, Wamford Hospital,
14/12/95 Oxford.
08/02/96 Shame and Depression - Professor Paul Gilbert. Lecture for BABCP, 
University Department of Psychiatry, Wamford Hospital.
12/02/96 Therapist Factors in CBT, Camp Cognitive Therapy - Dr. Christine 
To Padesky & Dr.Kathleen Mooney. Five day workshop in Palm
16/02/96 Desert, Califomia.
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28/02/96 Cognitive Therapy with Chronic Fatigue - Ann Hackman & Dr.
Christina Surawy (frill day workshop). Cognitive Therapy course 
follow-up program, Oxford.
19/04/96 Reviewing the Literature - Dr. Lorraine Nanke (half-day).
University of Surrey.
16/10/96 Worrying about Worry - What can CBT contribute? - Dr. Gillian 
Butler. 1 day workshop for BABCP, Wamford Hospital, Oxford.
12/12/96 Brief Solution-focused Therapy - James Bennett-Levy (half-day 
workshop). Wamford Hospital, Oxford.
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S. Obsessive-compulsive disorder treatment trial.
Department of Psychiatry. University of Oxford.
A random controlled trial on effective treatment for obsessional ruminators, 
funded by a Wellcome Trust grant, is being carried out by Dr. Paul Salkovskis, 
assisted by Candida Richards and Elizabeth Forrester, to which I am seconded for 
two sessions. To date, there have been no random controlled trials which have 
shown any psychological treatment to be effective with obsessions not 
accompanied by overt rituals. A subsidiary part of the trial also attempts to assess 
the efficacy of cognitive behaviour therapy and behaviour therapy with ritualisers. 
In the first and main part of the trial, patients are randomly allocated to one of 
three conditions - cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT), applied stress management 
(ASM), and a wait-list condition. The wait-list condition is for 12 weeks and both 
treatment conditions are for 15 weeks. Assessment is carried out pre-treatment, 
during treatment, post-treatment and at three months and one year follow-up by 
an independent assessor who is blind to which treatment each patient is having. 
The ritualisers' part of the trial is still in the pilot stage, but follows the same plan 
except that instead of ASM, the patient would receive exposure and response 
prevention (ERP). This compares habituation-based exposure and response 
prevention with cognitively based therapy involving similar amounts of exposure 
and response prevention. If the cognitive theory is correct, more rapid and 
complete improvement would be expected with the cognitive-behavioural 
approach. The cognitive behavioural treatment emphasizes changing 
responsibility and threat beliefs and also explicitly develops the cognitive 
conceptualisation as an alternative to the fears held by patients about the meaning 
of their obsessional thoughts (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997).
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5.1 The size of the problem
Early surveys of the incidence of OCD in both in-patient and out-patient 
populations have given a relatively low figure, ranging from 0.5%-4.0% (Pollitt, 
1957; Kringlen, 1965; Ingram, 1961; Lo, 1967; Rasmussen & Tsuang, 1984). 
More recently, a study by Rasmussen & Eisen (1992) showed that in the private 
outpatient clinic where the study was undertaken 10% of the patients exhibited 
symptoms of OCD using DSMIII criteria. This figure is more consistent vdth the 
results of the NIMH Epidemiological Catchment Areas Survey (ECA). These 
suggested a six-month prevalence of 1.6% (Myers et al., 1984) and a lifetime 
prevalence of 2.5% (Robins et al., 1984). However, the accuracy of the ECA 
study has been criticised as non-professional interviewers had been employed to 
collect data. Although this may have led to some over-inclusion in these figures, 
the fact that a high proportion of OCD may still go unreported would suggest the 
higher figure to be more representative of the actual incidence in the community. 
As Black (1974, p. 21) observes "... patients suffering from obsessional states 
tend to be more secretive about their condition than other neurotic patients and 
to postpone seeking medical help till later. It is therefore probable that those seen 
in psychiatric practice are relatively more severe cases and the incidence of their 
attendance does not reflect the actual figure in the community." On the other 
hand, Bebbington (1990) concludes from the Camberwell Community Survey 
that out of 800 subjects randomly selected, only 1 case was felt to merit 
treatment.
In Oxford, the average rate of referral to the trial is 149 over a two year period, 
of whom 43 were not accepted for the trial. Reasons for not meeting criteria for 
the trial include subthreshold disorder (i.e. symptoms not currently causing 
sufficient distress to meet DSMIV criteria), a co-existing problem which would 
need separate treatment after the OCD had improved, being on medication which 
has not been stable for the last 6 weeks and patients with a history of psychosis.
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This compares with a referral rate of 24-28 per year to the Central Psychology 
Department and possibly the same again to the CMHTs. It is difficult to give an 
exact figure as the last year when there was reliable data for non-Central referrals 
was 1993/4 (the number and geographical grouping of the CMHTs has changed 
since then). This appears to be less than the yearly rate to the research trial, but 
the data is further confused by the fact that many of these will be the same 
patients, referred on to Psychology if they do not meet criteria for the trial.
5.2 Treatment conditions in the trial.
Cognitive treatment in the trial follows the model of Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 
1994) as described below. There is as yet little validation for the cognitive 
approach to OCD by proven success in controlled trials, although the trials of van 
Oppen (1995) and Ladouceur, Freeston, Gagnon, Thibodeau and Dumont, (1993) 
have supported its effectiveness. Nevertheless, there are good reasons, apart fi*om 
scientific curiosity, to use this approach vdth both client groups (ruminators and 
ritualisers). No behavioural treatment has been shown in controlled trials to be 
effective in the treatment of ruminators. Only 46% of patients treated in previous 
studies experienced 50% reduction in rumination frequency, and only 12% 
experienced a 50% reduction in distress (reviewed in Salkovskis and Westbrook, 
1989). As this group tend to have covert compulsions (e.g. a patient who pictures 
his or her child dead neutralises by thinking of the child alive), it is necessary to 
have a way of reaching these and to deal with the negative appraisal of the 
intrusions. It also helps those ritualisers who are afraid to fully commit to 
exposure and response prevention (ERP) because cognitive therapy does not 
simply ask the patients to stop carrying out the behaviour, but identifies and 
challenges those misinterpretations which lead them to ritualise. This lessens the 
element of risk and makes it easier for them to engage in therapy. A valuable 
advance in the way these patients see their problem is to change the patient's 
perception from, for example, that they are a potential child molester to one of
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being worried about being a child molester. In general, modification of the 
misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts and related beliefs should bring about a 
more complete and lasting change for the patient.
The other treatment condition for ruminators is applied stress management 
incorporating the applied relaxation technique of Lars Goran Ost (1987). For 
ritualisers it is exposure and response prevention which has already been well 
documented elsewhere (Foa & Goldstein, 1978; Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989) and 
has been moderately successful with OCD patients over the last twenty-five 
years.
The main elements employed in the cognitive-behavioural treatment are:
- identifying distorted beliefs and constructing a non-threatening 
alternative account of their obsessional experience, conceptualisation.
- self-monitoring of obsessional thoughts and the patient's appraisal of 
those thoughts.
- discussion which helps to modify both these appraisals and their basic 
assumptions.
- behavioural experiments to test these out.
- modification of general assumptions which maintain the problem (e.g. 
not trying to prevent harm is as bad as making it happen deliberately)
(Salkovskis, 1996, unpublished treatment manual).
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5.3 Illustrative case histories.
(For reasons of brevity, 'he' will stand for 'he/she' unless a specific person is being 
described.) These elements of therapy will be illustrated first by reference to a 
selection of examples from three case histories and then by a single full case 
history. The background to the three cases (two ruminators and one ritualiser) 
will be briefly described and used to clarify descriptions of therapeutic 
interventions. As examples will be taken mainly from ruminator cases, the full 
case history will be that of a ritualiser. Names and some biographical details have 
been changed.
Sarah. A 34 year old married woman with two small sons, aged four and a half 
years and fifteen months. She had obsessional ruminations about harming her 
children or herself. She was married to a policeman and had been a policewoman 
herself, and therefore had first-hand experience of violence being done to 
children. Her intrusive thoughts were of strangling her sons, especially the baby, 
or of committing suicide and leaving the family without a mother. This episode 
had started after the birth of her second son.
Nicky. A D.Phil. student at Oxford who first experienced obsessional thoughts 
in the run-up to her final undergraduate examinations. These also took the form 
of thoughts of harming others, but were less specific than those of the previous 
patient. She worried about being with anyone or thing which was potentially 
vulnerable or weaker than her, e.g. kittens, children, her boyfriend when he was 
asleep. Her other predominant intrusive thought was that she was mad. Her 
problems made her depressed and anxious and unable to cope with her work.
Anna. A 28 year old woman who had been a compulsive washer and cleaner for 
the past eight years. Her main fear of contamination was that she would contract 
HIV, ever since a party where a boy forced his attentions on her. She would have
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to wash her hands between any activity before going on to the next one or before 
touching anything else. She also does some checking of her typing at work, locks, 
etc. Anna had been brought up in Africa and had been given constant messages 
about the dangers of lack of cleanliness.
5.4 Cognitive-behavioural treatment.
The patient is first introduced to the idea of cognitive-behaviour therapy, i.e. a 
collaborative style, an agenda for each session and the fact that each session will 
be taped so that he can listen to it between sessions. He is asked to note the 
important points that have been covered and what he has learned from them, and 
also to note any issues that he would like the therapist to clarify or that he might 
have felt were not sufficiently dealt with in the session. He is also given a 
socialisation handout to be read before the next session. It is explained that the 
main focus Avill be on the "here and now", the things which are currently 
constituting the problem for the patient, although it may also be important to find 
out if there are vulnerabilities which could precipitate a relapse in the future.
The first element of therapy is identifying distorted beliefs and constructing a 
non-threatening alternative account of their obsessional experience. As intrusive 
thoughts are often so distressing to the patient and taken by them as a sign of 
abnormality, the first step is to normalise the experience of those thoughts by 
discussing who has intrusive thoughts and how do the majority of people respond 
to them. It often comes as a surprise to them that research has shown that non- 
clinical populations have as many intrusive thoughts as obsessional patients (the 
difference being in how they deal vdth them), and can produce a significant 
change in their perception of themselves as mentally ill (Salkovskis & Harrison, 
1984). It also helps them realise that getting rid of the thoughts entirely is not the 
goal of treatment, but rather being able to let them go without feeling the need to 
act upon them. In addition, it is a step towards encouraging them to reframe their
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problem from being the sort of person who is a danger to others to being the sort 
of person who is worried about being a source of danger to others. Reminding 
herself about the difference between these two was found particularly helpful by 
Nicky, mentioned above, whose main source of anxiety was the threat she 
believed she presented to others.
5.4.1
Distorted beliefs about responsibility and about the importance of thoughts need 
to be identified and modified. Often the formulation, established collaboratively 
with the patient, goes a long way towards providing an alternative account of 
their problem and towards modifying their beliefs. Demonstrating the 
maintenance cycle is usually the first step towards formulation. This entails 
demonstrating, using the patient's own examples, the role played by neutralising, 
by heightened awareness of threat, by an exaggerated need for control or certainty 
and the effect these have on mood (Salkovskis, 1996). Looking first at an 
example of a ritualiser, (Anna), a maintenance cycle was built up collaboratively 
as shown below in Fig.l :
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Beliefs about responsibility 
(I must go to any lengths to make sure myself and others are safe.)
Neutralising - 
washing, checking
Heightened awareness of 
threat of contamination
Misinterpretation of the importance of thoughts
Need for control/ 
certainty
Increased anxiety 
Distress
nK
OCD
Fig.l
Anna was able to see how these vicious circles kept her obsessional symptoms 
going, and found that looking at the problem in this way demystified it to a great 
extent. She also realised that the effect of making a constant effort to prevent 
something has the effect of increasing preoccupation about it.
Looking beyond the maintenance cycle, it was possible for her to see how her 
general beliefs about responsibility and need for certainty had arisen. There were 
several episodes in her childhood where there had been an exaggerated response 
by her mother to "unclean" events, such as when she was smeared with goat's 
blood by their neighbours in an African ritual, or when she was tricked by other
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children into drinking a "filthy goo" and believed she had poisoned herself.
Linking those general beliefs and the experiences which produced them with the 
maintenance cycle gives a hypothetical formulation for the individual's 
obsessional problem. An illustration of this is the cognitive formulation for Sarah 
below. (This formulation is based on an updated version of Salkovskis' cognitive 
model, not yet published.)
Page 75
EARLY EXPERIENCES
Constant reminders of trying to harm baby
Blaming self for dog drowning
Lack of approval / affection from mother
CRITICAL INCIDENTrS^
* Birth of son- responsible for the 
first time for another human being
ASSUMPTIONS. GENERAL BELIEFS 
I am responsible for bad things happening 
I must t^ e  precautions to avoid causing harm 
I am not a person to be trusted 
Only bad people have bad thoughts
vl^
INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS
I could easily strangle him - it would be over in an instant 
Something might make me put my hands round his neck 
I could swerve in front of that car, it would be over in a flash 
I could put that plastic bag over my head 
I must be mad or evil
NEUTRALISING 
Mental argument 
Avoidance of being alone with 
children or having knives, plastic bags.
ATTENTION 
Over-alert to situations 
seen as dangerous
MISINTERPRETATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE ^
AND MEANING OF INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS
If I have those thoughts I am capable of doing those things 
If I have those thoughts I am a bad person
I may be mad and therefore do these things because I have no control over 
^  what I am doing
jI
ATTEMPTS TO OVERCONTROL 
Thought suppression 
Increased monitoring of mental 
processes
' i /
OCD
MOOD CHANGES 
Distress 
Anxiety 
Depression
Fig. 2
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5.4.2 Self-monitoring of obsessional thoughts and altering their appraisal.
The patient is asked to record some of their intrusive thoughts. Perhaps one day 
in the week would be chosen or a time-sample of each day. (Otherwise the 
volume of material collected could be prodigious.) A modified version of the 
Dysfimctional Thought Record is used to record both the thoughts and the 
patient's appraisal of that thought. For example, the intrusive thought that Nicky 
had "I could stab Alan (her boyfiiend) while he is sleeping" was appraised by her 
as meaning that because she had the thought, she was likely to do it and that she 
was a potential murderess. When she was sometimes able to dispel that appraisal, 
she was still highly anxious as the fact that she did not want to do it but was still 
having this sort of thought must mean she was mad, and therefore likely to do it 
against her v^ll.
5.4.3 Discussion to modifia appraisals and assumptions.
Through questioning, the patient can be helped to see that the appraisals and 
assumptions he or she has been holding are faulty. A patient who believes that a 
negative thought about the family Avill have terrible consequences unless it is 
neutralised in some way, can be asked if that then would be an effective way to 
ensure someone's death. If the Mafia were holding one's children prisoner and to 
obtain their release one had to carry out a contract killing, would it be possible 
just to think the victim dead? The patient can then see the absurdity of this belief.
Once patients can perceive an alternative way of looking at the problem, they can 
then challenge the intrusive thought. An example of this is a thought recorded by 
Nicky "I might pick up that kitchen knife and stab my boyfiiend with it while he 
is asleep." which she answered by "A thought is not the same as a deed. I realise 
I am only thinking that because the thought of that is so terrible to me, and I am 
not likely to do anything of the sort." However, it is important to make sure that
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the patient is not using the new coping strategy as an alternative form of 
neutralising. Many patients are aware of this danger and will comment on it 
spontaneously. Some also worry that it is substituting another form of 
reassurance. Anna, for example started to tell herself on each occasion "No, you 
don't need to wash, it was not dirty." It is helpful to advise patients to change the 
form of the challenge each time, and also to remind them that it should be only 
necessary for a limited period to have to consciously challenge the thought as it 
becomes easier to just let the thought go.
5.4.4 Behavioural experiments.
These are carried out in a spirit of "Let's see how it works." and fall broadly into 
3 types (Salkovskis, 1996):
1) experiments to find out what may be playing a part in maintaining the problem 
and what process is increasing the patient's symptom's and fears (including 
intrusive thoughts).
2) exposure exercises with loop tape where the patient has the opportunity to 
discover that repetition of their intrusive thoughts leads to a reduction in their 
anxiety and in their perception of responsibility.
3) exposure exercises "in vivo" to give the patient the opportunity to see that even 
when the neutralising behaviour is not carried out, their anxiety will still diminish 
by itself.
5.4.4.1 Thought suppression.
One example of experiments in the first category would be illustrating the effects 
of thought suppression. It has been shown that trying not to think a thought 
usually has the effect that of making the thought come all the more (Wegner, 
1989; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1993). This is demonstrated to the patient by 
asking him not to think about some irrelevant subject e.g. a giraffe. Then 
behavioural experiments involving deliberate suppression of their own intrusive
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thoughts (such as Sarah's thought about strangling her baby son) are constructed 
asking the patient to alternate brief periods of 5-10 minutes of trying not to think 
a thought and of recording it. Homework can also be given asking them to record 
thoughts and alternate attempts to suppress them.
5.4.4.2 Loop tape experiments and belief modification
This technique has been shown to be useful with those patients with no overt 
compulsions (Salkovskis and Westbrook, 1989). First the use of the audiotape 
procedure is explained. Then a key intrusive thought is elicited and a rating 
obtained of the discomfort. It appears to be important that a fair degree of anxiety 
is elicited, otherwise this intervention is ineffective as no belief modification is 
achieved. Then this is recorded onto loop tape by the patient, and any urges to 
neutralise are identified. Response prevention is initiated with  a cognitive 
rationale. The patient begins with a recording of discomfort and home work is set 
up to repeat this daily for a set period of time (e.g. 15 mins). Emphasis is still on 
belief modification and the patient is asked to note what changes are occurring 
and what they make of them. Later, practice is moved from the patient's home to 
situations which trigger these thoughts. Lastly, the patient is asked to carry a 
personal stereo with the tape in it and use it when they are currently experiencing 
intrusions. Beliefs are still monitored and continue to be modified through 
behavioural experiments and discussion.
This technique is not without its problems and does not always result in belief 
modification. This can be because the wrong phrase has been selected i.e. one 
which was not sufficiently central to the problem in the first place. It can also be 
because underlying assumptions may prevent the patient from changing the 
appraisals effectively so the focus has to shift to challenging the assumption. It 
is also my opinion that a more theoretically 'pure' way of achieving this would be 
to have the person produce the thoughts for themselves, given the hypotheses 
about inflated responsibility, rather than externally by a tape. This was successful
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with Sarah who was asked to sit in the dark beside her sleeping baby for a period 
each evening thinking"! am going to strangle Jamie". She noted the level of 
anxiety each time and as the level of anxiety decreased, the strength of the belief 
did also reaching 0% at the end of two weeks. However, it is not always possible 
for the patient to be able to do this by themselves and then the tape is a necessary 
addition for them.
5.4.4.3 Exposure and response prevention
ERP for ritualisers is introduced as a behavioural experiment within a cognitive
framework. "Let us see what happens etc." As in standard ERP, there is an
escalating task list and a diary record is kept. At least one session of this for 
ritualisers is usually "in the field". However, emphasis is on testing out 
responsibility beliefs and testing the predictions of the "my problem is worry" 
hypothesis.
5.4.4.4 Experiments related to responsibility
Use of a responsibility pie-chart weakens beliefs about being responsible for 
negative outcomes. All the factors relating to the feared catastrophic event are 
listed. A circle is drawn and the patient fills in pieces of the pie differing in size 
relative to the importance of each factor. The patient's most catastrophic fear is 
added to the list last. An example of this is the man who is afraid that because of 
his carelessness a terrible car crash on the street will happen if his bicycle fell on 
the street (van Oppen & Amtz, 1994). Fig. 3 illustrates this "pie-technique".
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weather
25%
driver
myself
5%
car mechanic 
5%
approaching car 
20%
Illustration of pic technique" of factors which contributed to the car crash.
Fig. 3
As obsessional patients generally believe that thinking about something can make 
it more likely to happen, encouraging the patient to actively think negative 
thoughts about someone helps disconfirm their beliefs about their influence. This 
is begun with some relatively minor harm (e.g. someone having a puncture, or 
getting a dent in their car) and gradually moving to more catastrophic 
consequences. When encouraging them to think of more catastrophic outcomes, 
it is useful for the therapist to start with himself as it is often too threatening for 
the patient to be able to think bad thoughts about his family e.g. asking him to 
think that the therapist will twist an ankle on the way home that evening or, as the 
patient gains in confidence, that the therapist will have a heart attack. Ultimately, 
they are encouraged to think or write down some catastrophe that might befall a 
member of their family in the next week, thus weakening their belief that their 
thoughts can influence outcome. It has been shown that manipulating 
responsibility can make a considerable difference to the level of distress and the 
urge to neutralise experienced by the patient (Roper and Rachman, 1973; 
Hodgson, Roper and Rachman, 1975). So homework which has been assigned by
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the therapist (such as ERP) can often be carried out more readily than a similar 
task which they have been asked to initiate for themselves. This helps increase the 
patient's understanding of the role of responsibility in their problem.
5.4.4.S Estimation of catastrophe
It is useful to challenge the over-estimation of danger by shovvdng how to 
calculate the probability of the catastrophe as in Fig. 4 (Hoekstra, 1989).
Step
1.1 did not extinguish my 
cigarette.
2. A little spark falls on the 
floor covering.
3. The wall-to-wall carpet will 
catch fire.
4. The carpet starts to bum 
and I do not immediately 
notice the fire.
5 .1 notice the fire too late 
so I cannot do anything 
about it.
Chance
1/10
1/10
1/10
Cumulative
chance
1/10
1/100
1/1000
1/100 1/100,00
1/100 1/ 10,000,000
The patient can then see that his own responsibility is much smaller than he first 
thought it to be.
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5.4.4.6 Imagery restructuring
In many obsessional patients, images can be regarded as being prophetic - having 
"seen" something happen in their head, they fear it is going to happen. Also 
recurrent distressing images can maintain an intolerably high level of anxiety. 
One way to help them accept that an image is just an image and nothing more is 
to teach them to restructure the image. This can be done by treating the image like 
a video in which the image is enlarged or made smaller and finally switched off. 
Alternatively, it can be transformed into a humorous situation or even cartoon 
characters. For example, Sarah had been plagued by intrusive images of her small 
son being put through the office shredder after joking with some colleagues about 
what they were going to do with him (he had accompanied his mother into the 
office one day). She was encouraged to find a way of changing the ending, rather 
in the way of Tom and Jerry cartoons, and settled on having him come through 
the shredder in fiat strips in true cartoon fashion, taking the strips to the hospital 
to have them stuck together again, and then he pops up as good as new. She found 
this completely defused the guilt and anxiety she felt about having made a joke 
about it and was able to use this technique effectively on other similar anxiety- 
provoking images. It is important to avoid the patient treating this as a safety 
behaviour which would then increase the importance of the intrusive image rather 
than reducing it.
5.4.4.7 The issue of control
Many patients believe that their thoughts being out of control is a sign that they 
themselves are out of control. It is helpful to demonstrate (by the giraffe example 
already mentioned, for example) that our thought processes are never entirely 
under our control. The patient is invited to try their hardest to lose control 
mentally, which of course they are unable to do. It is also helpful to use 
metaphors to explain how attempts at control can actually serve to maintain the 
patient's fears. (For example the story about the man sitting in the railway
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carriage tearing up bits of newspaper and throwing them out of the window. 
Asked by the ticket-collector why he is doing this, he replies "To keep the 
elephants off the line." When the ticket-collector protests that there are no 
elephants on the line, he says "See, it works then!")
5.5 Relapse prevention
It is important to spend time in the last one or two sessions preparing the patient 
to cope alone, to plan ahead to be alert to any sign of a recurrence and to identify 
what will help them deal with it from the skills already learned. One way of doing 
it is to draw up a blue-print which includes what the patient has learned in 
therapy, and how they will continue to use that in everyday life or if a setback 
were to occur. An example is included below:
Nicky's Blueprint.
What have I found useful?
* Using imagery modification.
* Learning the facts about OCD - that the thoughts are not connected to the 
act; that OCD sufferers do not commit crimes connected to their 
preoccupation; that these thoughts are found in a wide range of people who 
are not ill but are often perfectionists and need to feel they are in control.
* Reassuring to find it is not a mental illness but stems from my beliefs.
* Learning to let thoughts go rather than try to stop them.
* Learning the real nature of anxiety and that it is not going to do me any 
harm.
* Learning the reasons for my low self-esteem.
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What can I continue to use?
* All of the above.
What might make it difficult for me to use these ?
* Fine when things are going smoothly.
* If life throws things at you (not getting a job or not doing well on paper), 
have to be alert to thoughts recurring.
What might cause a setback ?
* Relationship difficulties / end of the relationship.
* Some kind of emotional stress.
* Big life crises, unemployment.
What would vou do about it ?
* Watch out for increasing anxiety, depression, loss of appetite, poor sleep, 
difficulty concentrating, obsessive thoughts.
* Dealing with these symptoms.
* Taking time out to relax.
* Making time for the things I enjoy.
* Talking to someone.
* Try to work out why, come back to things we've talked about, look over 
notes.
* Read "Stop Obsessing" again.
* Realise that it is normal to be anxious and it is not a sign of failure to be 
fiightened.
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5.6 Difficulties in treatment.
Once the patient has reached the point where he believes that obsessional 
thoughts are irrelevant to further action, there is often a concern that they will 
find it difficult to discriminate between obsessional worries and normal intrusive 
thoughts which may require some action. A normal intrusive thought might be 
"I've left my car keys on the kitchen table" and this requires some action. On the 
other hand, "Can I be sure I shut that door? Should I go back to check?" is 
associated v^th doubt. He can be encouraged to respond only to the intrusions 
which carry conviction and not those that are associated Avith doubt and the 
possibility of things going wrong.
The patient should also be on the alert for the return of any neutralising 
behaviour, as what may start as a coping technique may turn into a mental ritual 
(or a compulsive behaviour in the case of ritualisers). For this reason it is useful 
for them to vary any techniques they have found helpful. If there is any sign of 
a ritual starting, they should have the necessary knowledge to "nip it in the bud". 
A blueprint for the future is drawn up, listing what the patient has learned, how 
they are going to put it into practice, what difficulties might arise in doing this, 
what might cause a setback and how they would deal with that.
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6. Case Example of a Ritualiser
6.1 Biographical Data
Mark is a 40 year old male University lecturer who has had a compulsive 
checking problem for over 10 years.
He was brought up abroad in a country with an extremely repressive regime, in 
an atmosphere of political persecution and neighbour informing on neighbour. 
However, a change in the regime meant that he was able to go to University, and 
subsequently came to this country to do his doctorate. He has been here for over 
10 years now and is married with no children.
6.2 Presenting Problem
Intrusive thoughts about having said or written something wrong which then 
necessitates checking to make sure that it has not happened. Also, to a lesser 
degree, checking gas taps, electrical sockets and locks. Recent example : In the 
University Library, he had the sudden intrusive thought that he might say "I have 
stolen a book." He then became highly anxious that he might say it or write it. He 
then had to go over the event in his head again and again to make sure he did not 
say it. He imagined catastrophic scenarios about being arrested. If he had been 
with someone, he would have sought reassurance that he had not in fact said 
anything. Gradually, through the rest of the afternoon and evening, his need to 
check over the conversation in his head and his anxiety reduced.
6.3 Triggers
- seeing a notice saying that books are missing.
- writing on a card for a colleague.
- someone at work asking who made a long distance phone-call.
- having to fill out a form at hospital that he did not have time to check.
- any conversation that might have any importance
e.g. speaking to bank on phone after direct debit account had been
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stopped by accident.
6.4 Rituals
- checking everything he has written in case he has written anything 
"bad".
- checks letters before posting.
- checks conversations in his mind to make sure he has not said 
anything wrong.
- patterns for checking sockets, locks, etc.
- sometimes instead, he will get his wife to check for him or will ask 
her for reassurance.
6.5 Pre-treatment scores *
- Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 10
- Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAJ) 14
- Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory 35
- Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory 46
- Maudsley Obsessive-compulsive Inventory 11
- Obsessive-compulsive Questionnaire 28
(checking subscale 12)
* Interpretation of scores.
(These questionnaires make up part of the battery given in the research project, 
and as such are described in more detail in section 2.2 of the research dossier.)
BDI - cut-off points 
(Beck, Ward, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961)
0-9 Normal range 
10-15 Mild depression
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16-19 Mild-moderate depression 
20-29 Moderate-severe depression 
30-63 Severe depression
BAT
(Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988)
0-9 Normal range. Maximum score - 63.
No further cut-off points exist for the BAI. In the paper cited above, the mean for 
anxiety groups was 25.76 and the standard deviation 11.42.
Spielberger State-Trait Anxietv Inventorv 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene, 1970).
Sample means and SDs for non-clinical and clinical groups:
Trait State
Mean SD Mean SD
Freshmen 38.07 8.20 40.1 7.85
Psychiatric patients 46.62 12.41 47.74 13.24
Maximum score - 80.
Maudslev Obsessive-compulsive Inventorv tMOCD 
- means and SDs (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977)
Obsessionals Non-obsessional neurotics
Mean SD Mean SD
Total 18.86 4.92 9.27 5.43
Maximum score - 30.
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Obsessive compulsive Questionnaire tOCO'>
(Salkovskis & Foa, 1994, unpublished collaboration).
- Means and SDs for total and checking subscale
Obsessionals Non-patients
Total 66.33 (31.9) 25.25(20.8)
Checking ss 1.51 ( 0.9) 0.52(0.5)
Maximum score -168.
6.6 Development of problem
Mark described himself as always having been very over-cautious, very 
disciplined and very honest. The first sign of this disorder, however, came when 
he went to Holland to give a paper at a conference. At the airport, there was a bag 
check for drugs. He found himself worrying repeatedly why he had been checked 
although he knew perfectly well he had no drugs, and checking over in his head 
what had actually been in his case. After that, the problem spread to any situation 
where he might have said or written something totally alien to his nature. He did 
realise that his preoccupations were always related to something which was 
completely opposite to what he would have wished to do in the situation, e.g. 
worrying that he had walked off without paying for a train ticket, or that he had 
accidentally written something insulting in a letter. The amount of time this has 
taken up has waxed and waned over the 10 years that it has been happening, 
sometimes resulting in hours of checking and rechecking conversations in his 
head, or rechecking a letter up to 8 times. Checking of gas, locks and electrical 
things also increased though he has never found that as much of a problem. 
Before leaving the house, he would check the gas fire, all electrical plugs and 
sockets and lock every door. Before bed, he would check the gas fire and then 
have to return two or three times to make sure. Posting letters or throwing written 
things into the waste-bin were both difficult.
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6.7 Previous treatment - none.
6.8 Current coping methods:
- avoidance of writing letters if possible
- keeping very busy
- asking wife for reassurance
- avoiding contributing much to conversations
6.9 CASE FORMULATION
6.9.1 Current thinking, affect and behaviour.
Obsessional thoughts:
- 1 might not have paid for that ticket.
- What if I said I stole that book.
- Maybe I have put something in that letter that the recipient will find 
offensive.
- There might have been something harmful in that box of chocolates 
that I have just given as a present.
Affect: low mood, but varies with intensity of problem.
Behaviour: - avoidance of trigger situations where possible (as already 
described).
- compulsive checking of household things (also described).
6.9.2 Maintenance of Problem.
Mark has worried over a period of time that because he has intrusive thoughts 
which are anathema to him, it is possible that he might actually say or write these 
things. He recognises that the probability of such a thing happening is very small.
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but because of the perceived cost of the consequences of doing this and his 
perception of being responsible for harm that may come to himself or others, he 
still feels compelled to check. However, his neutralising efforts (either physically 
or mentally checking) and his attempts to suppress these thoughts reduce his 
discomfort in the short term but have the longer term effect of increasing 
preoccupation and triggering further intrusions. His avoidance of triggering 
situations prevents him from having more opportunity to disconfirm his beliefs. 
His mood also interacts with his symptoms as it drops due to his inability to deal 
with his problem. The more it drops, the more intense the problem becomes.
6.9.3 Cognitive vulnerability factors.
As mentioned briefly, Mark was brought up in a repressive regime where there 
was suspicion of the type of background he came from. This meant they were 
continually in danger and he remembers his father telling him many times "Think 
it three times in your head before you say it." He grew up with the habit of being 
very guarded in what he said. In his early teens, he remembers being left to look 
after his younger sister (aged 10) as his parents had been detained briefly. His 
early experience was that the world was a dangerous place for such as he, that he 
was responsible for the safety of others and that he needed to exercise a great deal 
of caution. In addition, his parents set very high moral standards and discipline, 
honesty and hard work were held up as family values. This experience gave rise 
to beliefs and assumptions such as:
- People are not to be trusted.
- The world is a dangerous place.
- If I don't take precautions against them, bad things might happen.
A summary of the cognitive formulation is in Fig. 6.
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EARLY EXPERIENCE 
Parents' emphasis on doing the right thing
and on doing everything right.
Knowledge that life is dangerous.
Need to go over things in head before saying them.
CRITICAL INCIDENTS
- Coming to live in an unfamiliar culture. 
Responsibility of taking a University post.
ASSUMPTIONS. GENERAL BELIEFS
People are not to be trusted.
The world is a dangerous place.
I must do everything as well as I can.
If I don't take precautions against them, bad things might happen.
If there is any possibility that I can influence a negative outcome, it is my 
duty to do it.
INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS
I might have said something which would have embarrassed me / offended 
them.
Did I remember to pay for that ticket?
I could blurt out that I have stolen this book and I will be shamed.
NEUTRALISING 
Checking 
Reassurance seeking \  
^  Avoidance i
ATTENTION
Heightened awareness of 
potential threats
MISINTERPRETATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE 
AND MEANING OF INTRUSIVE THOUGHTS.
If I think something, I might say or write it.
If a negative thought occurs to me, I must do everything in my power to 
avert it happening.
-V ATTEMPTS TO OVERCONTROL
Increased monitoring of 
mental processes 
Seeks absolute certainty
L 3
MOOD CHANGES 
Anxiety 
Discomfort 
Depression
Fig. 6
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6.10 Course of treatment.
6.10.1 Developing alternative hypotheses about the development and 
maintenance of his OCD.The hypotheses about the development of Mark's 
obsessive-compulsive problems were that his early experience led to the 
formation of beliefs about the necessity of extreme caution in what one says or 
does, and about the value of doing things as well as possible. These beliefs were 
reactivated by moving to a completely different culture and by having the 
responsibility of a lectureship at University. The more he became anxious to 
make sure he did everything just right, the more he felt compelled to check. The 
more he checked, the harder it became for him to decide whether he had actually 
said or written anything he should not have, and the more anxious he became. As 
he is a highly intelligent, logical person, it distressed him that he appeared to have 
no control over this problem. He started to avoid trigger situations and therefore 
deprived himself of the chance to discover that, without the checking, the anxiety 
would have diminished anyway (as shown in the formulation on the previous 
page).
6.10.2 Socialisation to the model. The cognitive model was introduced and a 
socialisation handout given. As therapy progressed, various journal articles were 
given to support points that were being discussed. For example, when 
normalisation of intrusive thoughts was being targeted, an article on the 
comparison of intrusive thoughts in clinical and non-clinical populations was 
given (Salkovskis and Harrison, 1984). After establishing the role of inflated 
responsibility through Socratic questioning, this was backed up by another 
Salkovskis article (1994). Even just these interventions made a considerable 
difference to Mark's feeling about his problem, helping reduce the idea that he 
might be losing control or going mad. Of course, the choice of reading material 
in this case was determined by the sophistication of the subject and would not 
have been appropriate for many subjects.
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6.10.3 The subject of neutralising was next raised, and the way that carrying out 
the rituals strengthens negative beliefs was highlighted. The role of reassurance- 
seeking was identified as part of neutralising, and he was encouraged to stop 
asking his wife either for reassurance or to write letters for him or to check things 
he had written. He found this difficult at first and after being able to refirain from 
asking her to check for him, continued to check his letters twice before posting 
them for another two to three weeks.
6.10.4 Next, the subject of responsibility was dealt with. Time was spent on 
identifying and monitoring Mark's thoughts, his appraisal of these thoughts and 
his beliefs, especially those related to responsibility. He was encouraged to take 
more responsibility and to use the information to challenge the evidence for his 
appraisals. Often at this point, a home visit would be arranged for ritualisers as 
that is usually where the bulk of their rituals are centred. However, as the larger 
part of Mark's checking was mental, it was not considered to be particularly 
beneficial in his case.
6.10.5 Response prevention, as part of a behavioural experiment, was also 
introduced, e.g. he first of all managed to postpone checking things around the 
house for ever-increasing lengths of time. This helped bring his appraisals to the 
fore which made it easier for him to challenge them. Latterly, he has been able 
to reduce his checking of these things to once. His habit of checking "till it feels 
right" was also discussed and whether "feeling right " was a reasonable criterion 
forjudging whether an action had been done properly or not. He started to test out 
whether he could tolerate that the action did not feel right while at the same time 
knowing intellectually that he had completed the action. He discovered that the 
discomfort generated by leaving the task before it 'felt right' quickly dissipated 
and it became easier to use an intellectual rather than an emotional criterion.
Page 95
6.10.6 His overestimation of the danger of leaving things unchecked was 
challenged by showing him how to calculate the probability of any catastrophic 
outcome happening, as in the example in the description of treatment. Checking 
over things he had written was tackled by encouraging him to make no copies of 
his E-mail, to post letters straight away, and not to ask his wife to check anything. 
Strangely, he never had any problems with checking journal articles he had 
written, beyond one read through for proof-reading. It was only personal matters 
that brought on the urge to check.
6.10.7 Checking conversations was reduced, first by pointing out the 
impossibility of remembering everything that was said in a conversation, (and 
how even the attempt of trying raises the anxiety) and secondly by encouraging 
him to distract himself and do something else if the urge to check back over a 
conversation came into his mind (i.e. cognitive exposure and response 
prevention) to disconfirm the belief that it had been necessary in the first place. 
Although distraction may be viewed as an avoidance technique, the intention 
behind the distraction would seem to be the more appropriate way to classify it. 
If the intention is to provide a way of allovvdng the discomfort to remain without 
dispelling it (as opposed to trying to use distraction to take away any anxiety) it 
can be a valid and theoretically consistent way of allowing the person to 
disconfirm their hypothesis i.e. of having to go over their conversation mentally 
to make sure nothing bad was said. A problem with this is that one has to rely on 
the patient's honesty.
6.10.8 Towards the end of treatment, Mark was increasingly encouraged to take 
responsibility for setting his own homework. The focus moved more to relapse 
prevention work and a 'blueprint' was drawn up to summarise what he had learned 
in therapy and how he could build this into his everyday life.
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6.10.9 Problems encountered in therapy.
As a way of challenging Mark's perfectionist tendencies, he was encouraged to 
allow himself to make mistakes, send them out unchanged and find out whether 
this confirmed or disconfirmed his belief that others would evaluate him 
negatively. This was difficult, as not just his own beliefs but the fact that his 
career was in academia added to the pressure to 'get things right'. His reluctance 
to test this out was probably based on a realistic assessment of the way others 
would regard his 'errors'. It is a drawback of this type of behavioural experiment 
that if the patient is working in a very competitive environment, it can be 
inappropriate to push this too far. However, some headway was made vsdth 
unimportant memos.
Another problem which arose was that of symptom substitution, or perhaps more 
correctly, situation substitution. Mark would overcome difficulties about dealing 
with banks (e.g. Did 1 say the wrong thing to them? Did 1 put the correct signature 
on the cheque? What iff misunderstood what they were instructing me to do?) 
and then would develop preoccupations with something else (e.g. staying in a 
hotel, thinking that possibly the last tenant of the room might have been a drug 
dealer who had hidden some drugs there, and if they were found, it would be he, 
Mark, who would be suspected and charged). At first he seemed unable to 
recognise the similarity in the situations and would come back asking for 
reassurance about the latest one. Although he understood the formulation firom 
an early stage of therapy, knew at one level that this was another expression of 
the old problem, and knew that the likelihood of the occurrence was 
infinetismally low, the perceived dreadfulness of the result was still high. 
Discussing again Salkovskis' 'equation' of anxiety (1994) proved helpful, as 
shown below.
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Anxiety
Perceived likelihood of 
anticipated danger X 
Perceived ability to X 
cope with danger
Perceived awfulness 
of anticipated danger 
Perceived external 
factors which would 
assist rescue
6.10.10 Outcome measures.
The questionnaires administered at the beginning of treatment were repeated at 
the end of treatment. Results are shown below:
Pre-treatment Post-treatment
EDI 10 8
EAl 14 9
Spielberger State 35 23
Spielberger Trait 46 44
MOCl 11 6
OCQ 28 6
(checking subscale 12 3)
As can be seen from these scores, there was little difference in his anxiety and 
depression scores as measured by the BAJ, the EDI, and the Spielberger Trait 
Anxiety Inventory, though a larger difference on the State Anxiety as one might 
expect with an improvement in his OCD symptoms. However there is a more 
marked difference in the OCD symptom measures, especially in the OCI score 
(28 down to 6) and the checking sub-scale (12 down to 3) which relects his 
improvement.
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6.10.11 Discussion.
The cognitive approach, in my opinion, gave this patient a very credible rationale 
for understanding his problems, which facilitated engagement and collaboration. 
Mark quickly learned to become his own therapist, setting the agenda and his own 
homework. He was strongly motivated from the beginning and was able to see 
the relationship between his past history and his beliefs and assumptions. This 
helped normalise his thoughts and behaviours and gave him optimism that he 
would be able to change those past beliefs in the light of his present knowledge. 
His checking has reduced to normal limits, though the urge to do some mental 
checking is still occasionally quite strong. At 6 month follow-up, Mark regarded 
his problems as 85% better than when he started.
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7. Summary.
It has been my impression over the last two years in working with these patients 
that the cognitive approach to treatment has added significantly to the more 
traditional ERF treatment. One patient already referred to, Anna, remarked 
spontaneously that she realised why ERP had only given her temporary 
improvement because it had only changed her behaviour but had failed to change 
the beliefs behind it, so that it was inevitable that it would come back. This 
modification of not only the behaviours involved in OCD, but of the beliefs about 
the importance of thoughts and about heightened responsibility appears to 
enhance the likelihood of successful treatment. This style of therapy appears to 
be particularly useful for those patients who otherwise would be afi*aid of 
committing themselves to ERP as it helps them first identify the 
misinterpretations which lead them to ritualise so that resisting the rituals 
becomes less dangerous for them. It also is producing promising results with 
those patients who suffer fi'om obsessional ruminations with no overt rituals. The 
covert nature of mental rituals makes them difficult to stop without dealing with 
the patient's appraisal of the intrusions. Normalisation of intrusive thoughts, 
helping them realise that the goal is not to get rid of the thoughts but to change 
their appraisal of them, and modification of the relevant beliefs and assumptions 
appear to be an effective way of tackling a traditionally treatment resistant group. 
However, although this style of therapy appears to be increasing the range of 
OCD patients who can be helped, there are still patients who do not respond to 
this approach, so there is need for more experimental investigation into increasing 
treatment effectiveness and controlled trials to establish its effectiveness in 
relation to other treatment methods.
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PART IV
RESEARCH DOSSIER.
A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY MEASURES IN 
OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER.
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INTRODUCTION
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Abstract.
An increased sense of responsibility has been identified in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD) where patients evaluate their thoughts in terms of the harm they 
could cause to themselves or others. This study investigated whether a difference 
could be demonstrated between groups of obsessional-compulsive patients 
(n=26), anxiety controls (n=13) and non-clinical controls (n=25) on responsibility 
measures. This would support the role of excessive responsibility in OCD and 
encourage the use of such measures to target appropriate beliefs in therapy, to 
inform on progress in therapy and to predict outcome. A set of questionnaires 
which included general measures of psychopathology, symptom measures 
specific to OCD and cognitive measures (of cognitions identified in obsessive- 
compulsive patients) were given to the three groups and results compared. It was 
hypothesised that obsessive-compulsive subjects would differ fi'om the other 
groups on symptom measures, on responsibility appraisals and on responsibility 
assumptions, but in this last category there would be more convergence between 
obsessive-compulsive and anxious S's as they would share some of these more 
general beliefs. One-way analysis of variance confirmed all three hypotheses. An 
exploratory factor analysis was also carried out. Factors which emerged from 
analysis of the three cognitive measures were appraisal of self as a source of 
harm, need to protect others, intolerance of ambiguity, thought/action fusion and 
perfectionism. These factors correspond with the domains of beliefs identified by 
the International OCD Beliefs Working Group (1996). Results are discussed in 
the context of the role of responsibility in OCD and implications for 
measurement, therapy and future research are identified.
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1. INTRODUCTION.
1.1 Obsessive-compulsive Disorder.
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is an anxiety disorder which can range in 
its effects from slight to extreme impairment of functioning. Although once 
thought to be rare, it is now regarded as relatively common. The National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Epidemiological Catchment Area Survey 
brought to light a much higher incidence than had been expected, making it the 
fourth most common psychiatric disorder after phobias, substance abuse and 
major depression. Figures suggested a six-month prevalence of 1.6% (Myers et 
al. 1984) and a lifetime prevalence of 2.5% (Robins et al. 1984). However, the 
ECA survey has been shown to have over-estimated.
1.2 Nature of OCD svmptoms.
OCD is characterised by persistent intrusive thoughts, impulses or images which 
may be accompanied by compulsive behaviours; these features cause the sufferer 
anxiety or distress. Intrusive thoughts can be defined as mental events which are 
perceived as interrupting a person's stream of consciousness by capturing the 
focus of attention (Salkovskis 1990). Compulsions typically include both overt 
rituals (such as checking or handwashing) or covert rituals (such as repeating 
words in one's head or mentally 'undoing a thought'), both of which are ways of 
neutralising or cancelling out thoughts involving negative outcome. Intrusive 
thoughts are involuntary whereas compulsions are voluntary and can be seen as 
an attempt to reduce anxiety or discomfort. However, anxiety reduction does not 
always occur (e.g. in checkers) and frequent ritualising often serves to increase 
rather than decrease anxiety.
The most common symptoms are checking compulsions accompanied by 
doubting and washing accompanied by fears of contamination. In addition to
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these, compulsions may include counting, ordering, hoarding and seeking 
reassurance. These tend to be accompanied by unwanted thoughts of causing 
harm to oneself or to others. Other problematic intrusive thoughts may be 
aggressive, blasphemous or sexual in nature. Trait-like characteristics are often 
present, e.g. pathological doubting, poor tolerance of uncertainty and 
overestimation of risk, all of which lead to increased anxiety. However, these are 
not unique to OCD but are true of all anxiety disorders to a greater or lesser 
extent. Overconscientiousness may also be present and feelings of guilt are a 
common feature. The most common co-morbid Axis I disorder is depression, but 
this is most frequently a secondary feature, dependent on distressing OCD 
symptoms. Disruption to an individual's level of functioning can reach the point 
where it is impossible to live a normal life due to the amount of time devoted to 
ritualising in the day or to the avoidance of triggering situations. Criteria for 
diagnosis are suggested in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSMIV APA, 1994) as in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
The DSM IV criteria for obsessive-compulsive disorder
A. Either obsessions or compulsions:
Obsessions as defined by (1), (2), (3), and (4):
1) Recurrent and persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced, 
at some time during the disturbance, as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause 
marked anxiety or distress.
(2) The thoughts, impulses, or images are not simply excessive worries about 
real-life problems.
(3) The person attempts to ignore or suppress such thoughts, impulses, or images, 
or to neutralize them with some other thought or action.
(4) The person recognizes that the obsessional thoughts, impulses, or images are 
a product of his or her own mind (not imposed from without as in thought 
insertion).
Compulsions as defined by (1) and (2):
(1) Repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing, ordering, checking) or mental acts 
(e.g., praying, counting, repeating words silently) that the person feels driven to 
perform in response to an obsession, or according to rules that must be applied 
rigidly.
(2) The behaviors or mental acts are aimed at preventing or reducing distress or
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preventing some dreaded event or situation; however, these behaviors or mental 
acts either are not connected in a realistic way with what they are designed to 
neutralize or prevent or are clearly excessive.
B. At some point during the course of the disorder,
the person has recognized that the obsessions or compulsions are excessive or 
unreasonable. Note: This does not apply to children.
C. The obsessions or compulsions cause marked distress, are time consuming 
(take more than 1 hour a day), or significantly interfere vrith the person's normal 
routine, occupational (or academic) fimctioning, or usual social activities or 
relationships.
D. If another Axis I disorder is present, the content of the obsessions or 
compulsions is not restricted to it (e.g., preoccupation vrith food in the presence 
of an eating disorder; hair pulling in the presence of Trichotillomania; concern 
with appearance in the presence of body dysmorphic disorder; preoccupation with 
drugs in the presence of substance use disorder; preoccupation with having a 
serious illness in the presence of hypochondriasis; preoccupation with  sexual 
urges or fantasies in the presence of a paraphilia; or guilty ruminations in the 
presence of major depressive disorder).
E. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance 
(e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition.
Specify if: With poor insight: if, for most of the time during the current episode 
the person does not recognize that the obsessions and compulsions are excessive 
or unreasonable.
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1.3 Theories of OCD.
1.3.1 Cognitive Deficit Theory.
This is based on the assumption that obsessive symptoms represent the expression 
of a generalised and involuntary disturbance of information processing (Reed, 
1985). Obsessional ritualising is regarded as secondary to the primary cognitive 
deficit. Deficit theories have been based on the view that either obsessional 
patients experience a failure in cognitive control or that they have poor general 
memory and decision-making abilities. As yet, there is little evidence to support 
this view.
A slightly different way of looking at the problem was expressed by Toates, 
himself a psychologist and OCD sufferer. Toates (1990) suggests that it may be 
more important to find out what prevents a compulsive checker, for example, 
fi'om stopping rather than why he does it in the first place. When they get 'stuck', 
it may be a fault in the feedback system. This should be self-regulatory like a 
thermostat in a heating system. However, this seems an unlikely explanation as 
there is no reason why feedback should fail only in relation to those symptoms 
typical of OCD, and why do checkers for example not get 'stuck' permanently?
Maki, O'Neill and O'Neill (1994) found that non-clinical checkers performed 
similarly to non-checkers on tests of inhibitory control of cognition. However, 
checkers perceived themselves to be more prone to failures in cognitive control, 
with the result that they try too hard to control something which does not need 
controlled. It is true that OCD sufferers do seem to have memory problems and 
difficulty in making decisions. However, these are not general problems but 
highly specific to the areas causing concern to the patient. For example, a patient 
may check repeatedly that the front door is locked but will not bother to check 
whether electrical points are switched off. Similarly, what is perceived as 
'contaminating' by an obsessional patient does not always bear any relation to the
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degree o f  dirtiness'. So someone who perceives the rim of the washing machine 
door as contaminated, may be able cheerfully to change dirty nappies or even 
clear up dog faeces from her garden path.
In relation to any memory deficit, Sher and colleagues (Sher, Frost, Kushner, 
Crews & Alexander, 1989) have shown by correlating the Maudsley Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory (MOCl) vrith the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) that 
both clinical and non-clinical checkers have lower WMS scores than subjects low 
on checking. However, none of the subtests most sensitive to memory deficits 
differentiated between the groups, none of the clinical checkers were OCD 
patients and, although lower, the checkers’ scores fell within normal range.
Lastly, when one looks at the effectiveness of exposure and response prevention 
as a treatment for OCD, cognitive deficit theories do not fully explain why this 
should be so, as it clearly does not correct memory problems.
1.3.2 Neurobiological Theories. (Summarised in Tallis. 19951.
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to go into these in any detail. There 
are three main areas of interest.
1.3.2.1 The Serotonergic Svstem. Insel and Winslow (1990) have put forward a 
neurochemical model of OCD. They suggest that OCD patients have a 
hypersensitive set of serotonin receptors This would account for the exacerbation 
of symptoms in OCD patients when given a serotonin agonist and why use of a 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor such as Clomipramine leads to a reduction of 
symptoms. However, serotonin challenge tests indicate that, in OCD problems, 
the serotonin system is intact.
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1.3.2.2 The Septo-hippocampal Svstem. Gray (1982) describes a construct which 
he calls the behavioural inhibition system (BIS), which corresponds with the 
activity and function of structures in the septo-hippocampal area of the brain. 
This is activated by threat and when it is active, other ongoing behaviour is 
inhibited and arousal and threat-focused attention are increased. If the BIS is 
hyperactive, this will increase scanning and checking. In turn, this scanning and 
checking will increase the likelihood of the dreaded thought or impulse returning 
(which is relevant to the more current literature on thought suppression). There 
are two possible objections to this theory, one being that this seems to be related 
to a more general experience of anxiety and the other that this is at odds with the 
theories that are developing from recent brain-scanning evidence suggesting 
increased activity in the fronto-striatal brain systems relative to non-clinical 
subjects.
1.3.2.3 Fronto-striatal Theories. Several theories in this area have been proposed 
(Baxter et al., 1990; Rapoport, 1991). A common conclusion of these studies is 
that OCD is characterised by increased rates of metabolism in the frontal lobe and 
the basal ganglia. If fronto-striatal circuits play a significant role in the 
development and maintenance of OCD, exactly what that role might be is not yet 
clear. A hypothesis of hyperfrontality (excessive biological activity in the frontal 
lobes) being responsible has been suggested, but reducing complex characteristics 
and behaviour to an increase in metabolic rates in that area of the brain seems too 
simplistic. Another suggestion has been that rituals are innate motor programmes 
stored in the basal ganglia which are important for species survival. However, 
many behaviours in OCD would appear to have no evolutionary significance: 
number rituals, preoccupation with order, retracing steps, etc. Nor would this 
suggestion account for doubting. In summary, while a great deal of interest is 
being generated by work on various biological theories, as yet none of them can 
satisfactorily explain OCD phenomena as they stand at present.
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1.3.3 Psvchodvnamic Theory.
This suggests that overestimation of personal po'wer is a relic of the old 
megalomania of infancy (Freud, 1909 p. 113), i.e.regression to an earlier stage of 
development characterised by feelings of omnipotence. This approach has never 
demonstrated much success in removing obsessional symptoms. However, some 
of his concepts are pertinent to cognitive theory such as intrusive thoughts, fear 
of harming others, magical thinking and repression of unacceptable thought 
content (though it would now be regarded as suppression rather than repression 
and deliberate rather than unconscious). Jakes (1996) gives a considered account 
of psychodynamic theory, including a detailed analysis of a case discussion 
presented by Malan. He presents, point by point , the difficulties a 
psychodynamic approach to OCD encounters and suggests that Malan’s 
explanation of the patient’s problems in terms of his unassertive behaviour and 
his anger actually have little to do with a specifically psychodynamic account, but 
does point out that it may draw attention to a possible important element in OCD 
by looking at the role of unexpressed anger.
1.3.4 Behavioural Theory.
Treatment is based on the hypothesis that obsessional thoughts have become 
associated with anxiety through conditioning. Sufferers develop escape and 
avoidance behaviours which reduce the anxiety in the short term preventing the 
extinction of anxiety, but not in the long term (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). This 
led to the development of treatment specifically designed to circumvent that, 
namely exposure and response prevention (ERP). In this, the person is exposed 
to the stimuli that trigger the obsessional response but prevented from either 
avoiding the situation or from neutralising by carrying out compulsive behaviours 
(Steketee & Foa, 1985; Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989). This results in progressively 
lower anxiety, decreasing the person's need to ritualise. However, as there were 
frequently problems in treating people who ruminate but have no overt
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compulsions, who have over-valued ideas or have a concurrent depression, this 
suggested a need for alterations to the treatment plan which would allow those 
problems to be addressed.
1.3.5 COGNITIVE MODELS OF OCD.
1.3.5.1 McFall and Wollersheim (19791.
This cognitive-behavioural formulation of OCD hypothesises a 'primary' and 
'secondary' appraisal of threat, the first being an estimate of personal danger and 
the second being an evaluation of coping resources. Primary appraisals are 
exaggerated by abnormal risk assessments leading to anxiety. This of course can 
be taken as typical of all anxiety disorders, but McFall and Wollersheim tried to 
isolate the dysfunctional assumptions or beliefs that were particular to OCD. 
Beliefs that they suggested as relevant were that one can influence outcomes by 
rituals or ruminating; certain thoughts are unacceptable and can lead to 
catastrophe; one needs to maintain high standards to escape punishment.
Secondary appraisal covers underestimation of coping resources, which in turn 
lead to uncertainty and increased anxiety. Then the individual feels that it is easier 
to go ahead and carry out the ritual than to confront the feelings or thoughts 
directly.
McFall and Wollersheim compare their cognitive behavioural formulation to 
psychodynamic formulations and recognise that both see anxiety generated by 
unacceptable thoughts as central to OCD. In psychodynamic theory, the next step 
is 'suppression' which is defined as a conscious effort to protect the ego from 
uncomfortable affect. Later theorists have suggested this is a particularly 
significant factor in the etiology and maintenance of obsessional thinking.
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1.3.5.2 Salkovskis (1985.19941
Salkovskis' work suggests that intrusive thoughts are best regarded as cognitive 
stimuli rather than responses and these stimuli are linked to beliefs concerning 
responsibility or blame for harm to self or others (Salkovskis, 1985). Specific 
beliefs will be associated with specific symptoms, e.g. an inflated sense of 
personal influence may be associated with superstitious thinking, or an inflated 
sense of responsibility will link with both washing and checking.
Salkovskis starts with the proposition that obsessional thinking has its origins in 
normal intrusive thoughts. Intrusive thoughts occur in 90% of the general 
population (Rachman & De Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). 
According to cognitive -behavioural theory, the difference between normal 
intrusive thoughts and obsessions lies not in the occurrence of controllability of 
the thoughts, but the way in which OCD patients interpret intrusions as an 
indication that they may be responsible for harm or its prevention (Salkovskis, 
1994). This model has points of similarity with the cognitive theory of panic, 
(Clark, 1986) especially in the hypothesis of misinterpretation being the 
maintaining factor. In OCD, patients misinterpret their own mental activity as 
indicating personal responsibility. This leads to anxiety or discomfort and through 
that to a need to neutralise to reduce that. Salkovskis suggests that this 
interpretation produces three consequences: 1) increased discomfort, anxiety and 
depression; 2) greater accessibility of the thought; 3) neutralising responses. The 
discomfort is due to the patient's appraisal of the content and occurrence of 
intrusive thoughts. The increase in firequency is due to the neutralising 
behaviours. Lastly, the inflated sense of responsibility leads to a pattern of over­
control and preoccupation. This appraisal of one's responsibility was defined by 
Salkovskis, Rachman, Ladouceur & Freeston (1992, cited in Ladouceur, Freeston, 
Gagnon, Thibodeau & Dumont, 1995) as "the belief that one has the power which 
is pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial outcomes."
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1.3.5.3 W arren & Zgourides (19911
This model comes from rational-emotive therapy. There are similarities to other 
cognitive models, but beliefs were narrowed down to a few central ones:
"I must make a correct decision."
"I must have perfect certainty that I won't be the cause of harm to anyone."
"I must not have unacceptable thoughts or impulses."
1.3.5.4 Summary
With the more recent cognitive accounts of the problem, there is a common 
thread of fear of causing harm to oneself or others and an inflated sense of 
responsibility. To a greater or lesser extent, attention is also paid to concepts such 
as inability to tolerate uncertainty, thought action fusion and over­
conscientiousness. In Salkovskis' model, there is also emphasis on the fact that 
it is the appraisal and not the intrusive thoughts themselves that is the problem. 
It remains to be seen which of these factors are predominant in the etiology and 
maintenance of OCD and whether they are sufficient to account for the 
phenomenon of OCD. It is useful to look at these key factors in more detail.
1.4 Intrusive Thoughts
1.4.1 Comparison of clinical and uon-clinical populations.
Intrusive thoughts are mental events which are perceived as interrupting a 
person's stream of consciousness by capturing the focus of attention. Sometimes 
there is an intrinsic emotional element to the intrusion, as in the case of post- 
traumatic stress disorder. However, that is not always a feature, nor are intrusive 
thoughts always a sign of a clinical disorder. Salkovskis (1985) suggests that 
intrusions only cause distress when they have a particular meaning for the 
individual e.g. "I must be a bad person to have thoughts like that." "Iff can think
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things like that, I am capable of doing it." Previous studies have shown that 
intrusions are frequent among non-clinical populations also, and that the amount 
of discomfort was not affected by frequency or type of intrusion but by ease of 
dismissal (Rachman & de Silva 1978, Salkovskis & Harrison 1984). This 
supports the hypothesis that it is how the obsessional patients appraise the 
thoughts in comparison to normals which makes the difference. More recently, 
Salkovskis (1994, 1995) has said that the difference between normal intrusive 
thoughts and obsessions lies in the way obsessional patients interpret intrusions 
as an indication that they may be responsible for harm or its prevention.
1.4.2 Effects of Suppression
Given that the appraisal of intrusive thoughts by obsessional patients is a source 
of distress, it follows that in keeping with their pattern of over-control they will 
make efforts to suppress those thoughts. It had long been assumed that thought 
suppression resulted in paradoxical enhancement. Results have been mixed in 
studies of the effects of suppression. Wegner (1989) showed that initial 
enhancement did not occur but subsequently enhancement, described as a 
rebound, was observed. Later studies by Clark, Ball & Pape (1991) and Clark, 
Winton & Thynne (1993) also failed to find immediate enhancement effect. They 
suggested that studies which had found the effect had not taken into account the 
frequency with which the subject to be suppressed was mentioned prior to the 
task. Two recent studies (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1993; Trinder & Salkovskis, 
1994) used thoughts that were naturally occurring intrusions idiosyncratic to the 
individuals themselves, whereas previous research used emotionally neutral 
stimuli. Their results indicate that suppression can result in increased intrusion.
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1.4.3 Appraisal of intrusive thoughts
Cognitive theory proposes that people make particular appraisals because of 
assumptions learned from childhood onwards. Examples of these appraisals are 
seen in the way obsessional patients relate to perception of threat or to 
responsibility for outcome. In the, case of the first, perception of threat arising 
from assumptions relating to personal vulnerability leads to anxiety and to 
attempts to escape that anxiety. Salkovskis (1994) presents this in an 'equation' 
derived from Beck, Emery and Greenberg (1985) suggesting that anxiety can be 
seen as the combination of perceived likelihood of anticipated danger with the 
perceived awfulness of anticipated danger tempered by their perceived ability to 
cope with danger together with perceived rescue factors.
In the case of the second, a particular type of thought may be appraised as an 
indication that the individual has become responsible for harm to themselves and 
others. Then the most typical thinking error is probably "any influence over 
outcome = responsibility for outcome" (Salkovskis, 1994). Acquiring the 
meaning of'responsibility' distinguishes obsessional cognitions from anxious and 
depressed ones. If the appraisal solely concerns harm or danger without an 
element of responsibility, then the effect is more likely to be anxiety or 
depression (Teasdale, 1983). The appraisal of responsibility is a source of 
discomfort leading to the need to neutralise, which then is maintained by the 
perception of reduced responsibility and reduced anxiety.
1.5 Distinction between appraisals and assumptions.
It is important to be clear about the distinction between appraisals and 
assumptions or beliefs.This was clearly demonstrated in a recent meeting of the 
International OCD Beliefs Working Group (report awaiting publication, 1996) 
in a description by Dr. Mark Freeston of six levels of cognitive contents of OCD 
which were as follows:
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1) Symptoms. The obsessions or intrusive thoughts. "I might attack this person 
walking towards me".
2) Expectancies. This relates to the perceived consequences. "I could lose control 
and do it".
3) Appraisals. What the first two mean to the person, either the fact of having 
such a thought or about the expectancy. These can be identified as negative 
automatic thoughts e.g. "I must be really wicked to have a thought like that." or 
"There is a strong chance that I am going to lose control right now."
4) Specific beliefs. Generalised statements about OC cognitive phenomena e.g. 
"Thinking about something increases the chance that it will actually occur."
5) General beliefs. Statements that apply to OCD but are also found in other 
clinical populations e.g. "I should be able to control my thoughts."
6) Core beliefs. Beliefs about oneself e.g. "I am a wicked person."
As can be seen from seperating the cognitive content of OCD in that way, the 
appraisals are negative thoughts arising from the underlying assumption or 
beliefs. This type of appraisal and the specific beliefs are particular to OCD but 
many of the general and core beliefs will be held in common with other clinical 
groups, especially anxiety patients. As the appraisals are influenced by the beliefs 
of the individual, it is relevant to look at these beliefs in more detail, especially 
those beliefs which appear to be specific to OCD.
1.6 Specific domains of OC beliefs.
At the same meeting, some time was devoted to identifying major domains of 
OCD beliefs. These were identified by reviewing relevant literature and self- 
report measures. The following domains were thought to be of central importance 
to OCD.
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1.6.1 Inflated responsibility.
Salkovskis' model (1985, 1989) proposes that the appraisals which lead to OC 
symptoms are those in which the person regards him or herself as being 
responsible for the intrusion and for its perceived dangerous consequences. This 
arises from responsibility beliefs such as "if one has any influence over an 
aversive event, then one has complete responsibility for preventing the event." 
Thus the occurrence of a thought about future possible harm is appraised by the 
OC person as indicating that he or she is responsible for preventing the harm. 
This was supported by a study by Freeston et al. (1991), using their Cognitive 
Intrusions Questionnaire (CIQ), in which OCD patients were shown to feel more 
responsible than the control group if the content of the thought were to come true.
Another aspect of responsibility is the idea that errors of omission are as bad as 
errors of commission, especially if one can foresee the possibility of harm. This 
represents a reversal of the normal attributional bias which is that one is more 
culpable for errors of commission than for errors of omission (Spranca, Minsk & 
Baron, 1991).
1.6.2 Over-importance of thoughts and thought/action fusion fTAFl. This 
is characterised by thoughts such as "If 1 think something, it means 1 want it to 
happen." Thought/action fusion has two components: moral TAF and likelihood 
TAF. The former reflects the belief that thoughts are morally equivalent to 
actions ("Thinking is as bad as doing.") and the latter reflects the belief that 
thinking about something increases the likelihood of its occurrence to oneself or 
others ("If I think bad things, I am more likely to do them.") Recent studies 
suggest that this may also occur in normal people. Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, 
Trant & Teachman (1996) had students write the sentence "I hope that [friend or 
relative] is in a car accident" and found that this increased the subjective 
probability that the event would occur.
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1.6.3 Need for control over thoughts.
It was hypothesised (Clark & Purdon, 1993) that the following features 
characterise people with OCD: excessive monitoring for the presence of mental 
intrusions; hypersensitivity to the detection of unwanted intrusions; beliefs that 
the thought portends some catastrophe; belief that one is responsible for this harm 
because of the thought; belief that one must control the thought to avoid harm and 
reduce distress. Beliefs about the importance of controlling thoughts may arise 
from beliefs about the importance of one's thoughts (e.g. "If I think bad things, it 
is as bad as doing bad things.") Alternatively, the belief may arise as a 
consequence of having too many unwanted intrusions. Thus metacognitive beliefs 
may be both consequences and causes of obsessional problems (Salkovskis, 
1989).
1.6.4 Overestimation of probability and severity of threat.
This has already been touched on as an example of an OC appraisal. It is reflected 
in beliefs such as "Even if harm is an unlikely possibility, I must do all in my 
power to prevent it."There are several empirical studies supporting the association 
between OCD and risk aversion (Freeston et al, 1992; Steketee & Frost, 1994.) 
However these were based on measures of risk-taking behaviour, not the person's 
estimation of probability of negative outcome or of possible danger. Related to 
overestimation of harm are beliefs about coping ability and low tolerance of 
uncertainty and anxiety.
1.6.5 Intolerance of ambiguity.
Research has shown that OCD patients have difficulty in making decisions 
(Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Kozak, Foa & McCarthy, 1989). They also show more 
doubt about whether decisions were correct (Frost & Shows, 1993). These 
difficulties may arise from beliefs about the need for certainty (such as "There is 
a right and wrong in every situation"; "It is important to be sure of things") but
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there has been little research of beliefs in this area as yet.
1.7 Aims of Present Study
1.7.1 Summary.
From an examination of the current literature on obsessional-compulsive disorder, 
it would seem that cognitive theories show most promise at the moment to 
advance the treatment of OCD. There appears to be general agreement about the 
association of excessive responsibility with OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; 
Rachman, 1993; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Freeston et al., 1992; Freeston et 
al., 1993; Ladouceur, Freeston, Gagnon, Thibodeau & Dumont 1993). Obsessions 
are viewed as cognitive intrusions, the content of which patients interpret or 
appraise negatively as potentially harmful to themselves or others whom they are 
responsible to protect. To prevent harm they neutralise their thoughts by engaging 
in thought rituals or compulsive behaviours. On the other hand, there are some 
differences in emphasis between authors. For example, Salkovskis sees the 
problem as revolving principally round the concept of responsibility:
"...the core of the formulation is to be found in the occurrence of neutralising 
behaviour elicited by the appraisal of responsibility" (1994). It has also to be 
noted that Rheaume, Freeston et. al. (1995) feel that this is not the whole 
explanation but that the concept of perfectionism is equally important.
1.7.2 Aims
This study will attempt to demonstrate that there will be differences between 
groups of OCD patients, anxiety patients and normals on measures of 
responsibility. It is hoped that this study will provide information on which 
questionnaires will discriminate best between the groups, thereby also providing 
information on which beliefs to make the focus of interventions, to use as 
indicators of progress in therapy and as predictors of outcome. It is to be expected 
that this study will also support the role of responsibility in OCD. Items within
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cognitive measures will also be looked at to find whether a much abbreviated 
version might be successfully used for screening.
1.8 Specific Hypotheses
1.8.1 Hypothesis 1
Obsessive -compulsive patients will differ from psychiatric and normal controls 
as shown by higher ratings on measures of OCD symptoms (Obsessive- 
compulsive Questionnaire, Maudsley Obsessive-compulsive Inventory)
1.8.2 Hypothesis 2
OCD patients will differ from psychiatric and normal controls on a measure of 
appraisal of intrusions relating to responsibility (Responsibility Interpretations 
Questionnaire) as it would be expected that OCD patients will appraise them as 
indicating personal responsibility.
1.8.3 Hypothesis 3
OCD patients will also differ from psychiatric and normal controls on measures 
of responsibility assumptions (Responsibility Attitudes Scale, Obsessional Beliefs 
Questionnaire). However, other anxiety patients share some of these more general 
beliefs so there will be more convergence between OCD patients and psychiatric 
controls.
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2.. METHOD
2.1 Subjects.
2.1.1 Experimental Group.
This group consisted of 11 male and 15 female obsessional-compulsive patients 
as determined by case notes and the Structured clinical Diagnostic Interview 
(SCID). All were receiving or about to receive out-patient treatment at the time 
of testing, and some were receiving medication, usually Clomipramine or 
Fluoxetine. All met DSM IV criteria for obsessive-compulsive disorder. The 
mean age of the group was 34.8 years (standard deviation = 9.7). Subjects in this 
group were recruited from both the author's and colleagues' case loads, both in the 
Oxford NHS Mental Health Trust and in the OCD research trial in the University 
Department of Psychiatry, Oxford.
2.1.2 Psychiatric Control Group
The psychiatric controls were all diagnosed as anxiety disorders (generalised 
anxiety, panic, social anxiety) and were selected to establish whether what was 
being measured was simply anxiety or whether there were factors particular to 
OCD. This group consisted of 6 male and 7 female patients, all of whom were 
receiving outpatient treatment at the time. Subjects in this group were recruited 
from the author's case load or those of colleagues. The mean age of the group was
40.5 (standard deviation = 16.1).
2.1.3 Normal Control Group
A normal control group was also tested, comprising of 10 males and 15 females 
recruited from CMHT staff, medical centre staff and personal contacts. The mean 
age of this group was 48.8 (standard deviation = 14.5).
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The number in each group, along with male:female ratio and the means and 
standard deviations for age and scores on BDI and BAI are given in Table 2 (Chi- 
square showed no difference on male/female ratio (p>.5)). The age range for the 
normal control group was from 23 to 73, for the anxious control group from 21 
to 70 and for the OCD group from 20 to 60. A significant difference was found 
between the groups on age (F(2,63)=7.2, p<.001).
Variable NC OCD AC
N 25 26 13
Sex (m/f) 10/15 11/15 6/7
* Age 48.8 34.8 40.5
S.D. (14.5) (9.7) (16.1)
Table 2. Means of groups for matching variables (standard deviations are in 
parenthesis)
* F(2,63) = 7.2, p<.001.
2.2 Materials
(Four of the measures used, the ITS, RJQ, OBQ and RAS, are being developed 
by the OCD research team in Oxford and have not yet been published.)
2.2.1 Intrusive Thought Scale. (ITS)
(Salkovskis, Wroe, Richards, Morrison, Thorpe, Forrester & Reynolds , 1997) 
This questionnaire looks at the way in which the subject deals with their intrusive 
thoughts, focusing on attempts to suppress, to neutralise, to distract oneself from 
them, and exercise control over them. Sample items are :
I try to keep my thoughts on safe topics (suppression)
I run over things in my mind until I feel right about it. (neutralising)
I try to focus on what I am doing, (distraction)
I force myself to concentrate even harder on what I'm already doing.
Page 127
(controlling)
The items are scored on a 0 - 4 scale where 0 = none of the time, and 4 = all 
of the time. See appendix 1 for this questionnaire. No norms yet available.
2.2.2 Obsessive-Compulsive Questionnaire fOCO^
(Salkovskis & Foa, 1994).
This is a symptom measure of 42 items where the subject is asked to rate on a 0-4 
point scale how much these particular symptoms have troubled them, where 0 = 
has not troubled me at all and 4 = troubled me extremely. Item examples are:
I find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things, (washing)
I repeatedly check anything which might cause a fire, (checking)
I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against my will, 
(obsessions)
The questionnaire is scored for an overall total and for sub-totals in washing, 
checking, doubting, ordering, obsessional thinking, hoarding and neutralising. 
See appendix 2 for this questionnaire. (Norms submitted for publication.)
2.2.3 Responsibility Interpretations Questionnaire (RIOI
(Salkovskis, Wroe, Richards, Morrison, Gledhill, Thorpe, Forrester & Reynolds) 
This is an appraisal measure where the subject is asked to rate 22 statements, first 
for frequency (0 = idea never occurred, to 4 = idea always occurred when I had 
worrying intrusive thoughts) and then for belief (where 0% = I did not believe 
this thought at all, to 100% = I was completely convinced this thought was true). 
Items were generated from a selection of obsessive-compulsive patients’ 
statements.Norms are in preparation for publication. The questionnaire has 
internal consistency - a Cronbach alpha for high responsibility (frequency) of .93 
and for high responsibility (belief) of .94. Typical statements to be rated include: 
"I need to be certain something awful won't happen."
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"If I don't resist these thoughts, it means I am being irresponsible."
"Because these thoughts come from my own mind, I must want to have them." 
See appendix 3 for this questionnaire.
2.2.4 Speilberger State Anxiety Inventory. (SSAD (Appendix 4)
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger et al., 1970), one of the 
most widely used self-report measures of subjective anxiety, comprises 
two 20-item scales. This, the A-State scale requires subjects to report 
their feelings of anxiousness at the time when they are completing the 
questionnaire .These scales are used extensively in clinical practice where 
either a screening of anxiety level or an ongoing monitor of anxiousness is 
needed.
2.2.5 Speilberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAH
(Appendix 5) The A-Trait scale is as above but the subjects are asked to 
record how they generally feel.
2.2.6 Beck Depression Inventory (BDD
The revised BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987) is a 21-item self-report questionnaire in 
which each item consists of 4 statements indicating different levels of severity of 
a particular symptom experienced over the last week. Scores for all 21 items are 
summed to provide a single depression score. Internal consistency, based on a 
number of clinical samples, is 0.86. (Appendix 6)
2.2.7 Beck Anxiety Inventory IB AD
The BAI (Beck & Steer, 1990) consists of 21 symptoms that are rated on a 4- 
point severity scale referring to experience of symptoms over the past week. 
Scores for the 21 items are summed to provide a single anxiety score. Internal
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consistency has been found to be in the range 0.85 to 0.94. (Appendix 7)
2.2.8 Maudsley Obsessional-Compulsive Inventory (MOCH (Hodgson & 
Rachman, 1977)
A 30 item symptom measure, scored on a true/false basis, giving an overall total 
and sub-totals for checking, washing, slowness/repetitiveness and 
doubting/conscientiousness. (Appendix 8)
2.2.9 Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire (OBO^ (Morrison. 1996)
This is a 20 item attitude measure designed by the author using a 7 point Likert- 
type scale to rate agreement with the beliefs. Sample items are :
There is a right and wrong in every situation.
It is necessary to stay in complete control of your thoughts.
To have bad thoughts is the sign of a bad person.
(Appendix 9)
2.2.10 Responsibility Attitudes Scale (RASI
(Salkovskis, Wroe, Richards, Morrison, Gledhill, Thorpe, Forrester, & Reynolds) 
A 43 item attitude measure also using a 7 point Likert scale to rate agreement. 
Rather than looking at the appraisal of OCD patients of their intrusive thoughts, 
this questionnaire was designed to identify their underlying assumptions and 
attitudes in relation to responsibility .Examples of items are:
Iff can have even a slight influence on things going wrong, then I must act to 
prevent it.
Iff think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things.
I must protect others from harm.
(Appendix 10)
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2.3 Procedure
The information sheet about the study and the informed consent form which 
permitted refusal to take part form Appendix 11 and 12. Almost all agreed to take 
part with the exception of two anxiety patients who felt that reading about a 
variety of symptoms which they did not have would either encourage them to 
develop those or to trigger anxiety just by reading them.
The subjects were allowed to take the battery of questionnaires away with them 
as it took approximately 45 minutes to complete. They were asked to complete 
the battery at one sitting. It was always presented in the order in which it has just 
been described in section 2.2. Inevitably, a few were not returned.
2.4 Analysis of Data
The data was analyzed using parametric statistics. The means for the total scores 
of the questionnaires were analyzed using one-way analysis of variance, with 
group (OCD, AC and non clinical subjects) as the between subjects factor.
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3. RESULTS
The results are laid out in the following order: 
descriptive and comparative data, and factor analysis.
3.1 Descriptive and comparative data
3.1.1 Group Characteristics.
3.1.1.1 General measures. (Table 31
Groups were first compared on general measures of psychopathology (BDI, BAI, 
Speilberger State and Trait). This showed that the non-clinical subjects are 
significantly lower on these measures than the other two groups, as would be 
expected. The obsessional subjects do not differ from the anxious controls except 
on the Speilberger State Anxiety where the anxious controls score slightly higher. 
As one concern was to eliminate the possibility that the questionnaires were 
simply measuring anxiety, it is important to note that the anxious controls do not 
score lower than the obsessional subjects in any of these measures. A summary 
of this is in Table 3.
Variables NC OCD AC F Sig.
BDI 5.3 15.9 19.9 21.6 .001
(4.5) (8.9) (8.2)
BAI 4.7 18.5 19.7 22.7 .001
(3.7) (10.4) (9.6)
SP. STATE 35.9 47.5 54.2 11.4 .001
(12.6) (12.2) (10.1)
SP. TRAIT 38.7 55.3 54.5 22.8 .001
(8.4) (10.6) (7.9)
Table 3. General measures of psychopathology. Means, standard deviations and 
results of one-way analysis of variance.
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3.1.1.2 Symptom Measures. (Table 41
As would be expected, univariate analysis of variance showed that obsessional 
subjects scored significantly higher than normal or anxious controls on both the 
OCQ and the MOCI. No significant difference was found between normal and 
anxious controls. In the case of the OCQ, the difference found (F(2,63)= 31.7, 
p<.001) was accounted for (using multiple comparison tests with a Bonferroni 
conversion) by the fact that the OCD group scored significantly higher than both 
normals and anxious controls, who showed no difference between them on this 
measure. This suggests that this measure discriminates well. Similarly on the 
MOCI, the difference found between the groups (F(2,63)= 43.5, p<.001) was due 
to the OCD group scoring higher than both the normal and anxious controls with 
no significant difference between these groups. (See figures 1 & 2.)
Variables NC OCD AC F Sig.
OCQ 9.6*’ 58.6' 21.6*’ 31.7 .001
(10.2) (31.2) (18.6)
MOCI 3.3*’ 14.6' 6.1*’ 43.5 .001
(2.1) (6.1) (3.7)
Table 4. Measures of symptoms specific to OCD. Means, standard deviations and 
results of one-way analysis of variance. The direction of the difference of the 
means is indicated by superscript a b or c, where a>b>c.
3.1.1.3 Cognitive Measures. (Table 51
Measures of cognitions as hypothesised in obsessive-compulsive problems, 
namely the RIQ, RAS and OBQ, were compared across groups. Obsessional
Figure 1.
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subjects scored significantly higher in these than either of the control groups. 
Anxious controls scored slightly higher than normals but not significantly so 
except on the beliefs section of the RIQ. Significant differences were found in 
both the frequency totals (F(2,63)= 19.2, p<.001) and the belief totals (F(2,63)= 
24.6, p<.001) of the RIQ. On a multiple comparisons test on the frequency 
ratings, anxious controls scored slightly higher than normal controls but not 
significantly so, and OCD patients scored significantly higher than both. On 
belief ratings, anxious controls scored significantly higher than normals, and 
OCD patients again scored higher than both. This suggests that this test 
discriminates satisfactorily between obsessional patients and other groups. One 
would expect the anxious controls to score somewhat higher than normals on this 
test as the statements address some concerns that anxious patients are likely to 
hold in common with OCD patients. As a significant difference was found 
between the groups for age, the same analysis was carried out using age as a co- 
variate, but this made no difference to the results. Results of the OBQ (F(2,63)= 
6.7, p<.002) and the RAS (F(2,63)= 11.8, p<.001) followed the same pattern. 
(See figures 3, 4 & 5).
Figure 3
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Variable NC OCD AC F Sig.
RIQF 6.2*’
(7.3)
27.1'
(13.8)
15.8*’
(15.5)
19.2 .001
RIQB 98.6=
(172.3)
702.3'
(351.9)
386.9*’
(385.4)
24.6 .001
OBQ 70.5*’
(13.1)
91.0'
(24.8)
74.2
(22.8)
6.7 .002
RAS 137.5*’
(31.8)
187.7'
(46.0)
150.3*’
(29.2)
11.8 .001
Table 5 Measures of cognitions as hypothesised in OCD. Means, standard 
deviations and results of one-way analysis of variance.
The direction of the difference of the means is indicated by superscript a b or c, 
where a>b>c.
3.1.1.4 Measures of Thought Control. (Table 61
These did not discriminate as effectively as the other questionnaires, vrith only 
the neutralising sub-test approaching significance.
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Variables NC OCD AC F Sig.
Thought Control
- Suppression 4.6 
(3 5)
5.7
(4.1)
5.9
(3.2)
0.7 N.S.
- Neutralising lOJh
(7.6)
17.D
(9.0)
10.9
(7.3)
5.2 .008
- Distraction 7.5
(17)
6.7
(13)
5.8
(4.6)
0.9 N.S.
- Control 5.6
(4.6)
4.9
(3.9)
4.1
(3.9)
0.5 N.S.
Table 6. Measures of thought control. Means, standard deviations and results of 
one-way analysis of variance. The direction of the difference of the means is 
indicated by superscript a b or c, where a>b>c.
3.2 Factor Analysis.
3.2.1 General exploratory analysis.
In spite of the limitations of sample size, and the fact that to a certain extent what 
would emerge is partly dictated by what items were put into it, nevertheless it 
was felt that it would be interesting to see if the items clustered together in 
groupings which would support the domains identified by the International 
Working group on OCD. First an exploratory factor analysis including all 
variables was carried out. One general factor, which might be thought of as 
obsessionality, accounted for the largest percentage of the variance (43.6%). (See 
Table 7). Factors 2 (compulsive behaviour), 3 (anxiety/depression), and 4 
(thought control) added to 1 accounted for 70.3% of the variance.
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Table 7
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 3
(43.6) (11.5) (9.1) (61)
*OCQD OCQW BAI ITS
OCQO OCQC BDI ITN
OCQOB OCQD STA ITD
OCQN OCQT TRA ITC
OCQT MOCT OCQOB
MOCT MOCCG
MOCCG MOCWG
MOCDG MOCDG
RIQB
RIQF
OBQT
RAST
* Abbreviations for scores are as follows:
OCO - OCQW - Washing subscale; OCQC - Checking subscale; OCQD - 
Doubting subscale; OCQO - Ordering subscale; OCQOB - Obsessional thinking 
subscale; OCQH - Hoarding subscale; OCQN - Neutralising subscale; OCQT - 
Total.
MOCI - MOOT - Total; MOCCG - Checking subscale; MOCWG - Washing 
subscale; MOCSS - Slowness and rumination subscale; MOCDG - Doubting and 
conscientiousness subscale.
All other abbreviations as listed in 2.2.
Note: OCQH and MOCSS do not contribute to any factor in any of the analyses.
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3.2.2 Analysis of symptom and cognitive measures.
The analysis was repeated, this time omitting the measures of general 
psychopathology. Results were similar to the previous analysis, with factor 1 
seeming to be a general obsessionality factor with more emphasis on obsessional 
thinking, factor 2 again corresponding to compulsivity and factor 3 to thought 
control. Factors 1 and 2 accounted for 44.4% and 12.7% of the variance. (See 
table 8).
Table 8
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
(44.4%) (12.7%) (7.7%)
OCQD OCQW ITS
OCQOB OCQC ITN
OCQN OCQD ITD
OCQT OCQT ITC
MOCT MOCT
MOCCG MOCCG
MOCDG MOCWG
RIQF MOCDG
RIQB
3.2.3 Analysis of cognitive measures only.
In the next analysis, both general psychopathology measures and OCD symptom 
measures were omitted and the analysis carried out only on the cognitive 
measures for OCD. Factors 1 and 2 accounted for 38.5% and 22.6% of the total 
variance. (Table 9). The attitudes and appraisal measures hung together in one 
factor, and the thought control measures in the second one.
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Table 9
Factor 1 Factor 2
RIQF ITS
RIQB ITN
OBQT ITD
RAST ITC
3.2.4 Analysis of RAS.
An analysis of the individual items of the Responsibility Attitudes Scale was 
carried out. Factor 1 corresponded with appraisal of the self as a source of harm 
represented by such items as "Everything I do can cause serious problems" and 
I am often close to causing harm." Factor 2 centred on responsibility for 
protecting others, represented by items such as "To me not acting to prevent 
disaster is as bad as making disaster happen." and "I must protect others from 
harm." Factor 3 centred on the inability to tolerate even the slightest doubt, e.g. 
"If I know that harm is possible, I should always try to prevent it, however
unlikely it seems." and "If I can even have the slightest influence on things going 
wrong, then I must act to prevent it." Factor 1 and 2 accounted for 39.1% and 
11.1% of the total variance. (Table 10).
Factor 1
Table 10 fRASl
Factor 2 Factor :
(39.1%) (11.1%) (5.6%)
18 3 12
21 9 28
25 22 31
33 31 43
40 36
42
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3.2.5 Analysis of RIQB and RIQF.
Similarily, an analysis was carried out for the RIQB and the RIQF. In the RIQB, 
the first factor (general responsibility) accounts for 58.4% of the variance, with 
the second factor (predominantly moral thought/action fusion although item 18 
indicates straightforward thought/action fusion) accounting for a further 8.8%. 
In the RIQF, three factors were identified. The first, which appears the same as 
the first for the RIQB, general responsibility, accounted for 52.1% of the variance 
with factors 2 (thought/action fiision) and 3 (negative evaluation of the 
importance of controlling thoughts) accounting for a further 10.9% and 6.8%, as 
shown in Table 11. These results suggest that the RJQ is a monolithic measure.
Table 11.
RIQB RIQF
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
(58.4%) (8.8%) (52.1%) (10.9%) (6.8%)
RIQBl RIQB 14 RIQF 2 RIQF 4 RIQF 1
2 18 4 14 8
4 22 5 20 19
5 7 22
7 10
8 11
10 12
11 16
12 21
16
19
20
21
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3.2.6 Analysis of RAS with OBQ.
Next, the two attitude measures were analysed together. The first factor accounted 
for 34.9% of the variance, with factors 2, 3 and 4 accounting for a further 9.2%, 
6.2% and 5.4% respectively. The two questionnaires appear to be measuring 
different aspects of OCD. Factors 1 and 3 were made up of items from the RAS 
with the exception of one item from the OBQ, number 6 "I am responsible for 
causing harm."
The RAS is rating beliefs about being responsible for protecting others from harm 
and about being a source of harm to others. Items representing factor 1 are: "If I 
don't act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences if it 
happens." and "I must protect others from harm." Items typical of factor 3 are: 
"Everything I do can cause serious problems." and "I am often close to causing 
harm." The OBQ (factors 2 and 4) appears to explore beliefs about having to do 
things perfectly and about needing to have control and/or certainty. Items 
representing factor 2 are: "I must not make mistakes." and "It is important that 
people see I do things correctly." Some factor 4 items are: "It is important to be 
sure of things." and "I must have complete control over everything at all times." 
A summary of these results is in Table 12.
Table 12
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
(34.9%) (9.2%) (6.2%) (5.4%)
RAS 3 OBQ 5 RAS 18 OBQl
RAS 9 OBQ 10 RAS 21 OBQ 4
RAS 22 OBQ 14 RAS 25 OBQ 7
RAS 31 OBQ 15 RAS 40 OBQ 8
RAS 32 OBQ 18 OBQ 6
RAS 34
RAS 36
RAS 42
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3.2.7 Analysis of RAS, RIQB and OBQ.
Lastly, the three cognitive measures, the RAS, the RIQB and the OBQ, were 
analysed together. Once again, the content of each questionnaire contributed to 
different factors. Factor 1 accounted for 32.2% of the variance and factors 2, 3, 
4, and 5 accounted for a further 8.9%, 6.4%, 5.1% and 4.3% respectively. The 
first factor appeared to be appraisal of oneself as responsible for causing harm to 
others and as a source of threat. It was made up of 14 items of the RIQB and 2 of 
the OBQ. It is not clear why one of these, OBQ 12 (I am in continuous danger) 
is included here as it is more typical of a general anxiety factor. Factor 2 (8.9% 
of the variance) was prevention of harm to others, comprised of 11 items of the 
RAS.
Factor 3, formed by 5 items of the OBQ, is perfectionism. A fourth factor has 
been formed by the 6 reversed items of the RIQ (such as "Thinking of something 
happening does not make me responsible for whether it happens.") This factor 
has a negative correlation with the other factors and is related to dismissal of 
intrusions. These items were found not to discriminate between the three groups, 
and in fact appeared to be confusing to all groups. Therefore in all other analyses, 
these items have been omitted. The fifth factor was intolerance of uncertainty, 
with 4 of the OBQ items contributing. (Table 13)
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Table 13
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
(32.2%) (8.9%) (6.4%) (5.1%) (4.3%)
RIQB 1 RAS 3 OBQ 5 RIQB 3 OBQl
RIQB 2 RAS 9 OBQ 10 RIQB 6 OBQ 3
RIQB 4 RAS 12 OBQ 14 RIQB 9 OBQ 4
RIQB 5 RAS 22 OBQ 15 RIQB 13 OBQ 8
RIQB 7 RAS 28 OBQ 18 RIQB 15
RIQB 8 RAS 31 RIQB 17
RIQB 10 RAS 32
RIQB 11 RAS 34
RIQB 12 RAS 36
RIQB 16 RAS 42
RIQB 18 RAS 43
RIQB 19
RIQB 20
RIQB 21
OBQ 6
OBQ 12
3.2.8 Key to items in factor analysis.
3.2.8.1 RIQB & RIQF.
1. If I don't resist these thoughts it means I am being irresponsible.
2. I could be responsible for serious harm.
4. I cannot take the risk of this thought coming true
5. If I don't act now then something terrible will happen and it will be my fault.
7. I need to be certain something awful won't happen.
8. I should'nt be thinking this type of thing.
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10. It would be irresponsible to ignore these thoughts
11. I'll feel awful unless I do something about this thought.
12. Because I've thought of bad things happening then I must act to prevent them.
14. Since I've thought of this I must want it to happen.
16. Now I've thought of things that could go wrong I have a responsibility to 
make sure I don't let them happen.
18. Thinking this could make it happen.
19.1 must regain control of my thoughts.
20. This could be an omen.
21. It's wrong to ignore these thoughts.
22. Because these thoughts come from my own mind, I must want to have them.
3.2.8.2 RIO Reversed Items.
3. Thoughts can NOT make things happen.
6. This is just a thought so it doesn't matter.
9. Thinking of something doesn't make me responsible for whether it happens.
13. There's nothing wrong with letting such thoughts come and go naturally.
15. Everybody has horrible thoughts sometimes, so I don't need to worry about 
this one.
17. Having this thought does not mean I have to do anything about it.
3.2.8 3 OBQ.
1. It is important to be sure of things.
2. I must have guarantees.
3. I cannot stand anxiety or discomfort.
4. I cannot tolerate any uncertainty.
5. I must not make mistakes.
6. I am responsible for causing harm.
7. I must have complete control over everything at all times.
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8. It is necessary to stay in complete control of your thoughts.
9. Thinking is the same as doing.
10. It is awful to make wrong decisions.
11. There is a right and wrong in every situation.
12.1 am in continuous danger.
13.1 am responsible for others.
14.1 must be perfect.
15. It is important that people see that I do things correctly.
16. One should not take any risks.
17. To have bad thoughts is a sign of a bad person.
18.1 must not be seen to make mistakes.
19.1 am responsible for preventing harm.
20. People close to me could be in danger if I do not do things properly.
3.2.8.4 RAS.
1. I often feel responsible for things which go wrong.
3. Iff don't act when I can foresee danger, then I am to blame for any 
consequences if it happens.
4. I am too sensitive to feeling responsible for things going wrong.
6. Iff think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things.
8. I worry a great deal about the effects of things which I do or don't do.
9. To me, not acting to prevent disaster is as bad as making disaster happen.
12. If I know that harm is possible, I should always try to prevent it, however 
unlikely it seems.
14.1 must always think through the consequences of even the smallest actions.
17.1 often take responsibility for things which other people don't think are my 
fault.
18. Everything I do can cause serious problems.
21.1 am often close to causing harm.
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22.1 must protect others from harm.
23.1 should never cause even the slightest harm to others.
25.1 will be condemned for my actions.
28. If I can have even the slightest influence on things going wrong, then I must 
act to prevent it.
31. To me, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is as bad as making 
that disaster happen.
32. For me, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect other 
people.
33. In all kinds of daily situations, my inactivity can cause as much harm as 
deliberate bad intentions.
34. Even if harm is a very unlikely possibility, I should always try to prevent it 
at any cost.
35. Once I think it is possible that I have caused harm, I can't forgive myself.
36. Many of my past actions have been intended to prevent harm to others.
38.1 have to make sure other people are protected from all of the consequences 
of things I do.
40. Other people should not rely on my judgement.
41. If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I feel that I am to blame.
42. If I take sufficient care then I can prevent any harmful accidents.
43.1 often think that bad things will happen if I am not careful enough.
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3.2.9 Abbreviated measures.
Within each of the three cognitive measures, the RIQ, the RAS and the OBQ, the 
five items which had the highest correlation with the total score on that 
questionnaire were selected. The criterion was a correlation of .7 or above 
although most were considerably higher. Then the abbreviated total was 
correlated with the unabbreviated total.
3.2.9.1 RIO. As the frequency rating results had almost identical values to the 
belief ratings, it was decided to calculate this only for the belief ratings. This 
questionnaire had the highest item correlations with the total score, the lowest 
item taken having a correlation of .85 with the total. Correlation of the 
abbreviated 5-item total with the full total was .95. The items selected reflected 
the factors identified in the previous analysis i.e. responsibility for protecting 
others from harm, importance of thoughts and thought/action fusion and were as 
follows:
5. If I don't act now then something terrible will happen and it will be my fault. 
lO.It would be irresponsible to ignore these thoughts.
11. I'll feel awful unless I do something about this thought.
12. Because I've thought of bad things happening then I must act to prevent them.
16. Now I've thought of things which could go wrong I have a responsibility to
make sure I don't let them happen.
3.2.9.2 RAS. The lowest correlation of the selected items with the total was .73 
and of the abbreviated 5-item form with the full was .90. The items which 
correlated highest corresponded with the factors identified for this rating scale i.e. 
responsibility for protection of others and the self as a source of harm to others. 
Those items were:
14.1 must always think through the consequences of even the smallest actions.
31. To me, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is as bad as making
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that disaster happen.
32. For me, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect other 
people.
38.1 have to make sure other people are protected from all of the consequences 
of things I do.
41. If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I feel that I am to blame.
3.2.9.3 OBQ. The lowest correlation between the total and the 5 items selected 
was .74 and between the abbreviated and full totals was .96. Items selected also 
were in line with the factors identified for this scale (perfectionism, need for 
control and responsibility) and were:
5. I must not make mistakes.
6. lam  responsible for causing harm.
7. I must have complete control over everything at all times.
9. It is necessary to stay in complete control of your thoughts.
16. One should not take any risks.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
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4. Discussion.
This study found differences between groups of OCD patients, anxiety patients 
and normal controls on symptom measures and on measures of responsibility 
(both in their appraisal of intrusive thoughts and in their dysfunctional beliefs 
about responsibility).
Results from hypothesis testing will be considered first, followed by an 
assessment of the limitations of this study and how this study fits with research 
evidence so far. Then implications for measurement of OCD symptoms will be 
considered along with implications for therapy and for future research.
4.1 Summary of results.
On general measures of psychopathology, non-clinical subjects scored 
significantly lower than the two clinical groups, as would be expected. There was 
no difference between the two clinical groups. On both symptom measures (the 
OCQ and the MOCI), OCD patients scored significantly higher than both the 
anxious and normal controls, with the anxious controls scoring higher than the 
normals. This shows that both these tests discriminate well between obsessionals 
and other groups and confirms the first hypothesis. Measures of thought control 
were also looked at but the scores do not discriminate between any of the groups.
The second hypothesis, that there would be significant differences between the 
groups in appraisals of responsibility linked to the occurence of intrusive 
thoughts, was supported. OCD patients scored higher than anxious controls on the 
RIQ who in turn scored higher than normal controls. When the scores for the 
belief and frequency ratings were compared, the belief rating proved to be a 
slightly better discriminator than frequency, as expected from the cognitive 
account of OCD.
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The third hypothesis, that there would be significant differences between the 
groups in general beliefs about responsibility, was also confirmed. OCD patients 
scored higher on the responsibility belief measure than both anxious and normal 
controls. As expected, there was a less marked difference between the groups as 
many of the beliefs are common to both OCD patients and anxious patients. On 
the OBQ, normal and anxious controls showed little difference between them. 
The RAS gave similar results, but discriminated slightly better between normal 
and anxious controls.
Results of an exploratory factor analysis of all the variables suggested three main 
factors, obsessionality (mainly thinking), compulsivity and thought control. 
Measures of general psychopathology and of obsessional sympomatology were 
then omitted and the RAS (a measure of beliefs and assumptions) was analysed. 
The factors which emerged were appraisal of self as a source of harm, need to 
protect others and intolerance of ambiguity. The factors which emerged firom the 
other belief measure, the OBQ, were perfectionism and intolerance of ambiguity 
suggesting that these two questionnaires were measuring different aspects of 
obsessionality. These factors correspond to three of the domains identified by the 
International Working Group on OCD (already mentioned) as central to OCD.
The appraisal measure, the RIQ, was then analysed, first for the belief ratings and 
then for the frequency ratings. The factors which emerged for the belief ratings 
were responsibility and thought/action fusion. When the frequency ratings were 
analysed, a third factor in addition to these two was added, that of importance of 
controlling thoughts. Again these factors support the domains identified by the 
working group as central to OCD. When all three cognitive measures were 
analysed together, the same factors emerged. These results are consistent with the 
cognitive model of OCD.
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4.2 Limitations of this study.
The most obvious limitation of this study is that the numbers in each group are 
not very large. This is true especially of the group of anxiety controls which 
presented the most difficulty in obtaining subjects. As the department had 
become tertiary (i.e. a unit to provide treatment for the more complex cases, 
taking referrals from psychiatry and the community mental health teams rather 
than directly from general practitioners), there were very few straightforward 
anxiety cases referred there. This is reflected in the small number of anxiety cases 
compared to the other two groups. OCD patients were easier to obtain through 
those referred to the OCD Cognitive Therapy trial. Nevertheless, although the 
numbers are small, the differences between groups are substantial.
A fact which may have resulted in slight dilution of the results is that although 
all the OCD patients were administered the Structured Clinical Interview for 
Diagnosis (SCID) based on DSMIV, this was not the case with the anxiety or 
normal controls. Looking at the scores on the symptom measures, there appear 
to be one or two of the anxiety controls who tend towards OCD levels of score 
and therefore may have a mixed diagnosis.
As the battery of questionnaires is quite lengthy (taking 45 minutes to complete) 
and the recipients were asked to complete it at one sitting, the possibility of 
questionnaire fatigue has to be considered. However, no evidence of response set 
has been detected.
A further limitation is the use of factor analysis here when the total numbers are 
so small in comparison to the variables. Some researchers play very safe and 
advise sample sizes which are 10 times larger than the number of variables in the 
study (Child, 1995). This would have meant obtaining several thousand subjects 
which would not have been possible. However, Child mentions the level of
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significance of factor loadings as being 0.3 but the level decided on in this study 
(0.5) was more conservative.
In addition, it is important to avoid reading too much into the factors which 
emerge as they are derived from correlations, and therefore causal relationships 
cannot be inferred. So, for example, although factors such as inflated 
responsibility and thought/action fusion have emerged, one cannot draw the 
conclusion that these are causes of OCD.
Lastly, the question of the size of sample crops up again in the attempt to form 
abbreviated scales as it is too small to be certain those correlations would hold for 
a much larger sample. If it were possible to base them on a much larger sample, 
these could be useful screening tools which could be used in a survey of the 
general population to examine vulnerability to OCD in general.
4.3 Previous studies.
These results support the cognitive account proposed by Salkovskis (1985,1989) 
that perceived responsibility for harm to self or others is at the heart of OCD. This 
has also been supported by studies by Lopatka and Rachman (1995) and Shafran 
(1995) where responsibility in checkers was manipulated resulting in temporary 
changes in symptoms, and by Rheaume et. al., (1994 & 1995). There is increasing 
evidence (van Oppen & Amtz, 1994; Ladouceur, Leger, Rheame & Dube, 1996) 
that targeting inflated responsibility has proved to be a successful intervention 
with OCD patients.
A further factor which emerged was the inability to tolerate any uncertainty and 
the need for complete control over thoughts, which has been documented 
elsewhere in relation to OCD (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Clark & Purdon, 
1993; Ladouceur, Freeston, Gagnon, Thibodeau & Dumont, 1994; Rheame, 
Freeston, Dugas, Letarte & Ladouceur, 1995). Similarily, there has been
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agreement on the importance of overestimating the importance of thoughts and 
thought/action fusion (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; Rachman, 1993; Freeston, 
Ladouceur, Gagnon & Thibodeau, 1993; Freeston, Ladouceur, Rheaume & 
Letarte, 1994).
4.4 Implications for measurement.
It would seem that in the case of symptom measurement, the OCQ discriminates 
as well as the MOCI between OCD patients and other clinical and non-clinical 
groups. The OCQ has the advantage of measuring ruminations as well as rituals 
whereas the MOCI only measures compulsive behaviour. Neither the hoarding 
subscale on the OCQ nor the slowness subscale on the MOCI appear to add any 
useful information. As was noted earlier, neither contributed to any of the factors 
in the analysis.
In the case of the cognitive measures, the appraisal measures discriminate most 
clearly between OCD patients and both other clinical and non-clinical groups. 
Measures of assumptions and beliefs also discriminate although there appears to 
be less difference between anxiety controls and normals on this measure. The 
advantage of using this type of questionnaire is that not only does it assist 
diagnosis but also identifies dysfunctional beliefs which then can be targeted. In 
this respect, assessment becomes part of therapy.
4.5 Implications for therapy.
Among the cognitive measures, the responsibility appraisal measure was the one 
which discriminated most between the three groups. This is consistent with the 
cognitive hypothesis that the appraisal of the intrusive thought as implying 
heightened responsibility is what differentiates OCD from other anxiety 
disorders. The appraisal of the intrusive thought is hypothesised as central to the
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continuation of neutralising in an effort to "make safe" the thoughts. Therefore 
it is helpful to use a tool which will enable the therapist to identify the precise 
nature of those appraisals and to target them accurately. Therapy will then aim to 
challenge these appraisals and teach the patient that obsessional thoughts are 
irrelevant to further action. As the usual result of their perception of their 
responsibility is an attempt at over-control, a further aim is to help them find out 
that such control is unnecessary. Repeating the reponsibility measure throughout 
treatment will enable the therapist to find out whether and at what rate those 
appraisals are diminishing. Initial results suggest that the RIQ could be used in 
therapy in much the same way as one uses the Chambless' Agoraphobic 
Cognitions Questionnaire (Chambless et al., 1984) with panic patients, i.e. as an 
identification of what are the most pertinent areas to target in therapy, and as a 
guide to the continuing change in these areas throughout therapy.
Whereas the measure discussed above would identify areas of immediate 
intervention, the belief questionnaires would identify areas of continuing 
vulnerability if not challenged or modified in some way. Repetition of these 
throughout therapy would give an indication of the rate and degree of change as 
well as an indication of which dysfunctional beliefs may still be unchanged at the 
end of therapy. It may be hypothesised that this last is important for prediction of 
relapse prevention, based on findings that relapse in panic disorder can be 
predicted by the continuing presence of catastrophic beliefs.
4.6 Implications for future research.
Scores on the RAS, RIQ and OBQ could be compared with end of treatment 
scores to see whether the scores had predictive value for the success of treatment. 
The appraisal and belief questionnaires could be given at regular intervals 
throughout therapy to guide therapy to the target and to document clinical change
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during treatment.It would be interesting to follow up OCD patients over several 
years to find out whether it is possible to predict relapse on the basis of residual 
beliefs. This was found to be the case with panic disorder patients in the study by 
Clark et.al. (1994). Those prone to relapse were those who at the end of treatment 
still had dysfunctional beliefs about the possibility of a catastrophic physical 
outcome. In addition, repeating this study with much larger groups which have 
been matched more closely would make it possible to do a more meaningful 
factor analysis. However, the disadvantage of attempting this would be the 
considerable length of time required to find the required number of subjects.
4.7 Conclusion.
The questionnaires in this study which were investigating obsessional symptoms, 
appraisals and beliefs all discriminated well between groups of obsessional 
patients and groups of both normal and anxious controls. Appraisal measures 
discriminated better than belief measures as was expected. Results support the 
role of responsibility in OCD.
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- . i  _..a r o l l o w i n g  p a g e s  a r e  som e o f  t h e  w ays nhan p e o p le  u s e  no 
^ e a i .vinh o r  p r e v e n n  u n a c c e p n a b le  i n n r u s i v e  n n o u g n n s . im age o r  
-m p u is e s . - l e a s e  r e a d  e a c h  snanem enn c a r e f u l l y  and in d ic a n e  how 
e a c n  o n e  by p la c in g  an X in  n h e a p p r c p r ia n e  b o x . 
" 1 ° ' ^  ^  n c n n  or  w rong a n s w e r s . I f  n h e r e  a r e  an y  w ays nhan  
^wU^-ee no d e a l  w in h  u n a c c e p n a b le  in n r u s i o n s  nhan a r e  non l i s n e d ,  
p le a s e  _ i s n  nhem in  nhe s p a c e s  o r o v id e d  in  o n e  a o p r o o r ia n e  
o a n eg o ry  and r a n e  nnem . ' ' '
2 - s n e r e n c e s  no " fh o u g n n s"  in  n h e sn a n em en n s in  n h e f o l l o w i n g
y a g e s , ...ay b e  in n e r p r e n e d  a s  im age o r  im p u ls e  a s  a p p r o o r ia n e .
:iiîî‘:KÏSliF““
! is n e d ” b Y i o w p e o p l e  s u p p r e s s  u n a c c e p n a b le  in n r u s io n s  a r e
Thougnn S u p p r e s s io n n on e som e h a l f  1 m ost a l l  1
or or o f  j o f o f  1
' t h e t h e t h e  ■ t h e t h e  ;
! t im e t im e t im e  1 t im e t im e0 1 2 1 3 4
I e x e r n  my w i l l  pow er no 1 i
p rev en n  n h e n h ou gh n s from !1 1
! k e e p  my n n o u o n n s on i
1 s a f e  n o p i c s . 1 1
I nry no k e e p  my n n o u o n n s 1 1
away rrom n o p ic s  r e la n e d  no 1 1
.th e  n h in g  I d o n ' t  w an t no I
th in k  a b o u t . ■
I t e l l  m y s e l f  t o  " s to o "  when i
I th in k  nh e nhougnn m ig h t  be 1
com ing i n t o  my m in d . 1
11
i
!
!
1
I
: ■  ■ ■ ... 1
.‘. ' e u n r a l i s in g  in v o l v e s  d e l i n e r a n e  a c t i o n  t h a t  m ig h t be u s e d  t o  
c a n c e l  any i l l  e f f e c t s  o f  a t n o u g n t .  no p u t  i t  r i g h t ,  o r  make 
s u r e  no i l l  e f f e c t s  n a v e  o c c u r r e d , when t h e  t h o u g n t  i s  
e x p e r ie n c e d .
Some or t h e  w ays t h a t  p e o p le  n e u t r a l i s e  u n a c c e p t a b le  i n t r u s i o n s  
a re  l i s t e d  b e lo w .
N e u t r a l i s i n g  I
1
. j
n on e  i 
o f  j 
t h e  
t im e  1
0 i
1
some
o f
t h e
t im é
1
h a l f  j 
o f  i 
t h e  I 
t im e  i 
2 !
m o st  
o f  
t h e  
t im e  1 
3 1
---= = n
a l l  !
o f
t h e
tim er
4
I t h in k  a n o t h e r  th o u g h t  j 
i n s t e a d .  i
j I c a n c e l  t h e  th o u g n t  by j 
1 t h in k i n g  a th o u g n t  t h a t  ! 
' r e v e r s e s  o r  b a la n c e s  t h e  • 
u n o le a s a n t  t h o u c n t . i
1
: !
I a n a ly s e  t h e  th o u g n t  { j 
! r a t i o n a l l y .  - I ! i
I t e l l  m y s e l f  t h a t  t h e  | 
th o u g h t  i s  n o t  t r u e .  1
1 I c h e c k  in  o r d e r  t o  f i n d  o u t  
: w h e th e r  i t  i s  t r u e . 1
i I a r g u e  w i t h  t h e  t h o u c h t .
j  I t e l l  m y s e l f  t o  " s to p " .
I run  o v e r  t h in g  in  my mind  
u n t i l  I f e e l  r i g h t  a b o u t  i t . !
; I c n e c k  p n y s i c a l l y  t o  maxe 
j  s u r e  t h a t  n o t h in g  h a s  g o n e  
I w ron g . 1
! 1 
1
I c h e c k  t o  make s u r e  t h a t  
. n o t n in g  h a s  g o n e  w rong  
: m e n t a l ly .
: I t r y  t o  t h i n k  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p l a n a t i o n s  or  
: i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  f o r  t h e
i t h o u a h t .■|---------- :---------------
1 i 1 
:  1 1
j
!
D i s t r a c t i o n
■
<
n o n e
o f
t h e
t im e
0
som e
o f
t h e
t im e
1
h a l f
o f
th e
tim e
2
m o st 1 a l l  
o f  o f  
t h e  1 t h e  
t im e  i t im e  
3 1 4
^  — y  f o c u s  on w hat I am ! 1 
d o in a .  1 1
— — I  t o  r o c u s  on o t h e r  
n e a a t iv e  t h o u a h t s . 1
. - — , _o z o c u s  on a o o s i t i v e  i  I : 
• t h o u c n t .  '  , ! 1 1
.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  ' I I I
1 - t y  t o  r in d  s o m e th in c  t o  '  i 
do t n a t  w i l l  o c c u o v  mv m in d . ’ : | !
i  y  t o  f o c u s  on a n e u t r a l  ! 
t h o u c h t .  j
• i s t e a  c e io w
o u g n t s . 
u n a c c e p t a b le  m
—o G em in a te , 
*^si.cns a r e
I f o r c e  m y s e l f  t o  do  
s c m e tn in g  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  a 
- f  c o n c e n t r â t  io n
I f o r c e  m y s e l f  t o  
C w .o e n tr a te  e v e n  h a r d e r  on 
^taw _ m a i r e a a v  d o in o .
I i r y _ t o  f i l l  a l l  my t im e  so  
u ta t  _ d o n ' t  h a v e  an v  t im e  
th in k  t h e  th o u c n t ' .
f  t o n ' t  a l l o w  m y s e l f  t o  
t . . in k  a b o u t  o r  e n c o u n t e r  
t n in c s  t h a t  w i l l  rem in d  me 
or th e  t h o u g h t .
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‘ roiiovvmg statements rerer to experiences which many people have in tneir evervday life. For 
n statem ent. cnoose the number wnicn best aescribes how much eacn experience has troubled you 
the last month.
I Has not trouoled me at all. 1 = Troubled me a little. 1 = Definitely troubled me.
3 = Troubled me a great deal. 4 = Troubled me e.xiremeiv.
Rating. (U. 1. 2. 3. 4)
npieasant thoughts come into my mind against my will and I cannot get rid of them.
think contact with bodily secretions ( perspiration, saliva, blood, urine, etc. ) mav 
intaminate my clothes or somehow harm me.
ask people to repeat things to me several times, even though I understood them the first 
me.
wash and clean obsessively.
have to review mentally past events, conversations and actions to make sure that I didn't 
D something wrong.
have saved up so many things that they get in the way. 
check things more often than necessary.
avoid using public toilets because I am afraid of disease or contamination, 
repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers etc..
repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off. 
collect things I don't need.
have thoughts of having hurt someone without knowing it. 
have thoughts that I might want to harm myself or others, 
net upset if objects are not arranged properly.
teel obliged to follow a particular oroer in uressing. undressing and washing mvseif. 
t'eel compelled to count while I am doing things, 
im ar'raid of impulsively doing embarrassing or harmful things, 
need to pray to cancel bad thoughts or feelings.
^eep on checking forms or other things I have written.
net upset at the sight of knives, scissors and other sharp objects in case I lose control with 
em.
im excessively concerned about cleanliness.
ind it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or 
rtain people.
need things to be arranged in a particular order, 
net nehind in mv work because I repeat things over and over again.
ti = Has not irouoied me at aii. i = l roubied me a iittie. 2 = Detiniieiy troubled me. 
3 = Troubled me a great deal. 4 = Trouoled me extremelv.
1 feel I have to repeat certain numoers.
.Alter doing something carefully. I still have the impression I have not finished it. 
find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things, 
find it difficult to control my own thoughts, 
have to do things over and over again until it feels right, 
am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against my will.
Before going to sleep I have to do certain things in a certain way. 
go back to places to make sure that I have not harmed anyone.
frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them, 
avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need them later, 
get upset if others change the way I have arranged my things.
feel that I must repeat certain words or phrases in my mind in order to wipe out bad 
houghts. feelings or actions.
After I have done things. I have persistent doubts about whether I really did them, 
sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel contaminated, 
feel that there are good and bad numbers, 
repeatedly check anvthing which might cause a fire.
Even when I do something verv' carefully I feel that it is not quite right.
1 wasn mv nanas more often or longer than necessarv'.
J
W c D O Ob H
Total
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Date.
3 interested in your reaction to intrusive thoughts that you have had in the last 2 weeks 
ve thoughts are thoughts that suddenly enter your mind , may interrupt what vou are thinking or doing and ter 
ir on separate occasions. They may occur m the form of words, mental image, or an impulse (a sudden urge t 
)ut some action). We are interested in those intrusive thoughts that are unacceptable. Research has shown th; 
eople expenence or have expenenced such thoughts which thev find unacceptable in some wav at some time i  
ves to a greater or lesser degree., so there is nothing unusual about this.
examples of unpleasant intrusions are: 
ted ima^e o f attacking someone
ilv thinking that your hands are dirty and vou may cause contamination
ily thinking you might not have turned o ff the gas, or that you left a door unlocked
ted senseless images o f harm coming to someone you love '
ted urge to attack or harm somebocfy (even though you would never do this)
ire just a few examples of intrusions to give you some idea of what we are looking at; people varv tremendous! 
ype of thoughts that they have. ^
IMPORTANT
T h i n k  o f  I N T R U S I O N  O F  T H E  
T Y P E  D E S C R I B E D  A B O V E  t h a t  
y o u  h a v e  h a d  i n  t h e  l a s t  2  
w e e k s ^  a n d  a n s w e r  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s  w i t h  
t h a t  i n t r u s i o n  i n  m i n d .  
T h e  q u e s t i o n s  d o  N O T  
r e l a t e  t o  a l l  t h o u g h t s  b u t  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  y o u r  
n e g a t i v e  i n t r u s i o n s .
vrite down the intrusions that you have had in the last 2 weeks:
V are 6umc iceas inai may go riaougii vour rmno wnen you are oorncrea oy worrying ini.izsive tnougUts 
{mow are probably senseless or unrealistic. Think of times when you were bothered by intrusive thouei 
Ises and images in the last 2 weeks.
i r e a u e n c v
jate now orten each of the ideas listed below occurred when vou were bothered bv these intrusive thougj 
[ses or images: circle the digit that most accurately describes the frequency of the occurrence of the ideas us 
bllowmg scale:
[ the LAST TWO WEEKS:
Idea never occurred 
Idea rarely occurred
Idea occurred during about half of the times when I had worrying intrusive thoughts 
Idea usually occurred
Idea always occurred when I had worrying intrusive thoughts
on't resist these thoughts it means I am being irresponsible
lid be responsible for serious harm
ights can NOT make things happen
not take the risk of this thought coming true
on t act now then something terrible will happen and
it will be my fault 0
is just a thought so it doesn’t matter 0
d to be certain something awful won’t happen. 0
uldn’t be thinking this type of thing 0
dng of something happening doesn’t make me responsible
for whether it happens 0
)uld be irresponsible to ignore these thoughts 0
ïel awful unless I do something about this thought. 0
use I've thought of bad things happening then I must
act to prevent them 0
e's nothing wrong with letting such thoughts come and go naturally 0
; I’ve thought of this I must want it to happen 0
/body has horrible thoughts sometimes, so I don’t need to
worry about this one 0
I've thought of things which could go wrong I have a 
responsibility to make sure I don't let them happen
ig this thought doesn’t mean I have to do anything about it
dng this could make it happen
;t regain control of my thoughts
could be an omen
Tong to ignore these thoughts
use these thoughts come from my own mind.
I must want to have them
never rarely half the usually always 
occurred occurred time occurred occuncd 
0
0
0
0
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
n 3 4
r [he las t tw o weeits
1 you were bothered by these worrying intrusive thoughts, how much did you believe each of these thoughts 
■e? Rate the belief you had of these ideas when vou had the intrusions, using the following scale: mark the po 
3 line that most accurately applies to your belief at the time of the intrusionT
' I did not I was complete)
Dn’t resist these thoughts it means I am
believe this 
thought at all
convinced this 
thought was tru
being irresponsible 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Id be responsible for serious harm 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
ghts can NOT make things happen 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
not take the risk of this thought coming true 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Dn’t act now then something terrible 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
will happen and it will be my fault
s just a thought so it doesn’t matter 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
i to be certain something awful won’t happen P__ 10 .20...3.Q. 40 .5.0. 60 .7.0...80 .90. 100
lid not be thinking this kind of thing 0_-IP..20..3.0 40..5.Q.Æ 70 100
dng of something happening doesn't make me 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
nsible for whether it happens
uld be irresponsible to ignore these thoughts P...J.P..20..30 .40..50...6.P.,.7.0.Æ 90.J.QP
el awful unless I do something about this thought 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
jse I’ve thought of bad things happening then I 
must act to prevent them
:’s nothing wrong with letting thoughts like this 
come and go naturally
I’ve had this thought I must want it to happen
Q__1Q_2(L10_40_5^60JO^
Q__J_Q„_20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 90 100 
Q_lO_3O_m_4OJO.mj0_80L9OJOO
tody has horrible thoughts sometimes, so I don’t 
need to worry about this one
I’ve thought of bad things which could go wrong 
3 a responsibility to make sure I don’t let them hai
P 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
ig this thought doesn’t mean I have to 
ything about it
ing this could make it happen
t regain control of these thoughts
:ould be an omen
Tong to ignore these thoughts
ise these thoughts corne from my mind. I must 
want to have them
ppen 0 „ m .J 0  J0 .4p_50 .60. TO_.8.0 90 100
0.... 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Q_10_20.m.m.50_60_7(Lm9(LlQO 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
o_m_20^.m.50.mjo.so_9o.wo
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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BecK inventons-A
INSTRUCTIONS : Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please read each 
item m the list carefully. Indicate how orten you expenenced each symptom aunne the 
PAST WEEK. INCLUDING TODAY by circiing tne corresponaing numoer in the 
column next to each svmotom.
Almost ail
Ngygi Occasionally Frequently the time
I. .Numbness or tingling. 0 "1 3
2. Feeling hot. 0 2 3
3. Wobbliness in legs. 0 2 3
4. Unable to relax. 0 -> 3
5. Fear of the worst 0 ;
happening.
b. Dizzy or lightheaded. 0 n
7. Hean pounding or racing. 0
8. Unsteady. 0 2
9. Terrified. 0 2
10. Nervous. 0 2
11. Feelings of choking. 0 1
12. Hands trembling. 0 2
13. Shaky. 1)
14. Fear of losing control. 0 T
15. Difficulty breathing. 0 T
16. Fear of dying. 0
17. Scared. 0 -)
18. Indigestion or discomfon 0 n
in abdomen.
19. Faint. 0
20. Face flushed. 0
21. Sweating (not due to heat). () ■»
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Piease answer each question oy putting a circle around the TRUE" or the FALSE" 
following the question. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick questions. 
Work uuickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the question.
!- I avoid using public iciephones because ot possible contamination. TRUE F.ALSE
3. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of
diem. t r u e  FALSE
1 am more concerned than most people about honestv. TRUE FALSE
1 am often late because i can t seem to get through evervthing on
time. TRUE FALSE
1 don’t worrv unduiv about contamination if I touch an animal. TRUE FALSE
1 frequently have to check things te.g. gas or water taps, doors, etc.)
several times. TRUE F.^LSE
I have a verv strict conscience. TRUE FALSE
1 find that almost every dav 1 am upset by unpleasant thoughts that
come into my mind against my will. TRUE FALSE
I do not worry unduly if 1 accidentally bump into somebody. TRUE FALSE
ID. 1 usually have serious doubts about the simple everyday things 1 do. TRUE FALSE
1 1 . Neither of mv parents was verv strict during mv childhood. TRUE FALSE
I I tend to get behind in mv work because 1 repeat things over and
over again. TRUE FALSE
13. 1 only use an average amount of soap. TRUE FALSE
14. Some numbers are extremelv unluckv. TRUE FALSE
15. I do not check letters over and over again before mailing them. TRUE FALSE
10. 1 do not take a long time to dress m the morning. TRUE FALSE
I am not excessively concerned about cleanliness. TRUE FALSE
ly. One of my major problems is that 1 pay too much attention to 
detail. TRUE FALSE
19.
:ü.
:i.
:3 .
24.
25.
26.
28.
29.
30.
I can use well-kepi toileis without any hesitation.
My major problem is repeated checking.
am not imduiv concerned about eerms and diseases.
I do not tend to check things more than once.
TRUE F.ALSE 
TRUE F.ALSE 
TR U E  FALSE 
TR U E FALSE
I do not stick to a very strict routine when doing ordinary things. T R U E  FALSE
Mv hands do not feel dirtv after touching monev.
I do not usuallv coimt when doing a routine task.
TR U E FALSE
TR U E FALSE
I take rather a long time to complete my washing in the morning. TR U E F.ALSE
1 do not use a great deal of antiseptics. TR U E FALSE
I spend a lot of time every day checking things over and over again. TR U E FALSE
Hanging and folding my clothes at night does not take up a lot of
time. T R U E  FALSE
Even when 1 do something very carefully I often feel that it is not
quite right. TR U E FALSE
T.Ob Cg Wg Ss/Rn D g/C s
Apoenaix Obsessional Beliefs Que?;t i nnnai re
This questionnaire lists different beliefs or opinions which 
people sometimes hold. Read each statement carefully and decide 
how much you agree or disagree with the statement.
For each of the beliefs, show your answer by placing a tick (V) 
under the column that best describes what you think. Be sure to 
choose only one answer for each belief. Because people are 
different, there is no right or wrong answer to these statements.
To decide whether a given belief is typical of your way of 
looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like most of 
the time.
Key
1= total 1 y agree 
2= agree very much 
3= agree slightly 
4= neutral
5= disagree slightly 
6= disagree very much 
7= totally disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. It is important to be sure 
of things
2. I must have guarantees
3. I cannot stand anxiety or 
di scomfort
4. I cannot tolerate any 
uncertai nty
5. I must not make mistakes
6. I am responsible for causing 
harm.
7. I must have complete control 
over everything at all times.
8. It is necessary to stay in 
complete control of your 
thoughts.
9. Thinking is the same as 
doi n g .
10. It is awful to make wrong 
deci si o n s .
11. There is a right and wrong 
in every situation.
12. I am in continuous danger.
13. I am responsible for 
others.
14. I must be perfect.
15. It is important that people 
see that I do things correctly.
16. One should not take any 
ri sks.
17. To have bad thoughts is a 
sign of a bad person.
18. I must not be seen to make 
mi stakes.
19. I am responsible for 
preventing harm.
20. People close to me could be 
in danger if I do not do things 
properly.
A p p e n d ix  10
R-Scaie
This uuesiionnaire iisis different atiituaes or oeiiefs which peopie sometimes noid. Reaa 
each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
For each of the attitudes, show your answer by putting a circle round the words which 
BEST DESCRIBE HOW YOU THINK. Be stire to choose only one answer for each 
attitude. Because peopie are different, there is no right answer or wrong answer to these 
statements.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of looking at things, simply 
keep in mind what you are like MOST OF THE TIME.
I often feel responsible for things which go wrong.
TOTILLY AGEEE AGREE DISAGREE. DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HUGH SLIGHTLY NEDTRAL SLIGHTLY ’.’ERY HÜCH DISAGREE
-If I can have any influence on things going wrong, then I oust act to prevent it.
■TOTALLY AGREE .AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY HEÜTR.AL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE
If I don't act when I can roresee aanger, then I as to blame ror any consequences
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY !ÎEÜTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE
I an too sensitive to feeling responsible for things going wrong.
TOTALLY .AGREE .AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HÜCH SLIGHTLY îi'EDTRAL SLIGHTLY •VERY MUCH DISAGREE
My sins will find ne out.
TOTALLY .AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HÜCH SLIGHTLY MEÜTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE
If I Think bad thinas, this is as bad as doipq bad things.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
.AGREE VERY HUGH SLIGHTLY KEüTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE
I often cause ham.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE ’/ERY MUCH SLIGHTLY MEÜTRAL SLIGHTLY 'VERY MUCH DISAGREE
I worry a great deal about the effects of things which I do or don't do.
TOTALLY AGREE .AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HÜCH SLIGHTLY KEÜTR.AL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE
To ce, not acting to prevent disaster is as bad as making disaster happen.
TOTALLY .AGREE .AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE ’/nY KOCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE
For ne, carelessness is inexcusable when it night affect other people.
TOTALLY .AGREE .AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
.AGREE "ERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE
J.-.a-ctivitv can cause as nucn nara as aeiiberate naa intentions.
TOTALLY AGREE .^ GREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HÜCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCH DISAGREE
If I know that ham is possible. I should always try to prevent it, however unlikely it seeos.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
agree '."ERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY THY MUCH DISAGREE
Once I have caused ham, I can't forgive nyself.
TOTALLY AGREE .AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE
I must always think through the consequences of even the scaliest actions.
TOTALLY .AGREE .AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE '.TRY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY ATRY HUGH DISAGREE
I have oone nany things which sight have named others.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DDTALLY
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGH DISAGREE
Other people are generally too careless.
TOTALLY .AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE '.TRY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY ATRY KUCH DISAGREE
I often take responsibility for things which other people don't think are ny fault.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
.AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGH DISAGREE
Everything I do can cause serious probless.
TOTALLY .AGREE .AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
.AGREE VERY HUGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAl SLIGHTLY '.'ERY KUCH DISAGREE
It's no good ne trying to put things right once they have gone wrong.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
.AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY ATRY HUGH DISAGREE
I have to nake sure other people are protected from things I do.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY AOT KUCH DISAGREE
I an often close to causing ham.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
.AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGH DISAGREE
I mist protect others iron ham.
TOTALLY .AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
.AGREE '.'ERY KUCH SLIGHTLY !fEUTRAL SLIGHTLY OT KUCH DISAGREE
1 shouiü never cause even the siiohtest nam to otners.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VZRY HÜŒ SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGH DISAGREE
Other peopie should not trust ne in case I fail them.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE '.TRY HUGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY 'rm  HUGH DISAGREE
I will re condemned for ny actions.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HUGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY vTRY KUCH DISAGREE
Accidents are always preventable if I take sufficient care.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
agree '.TRY KOCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY '/ERY HUGH DISAGREE
Bad things can easily happen as a result of sy carelessness.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCH DISAGREE
If I can have even a slight influence on things going wrong, then I oust act to prevent it.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
agree '.TRY HUGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGH DISAGREE
I need to be careful because I nay often be close to causing harm.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY '/ERY HUGH DISAGREE
I worry a great deal about the bad effects of things which I do or don't do.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE '.TRY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY '/ERY HUGH DISAGREE
To ne, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is as bad as making that disaster nappen.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY '/ERY KUCH DISAGREE
For ne, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect other people.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HUGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCH DISAGREE
In all kinds of daily situations, oy inactivity can cause as much ham as deliberate bad intentions.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY '/ERY KUCH DISAGREE
Even if ham is a very unlikely possibility, I should always try to prevent it at any cost.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE 'TRY HUGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCH DISAGREE
:r.ce i ir.ink it is possioie tnat I have causea nara, i can't rcraive ayseii.
rOTALLi AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KÜCÏÏ SLIGHTLY NEDTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KDŒ DISAGREE
Many or ny past actions nave been intended to prevent bam to others.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HÜCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGH DISAGREE
It's no good me trying to put things right once they have gone wrong.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY HUGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCH DISAGREE
I have to make sure other peopie are protected froa all of the consequences of things I do.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE '.TRY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGH DISAGREE
I must constantly be aware of the neeo to protect others froa any possibility of harn.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCH DISAGREE
Other people should not rely on ay judgeaent.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE '.'ERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIŒTLY VERY KUCH DISAGREE
If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I feel that I am to blame.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY \'ERY KUCH DISAGREE
If I take sufficient care then I can prevent any harmful accidents.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE '.TRY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY '/ERY KUCH DISAGREE
I often think that bad things will happen if I aa not careful enougn.
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY
AGREE VERY KUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCH DISAGREE
Appendix 11
Title of Project A comparison of different measures of
obsessional beliefs, symptomatology, intrusive thoughts and 
anxiety given to groups of obsessional patients, patients with 
anxiety disorders and normals
Names of Principal Investigators : N. Morrison, Dr P. Salkovskis 
Psychi atri c Research Ethi cs Commi ttee Appl i cati on Number
Have you read the patient information sheet? Yes/No
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss this 
study? Yes/No
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?
Yes/No
Have you received enough information about the study? Yes/No 
Who has explained the study to you? ..........................
Do you understand that you are free to leave the study
* at any time
* without having to give a reason for leaving
* and without affecting your future medical care? Yes/No
Do you agree to take part in the study? Yes/No
Signature
Date
Name (in block letters)
I n f o r m a t io n  o n  o b s e s s i o n a l  th o u g h t  p r o ie n t
Some p e o p le  a r e  t r o u b le d  b y  u n w an ted  t h o u g h t s  w h ich  t h e y  o f t e n  
f e e l  c o m p e l le d  t o  r i d  t h e m s e lv e s  o f  b y  som e o t h e r  th o u g h t s  o r  
a c t i o n s .  T h e se  t h o u g h t s  t e n d  t o  r e v o lv e  rou n d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
b e in g  t h e  c a u s e  o f  harm t o  th e m s e lv e s  o r ,  m ore o f t e n ,  o t h e r s .  
O ver t h e  p a s t  fe w  y e a r s ,  t h e r e  h a v e  b e e n  s e v e r a l  a t t e m p ts  t o  
c o n s t r u c t  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  w h ic h  w o u ld  p r o v id e  m ore in f o r m a t io n  
a b o u t t h i s  and  m ig h t  h e lp  f o c u s  t r e a t m e n t  m ore a c c u r a t e l y .
T h is  i s  an a t t e m p t  t o  f i n d  o u t  w h ic h  o n e s  do t h i s  b e s t .  S in c e
we w ant t o  b e  s u r e  t h a t  we a r e  n o t  s im p ly  m e a su r in g  a n x i e t y ,  we
a r e  a s k in g  som e p e o p le  w i t h  a n x i e t y  p r o b le m s  t o  do t h i s  t o o .
U n f o r t u n a t e ly ,  t o  do t h i s  c o m p a r iso n  d o e s  mean a  c e r t a i n  am ount
o f  r e p e t i t i o n  and  y o u  may f i n d  y o u r s e l f  t h in k in g  t h a t  y o u  had
a n sw ered  t h a t  q u e s t i o n  a  few  p a g e s  a g o . The w h o le  s e t  o f
q u e s t io n s  w i l l  t a k e  a b o u t  45 m in u te s  t o  c o m p le t e .  We w ou ld  p r e f e r
I f  you  c o u ld  do i t  a l l  a t  t h e  sam e t im e  r a t h e r  th a n  in  b i t s  and  
p i e c e s .
I f  y o u  f e e l  y o u  c o u ld  h e lp ,  we w o u ld  b e  g r a t e f u l .  H ow ever, i f
you  d e c id e  y o u  w o u ld  p r e f e r  n o t  t o ,  t h a t  w i l l  b e a l l  r i g h t  t o o
and w i l l  h a v e  no  e f f e c t  on  y o u r  t r e a t m e n t .  I f  you  do d e c id e  t o  
h e lp ,  th a n k  y o u  f o r  y o u r  t i m e .
Kl,
Norma M o r r iso n
P r in c ip a l  C l i n i c a l  P s y c h o l o g i s t
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